Szociológiai Szemle by unknown
- iREVIEW OF 
SOCIOLOGY























Róbert Tardos (Editor in chief)
Éva Fleleszta 
(Editorial secretary)
Style editor: Éva Fodor 
Experts:
József Böröcz, Adrienne Csizmady, 
László Füstös, Béla Janky, Tibor Kuczi, 
József Mészáros. Ferenc Moksonv,
Péter Róbert, Ákos Róna-Tas,
Tamás Rozgonyi, Tamás Rudas,
Endre Sik, Ágnes Simonyi, Péter Somlai. 
Júlia Szalai, Viktória Szirmai,
István János Tóth
Editorial Office:
Box: H-1250 Budapest, Pf. 20.









In 2000 the publication of the journal has been supported 
by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 
the Ministry of National Cultural Heritage, the National Cultural Foundation 
and the National Science and Research Foundation
STUDIES
B alog  Iván
ISTVÁN BIBÓ AND MAX WEBER'
In an interview given to Tibor Huszár in 1976, István Bibó1 2 made the following 
somewhat unexpected statement: „Max Weber has had and still has an enormous 
influence over me” (Litván-S. Varga 1995: 216). This assertion may call our 
attention to a yet unrevealed potential source o f  inspiration for Bibó. This paper 
attempts to answer the following question: can we take Bibo's declaration seriously 
or not? The answer can corroborate or falsify a longstanding opinion o f  Bibo's 
admirers and also his opponents that he was primarily a politician and publicist 
rather than a social scientist. On the one hand, our task is made the more difficult by 
the fact that Bibo's writings contain just a handful o f  direct quotations from Weber, 
crucial though they might be. On the other hand, there is a relative abundance of 
illuminating argumentations reflecting, sometimes polemically or through the 
medium o f other authors, the indirect influence o f  the great German sociologist and 
also concerning the key issues in Bibo's life-work. As we shall see, Bibó had a high 
opinion o f Weber not least because he held Barna Horváth and István Hajnal in great 
esteem, too. For my present purposes I shall deal with Weber only inasmuch as it 
helps to reach a better understanding of Bibó.
Lacking sufficient evidence on Bibo's sources, my method of investigation will 
primarily be comparison. In the following passages I shall discuss three main areas 
of intellectual sympathy for Weber: the Protestant ethic, legitimacy and rationality.
1 I am thankful to Csaba Jónás for supervising the translation of the modified version of my
 ^ article: Balog Iván: Bibó István és Max Weber. Szociológiai Szemle, 2000/2. 38-50. 
'ISTVÁN BIBÓ (1911-1979). political scientist:...doctor's degree University of Law. 
Szeged. 1934; postgrad. University of Vienna, 1933-34. Institute of International Studies. 
Geneva. 1934-35; scholar International Law Academy. The Hague, 1936... Called to bar. 
1940; official Hungarian Ministry of Justice. 1938-45; chief of department Ministry 
Interior. 1945-46; lecturer Szeged University. 1940; professor Political Science. 1946-50; 
deputy President Eastern European Research Institute. Budapest. 1947-49; librarian 
Budapest University. 1951-57; minister state, 1956: imprisoned. 1957-63: librarian Central 
Statistical Office. 1963-71. Member Hungarian Academy of Science. 1946-49. Author: A 
szankciók kérdése a nemzetközi jogban 11 he Issue of Sanctions in International Law], 1934: 
Kényszer, jog. szabadság [Force. Law, Freedom]. 1935: A magyar demokrácia válsága [The 
Crisis of Hungarian Democracy], 1945: A keleteurópai kisnépek nyomorúsága [The Misery 
of Small Peoples in Eastern Europe], 1946; Zsidókérdés Magyarországon. 1948 [The Jewish 
Question in Hungary); The Case of Hungary and the World Situation. 1957: The Paralysis 
of International Institutions and the Remedies, 1976. (Who's Who in the World 1978-79). 
Bibo's other publications: see References below.
I.
M ax Weber's Protestant Ethic (1930) played an important role in Bibo's career in 
two ways. First, it inspired his debut publication (1928). Second, it was the source o f 
the young Bibo's principal ideas in his writings on cultural crisis in modernity.
In the aforementioned interview the author recalls the introductory publication as 
follows: „...A s a youngster in eighth grade, I had to deliver a speech in 
commemoration of the Reformation and I held this speech on the basis o f  Max 
W eber's essay that my father gave me. This was my first encounter with Max 
W eb er...” (Litván-S. Varga 1995: 216). It is worth taking a closer look at the 17- 
year-old grammar school student's speech because in several aspects it already 
anticipates the older Bibó.
Bibó suggests that the greatest and most revolutionary thoughts of Reformation 
are „a return to the basics o f the Holly Writs; the rejection o f clinging to unalterable 
dogm as in favour o f a free quest o f truth; the evaluation of estates and masses 
replaced by the evaluation o f  the individual; a rejection of ceremonial formalities 
prom oting salvation in favour o f the search for divine grace; contemplative 
religiosity replaced by active faith” (1928: 2). Relief from magic is a recurrent 
motive in the article: „As Luther searched for the Christian truth solely in the Holy 
Scripture, so did they search for the natural sciences in nature itself and likewise for 
philosophy in the human mind itself...” (1928: 2). It is noteworthy that the principle 
„things should be explained by their own causes” (1986c: 123) dominates Bibo's 
thinking throughout his career, in particular his theory on the nature o f political 
hysterias (1986a: 373-380).
The following argumentation taken from the same speech is also o f decisive 
importance in the author’s oeuvre, primarily in his essay on the Jewish question, in 
the paragraph concerning dehumanised relations: „Reformation also renewed the 
evaluation of man. Mediaeval man was collective. As far as both religion and 
society are concerned, it was not his individuality but the estate he belonged to that 
played a key role. His value was determined by his being a churchman or a layman, 
a knight or a burgher, a seigneur or a vassal” (1928: 2).
The deepest impression that the Protestant Ethic made on Bibó was due to the 
idea o f  calling; although this is not yet evident in his 1928 speech, it comes to the 
fore only later. Earlier Bibó had appreciated Reformation as a current qualified to 
respond the challenges o f the 20lh century but 15 years later he already realized that 
it was in fact instrumental in bringing about the crisis o f values. In his essay entitled 
„M oney” he points out that while in modern times Mediaeval elites were dismissed, 
they were not replaced by competent new elites:
„ ...T h e  clerical estate ceased to be the only intellectual leader of people who 
began to lose faith in the inherited privileges o f the kingdom and the nobility... For 
a while, in some parts o f the European civilisation, the Mediaeval social value 
system based on faith and inheritance was successfully replaced by the values of 
capitalist bourgeoisie who also attempted to solve the problem of the distribution of 
money. This solution stemmed from the originally simple and deeply religious value 
system o f urban burghers and, as Max Weber pointed out, it was from Protestantism
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that it borrowed its special moral character that participated in the ethical foundation 
o f capitalism.
According to the bourgeois value system, wealth is the reward of labour and, on 
the grounds of the New Testament parable on talents, it is the owner's duty to 
manage the property entrusted to him. In other words, capital, as the accumulation of 
talents, came to be ethically evaluated, and the most conspicuous phenomenon of 
money economy, i.e. interest, which was incompatible with the moral value system 
o f the Middle Ages, was looked upon as the fruit and reward o f the faithful and 
industrious steward...The whole bourgeois value system, however, was only 
instructive for the petty bourgeois and middle class lifestyle and only in a lucky 
socio-eeonomic situation in which the excessive affluence o f society did not result in 
antagonistic conflicts because everyone willing to work, even the poorest, had the 
chance to accumulate capital. Later, however, a contradiction developed between the 
excessive wealth of capitalists and'the poverty o f the masses and in this situation 
wealth no more improved but impaired its moral balance. To reestablish this balance 
capitalism ought to have produced a group o f  people who, in possession of 
significant financial opportunities, conformed to a similar value system and 
regulated lifestyle that characterised the feudal landlords. However, that would have 
taken a longer time than was available and the simple moral categories o f the 
bourgeoisie were not adequate for such a purpose either. That is why the value- 
destroying impact o f the one-dimensionality o f  money was so unscrupulously 
effective in connection with capitalist big wealth” (1986a: 215-216).
This part in the text is important because it illustrates Bibo's theoretical grounds 
as an anti-capitalist and a philosopher o f crisis which in turn also dominate his 
review on Karl Mannheim's book, Diagnosis o f  Our Time. In his criticism, opposing 
Mannheim's interpretation o f  Weber, Bibó points out that the replacement of 
Gesinnungsethik dominant in liberal capitalism by Verantwortungsethik, that is, 
„awareness is not primarily required by the development of mass society but by 
crisis that accompanies it. It was, however, not caused but aggravated by the 
development o f mass society because it emerged in an era when social evaluation 
began to face a crisis...” (1986a: 269). In 1971 Bibó still clings to this line of 
argument which is Weberian in its origin but runs in a different direction in The 
Meaning o f  European Social Development (1986c: 65-66), although some accents 
are modified. After the turning-point of World War II and having read the main 
work o f  his master, Guglielmo Ferrero (1942), he, as a „criseologist” began to 
underline the political character o f the crisis and, from an anthropological point of 
view, started to attribute it to fear.
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II.
It is quite clear that the outlook o f  Bibo's view on legitimacy owes a lot to Ferrero. It 
has, however, due to the influence o f Barna Horváth,3 some Weberian traits as well. 
Nevertheless, the relationship is not obvious: Weber's theory of legitimacy did not 
influence Bibó directly. In Bibo's opinion, legitimacy is synoptical and it is Barna 
Horváth who has the copyright o f the synoptical method, which is built on semi- 
W eberian bases, his is what w e’ll discuss first.
The young István Bibó, a member of the so-called Szeged school o f Hungarian 
legal philosophy and Barna Horváth's disciple, was an adherent of the synoptical 
m ethod, although his understanding of synopsis is slightly different (Bibó 1986a: 5 -  
149; 1937: 623-638). What is the relationship o f  the Master, Barna Horváth to 
W eber's sociology? In one o f  his principal works he mentions Weberianism as the 
m ost congenial with the synoptical method: „Experts will not fail to notice the 
sim ilarity between the synoptical method and idealtypical construction. Namely, the 
essence o f both lies in that the function of the Is aiming at the Ought is likely to 
becom e fixed in the sense that the result of the Ought becomes causally adequate. 
However, this likelihood has to be tested in every historical moment because the 
existential effect may become norm-adequate as well” (Horváth 1934: 96).
There is a deeper homology between Horváth and W eber that in part affects Bibó 
as well and is also a basic idea o f synopsis: the consequent avoidance o f wishful 
thinking, i.e. the identification o f  facts with norms (W eber 1949; Horváth 1939). 
This is a main perspective in Bibo's oeuvre although he is less sensitive to the 
feeling and to the theoretical insight suggesting that Sein  and Sollen are separated 
from  each other. Consequently, he, as a political thinker, gives more priority to their 
linkage. Accordingly, in contrast with Weber, he considered sociology a science that 
is not value-free but one that is partly factual and partly evaluative, although, and 
this is his point, never both at the same time (AM HAS MS 5 1 16/12: 6).4
Let us return to the above mentioned quotation. It continues as follows: „This 
methodological similarity suggests that among historical and sociological laws 
exam ined primarily by Dobretsberger it is the meaning-logical type that is the most 
significant for synoptical legal sociology” (Horváth 1934: 96; Dobretsberger 1931: 
21 1—221). In fact, it is precisely Weberian Verstehen that Dobretsberger refers to 
and Horváth cites from him the following sentence: „W e can only have a hypothesis 
about an action if we know the aims” (Horváth 1934: 96; Dobretsberger 1931: 218). 
However, Horváth also criticises Weber: „...ideal-typical construction allows 
prediction only from the meaning of the Ought. This does not, however, satisfy the
3 BARNA HORVÁTH (1896—1973) Dr. luris (Budapest 1920), Bar examination (Budapest 
1923), Venia Legendi (Diploma Habilitationis) Philosophy of Law (Szeged 1925), Ethics 
(Budapest 1926), Professor of Philosophy of Law (Szeged 1929), Kolozsvár (1940): 
Member, Hungarian Academy of Science (1945). Visiting Professor, The New School for 
Social Research, Graduate Faculty (New York 1950) [Horváth 1968:35]. His prior 
publications include inter alia: Rechtssoziologie: Probleme der Gesellschaftslehre und der 
Geschichtslehre des Rechts (1934); Der Rechtsstreit des Genius: Socrates, Johanna (1942); 
English Theory of Law (in Hungarian, 1943); The Examination of Public Opinion 
(1942)... [Horváth 1952:243].
4 AM HAS. Archive of Manusripts, Hungarian Academy o f Science
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synoptical method because even the anti-rational change of subjective meaning may 
be subject to laws” (Horváth 1934: 96). It can be seen that Horváth's aim was on the 
one hand to integrate Weber as a major component into his most significant and 
theoretical innovation and on the other hand to transcend Weber. He considered 
Weber’s efforts only a partial success because Verstehen. applying the idealtype of 
Zweckrational action, suggests that the cause o f  social action is that the actor 
considers something valid.
According to Horváth, however, the approach focusing on the causal reason why 
N. N. considers something valid is also a half-truth: „In our understanding, legal 
sociology conceptualises the functionality between the Is and the Ought reciprocally 
and not unilaterally in favour o f  the former but as a mutual one... It expects a lot 
from the sociology o f knowledge because it also considers knowledge as something 
attached to existence. However, sociological existence itself can only be galvanised 
into life through meaningful relations. Inasmuch as the perceptible Ought is a 
function o f  the Is, the Is is also a function o f the validity of the Ought” (Horváth 
1934: 95). Accordingly, synopsis is nothing but two, reciprocally inverse paradigms: 
that is, Mannheimianism and Weberianism, and not their synthesis but the 
continuous correction and alternation of the two.
How does Bibó develop his master's semi-Weberianism: the synopsis? In one of 
his best works in legal philosophy from the pre-war period (1937) he, still as a 
scientist and not yet a publicist, deals with the most important theoretical problems 
o f his later career and, simultaneously, o f any „transitology” (Radnóti 1991): pre­
legitimacy and the creation o f legitimacy: „Owing to the continuous oscillation 
between norm and fact, legal force and nullity are always reconsidered. As neither 
the conformity nor the difference between norm and act mean any essential relation, 
they are always reconsiderable and reviewable. The reconsideration of »absolutely« 
irrevocable nullity and legal force situations settled »for ever«, ocuses our attention 
on the whole treasury o f extreme legal situations: revolution on the one hand and its 
counterpart, the renaissance o f  legitimacy on the other. Thus, it is only a 
psychological state o f affairs depending on experience that during such consecutive 
processes, be it at the second or the tenth occasion, there appears the feeling of 
infallibility (irrevocability). Fictitiousness does not mean that we should search for 
the origin o f infallibility in logics; quite the contrary, it stems from irrational sources 
(and as such, in legal sociological terms it is more powerful than the whole 
construction o f juridical logic!). It is fictitious only from the viewpoint o f  legal 
dogmatics and legal logics because, due to the strong tension between legal norm 
and act, it can be explained as fiction” (Bibó 1937:633-634).
In part, this text corroborates the observation o f a Bibó-scholar: „In describing 
and interpreting social phenomena, Bibó always attempts to rely on the basic 
experience and spontaneous reactions o f the members of society. Undoubtedly, this 
motive indicates a resemblance in Bibo's methodology to that of the Weberian 
Verstehen". However, this observation should be taken with some caution because 
Bibo's starting-point is not action but experience as his legal philosophical 
dissertation entitled „Force, Law, Freedom” (1986a: 5-149) shows, and this is not 
characteristic o f Weber. Another key aspect o f the above cited passage however 
points to an evident kinship between Bibó's and Weber’s views, namely, that
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legitimacy resembles faith, public belief, and consensus in its character (Weber 
1968). There are several instances that testify to this kinship in Bibo's writings 
(Litván-S. Varga 1995: 181 — 183; Bibó 1986c: 65), and the one I have chosen is 
embedded in an explicitly Weberian context: „As Max Weber pointed it o u t...” 
(Bibó 1990: 301). It can be found in the introductory part of Bibo's great treatise on 
international law: „In two great cultures, the Graeco-Roman and the Chinese, both 
rulers and ruled defined the nature of power. In both societies, those in power felt 
compelled to find a justification for their rule, in addition to merely exercising and 
administering that power, and consequently, the masses who endured, supported or 
suspected the power elite were able to question it. Through this the idea o f justifying 
pow er and of needing legitimacy for power became a decisive factor in these two 
cultures and a force which deeply affected other societies. Sometimes the ideas were 
used to justify the existing power, at other times to provoke mass risings and 
transform society through revolution” (Bibó 1976: 9—10, cf. Weber 1951). Bibo's 
definition of legitimacy also reflects Weber's influence: „The ultimate basis for a 
claim to legitimate power is a common conviction that those exercising power are in 
fact competent to do so. It then follows that the people accept that human attitudes, 
conditions and commands that are the products o f  power are, in fact, mandatory and 
reasonable: and also that the system of power distribution is right and practical. This 
common conviction is usually expressed in a few general and basic principles” 
(Bibó 1976: 10).
III.
Besides direct influence, W eber made an impact on Bibó not only through Horváth 
but Hajnal5 as well. Below, we shall demonstrate this intellectual relationship first in 
Bibo's essay on the Jewish question and later in his university lectures. In both cases, 
the central issue is rationality.
Among Bibo's writings, it is the second part o f  the Jewish Question that is the 
m ost sociologically conceived. In the chapter entitled Jews and Anti-Semites, which 
does not focus specifically on Hungary, Bibó analyses Jews' and non-Jews' 
interactions in a way very similar to Weberian Verstehen, that is, he examines the 
subjective meaning they ascribe to in-group and out-group actions (Weber 1968). 
These interactions (Bibó calls them experiences collected about each other) are 
investigated in three areas: (1) utilisation o f  social opportunities; (2) relation to 
social value systems; (3) traumas and compensations. In the case of social 
opportunities in mediaeval tim es the ultimate difference between Jews and non-Jews 
lay in the fact that the form er were rational in their attitude, while non-Jews were
5 ISTVÁN HAJNAL (1892-1956): Doctorate Degree in History (Budapest 1914), Diploma 
Habilitationis in History (Budapest 1921), Professor of Modern Universal History (Budapest 
1930-1950), Member, Hungarian Academy of Science (1928-1950). Author: Le role sociale 
de l'ecriture et 1'evolution Europeenne (1934), Az újkor története [History of the Modern 
Age] (1936), Történelem és szociológia [History and Sociology] (1939), Vergleichende 
Schriftproben zűr Entwicklung und Verbreitung der Schrift im 12-13. Jahrhundert (1943), 
fiber die Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Geschichtsschreibung kleinen Nationen (1944), 
Universities and the Development of Writing in the 12th—13‘" centuries (1954), A propos de 
l'enseignement de l'ecriture aux universités médiévales (1957). See Lakatos 1996.
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traditional. Recast in a quasi-Weberian terminology one could say that when it came 
to seizing an opportunity the typical Jewish action was Zweckrational and non-Jews 
acted traditionally (Weber 1968). One is reminded o f the same parallel as Bibó 
consciously turns to the means o f idealtypical concept-building: „Thus, there 
developed among Jews an attitude pattern (eventually quite typical) which 
recognised every new, unexplored, or unnoticed economic or human opening, 
reacted with a state of constant readiness, quick rational adaptability, the «taking 
advantage« o f new or newly recognized chances, and a conscious high regard for all 
forms o f  rational ones, those involving money or the management of money. This 
attitude pattern became a conditioned reflex, almost a socio-moral duty. This, of 
course, is not a Jewish invention, but one o f the available and widespread methods 
of approaching human opportunities; it contrasts with the other method, that of 
handling opportunities in the traditional and usual manner, governed by the precept 
that people base their existence on certain habitual resources, methods, and forms 
and, even if they know o f alternative possibilities, they are reluctant to exploit them. 
Actual practices are always located somewhere between these two approaches, 
because both totally unthinking traditionalism and wholly untested rationalism are 
unrealistic. The various behaviour patterns differ in how much they approach, or 
how they combine the two extreme methods” (Bibó 1991: 215-216).
The explanation given as to why this rational mentality became a typically Jewish 
characteristic hints again at a Weberian influence, although this time Bibo's 
interpretation of Weber is not the most accurate: „This meant that they were limited 
to the margins of economic, existential, and human opportunities; the only way for 
them to survive and become established was to choose_endeavours that were yielded 
to them or were spurned or unnoticed by society” (Bibó 1991: 215). It can be seen 
that Bibo's argumentation is based on the pariah status o f the Jews (cf. W eber 1952), 
in other words: the moral contempt surrounding them and their consequent 
exclusion from society from the Middle Ages onwards.
Up to this point Bibó followed Weber. However, his field of interest is not the 
spirit o f capitalism but antisemitism and this explains his wise scepticism towards 
the dominance of rational spirit: „By contrast, one trait of capitalism and the 
fledgling money-based economy o f the modern period was specifically that it 
gradually made the rational handling of opportunities one of the basic principles of 
social and economic life. In the sphere of classical capitalism this took place entirely 
without the participation o f  the Jews, demonstrating that developments had nothing 
to do with Jewish traits but were prompted by social conditions that could have 
occurred under different circumstances as well. We must not forget, however, that 
even though we view capitalism as the fundamental principle of modern social 
organisation its power to transform the entire social organisation was fully 
developed only in America. When it comes to European work and lifestyle, many of 
the broad social layers-especially civil servants, craftsmen, some of the merchants, 
and small landholders-have merely acknowledged the new conditions, and adapted 
themselves to capitalism only to the extent that they used its means o f distribution 
and mass-produced commodities. In all other respects, they continue to cultivate 
those forms o f human existence that have been in force before the advent of 
capitalism” (Bibó 1991:216).
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This is no more Weber; this is Hajnal. It is he, Weber's strongly polemical 
adherent (Hajnal 1936; 1993), through whom Bibó, the equilibrist, corrects the 
Founding Father o f German sociology. Other issues also show Bibó to take an 
intermediary position between Hajnal and Weber. In his interview given to Tibor 
H uszár0 he praises Hajnal for being able to recognise traits of intellectualism in 
technical activity and even in skilled physical labour. Moreover, Bibó seems to 
agree with Hajnal’s criticism on Weber's Protestant Ethic, which was glorified by 
him in the thirties. Nevertheless, Bibó rejects Hajnal's senseless anti-rationalism, 
w hich motivated Hajnal in criticising Weber:
„B.:— Hajnal's inspiration was very important because he wrote as if it was a 
programme that people shaping nature are doing an intellectually more valuable 
w ork than those administering things...That is, a craftsman who is almost an artist is 
m ore valuable than an office clerk ...[...] Hajnal's terminology is extremely difficult 
to understand, complicated almost beyond belief and he also used many basic 
notions in unusual ways. For example, he considered rationalism evil. [...] In his 
opinion, the substance o f rationalism was that represented by the army: rationally 
consistent, reasonable utilisation of opportunities for perhaps irrational, wicked 
purposes. [...]
H.:— Is it correct to say that Hajnal is a key figure in the reception of Max Weber 
in Plungary?
B.:— One can construct any kind of Geistesgeschichte from Weber... Well, it is 
very easy to make such a turn from what he has pointed out from the impact o f 
Protestantism” (1989: 236-237).
Bibo's casual remark on the rationality o f the army leads us to another imaginary 
debate within the Bibó-W eber-Hajnal triangle. In this case, Bibo's stance 
demonstrates well what a great social scientist we lost in exchange for a moral 
genius. To realise this, we have to examine Bibo's lectures on sociology and political 
science. The latter, reflecting almost wholly Hajnal's sociologically inspired vision 
about history, also belongs rather to the realm o f  sociology; moreover, they are 
arguably among the best among the author's oeuvre (and they are still unpublished!).
In his sociological lectures, Bibó analyses the so-called simple command, which 
he classifies among social rules: „...The possibility o f  giving occasional commands 
is a very significant developmental step... In the most primitive communities...the 
father and the chief who may punish, severely punish or even kill members o f  the 
fam ily and of the tribe may seem to be an absolute commander only for us because 
in fact there are very strict traditional rules that determine when, how and whom he 
may punish. In more sophisticated societies, however, certain commanding 
competences emerge: a certain social division o f labour or distribution o f powers 
gives some people the authority to give orders to others as they wish. It is through 
these discretional commands that social rules began to change from traditionality to 
rationality. For a long, long time it comes to no one's mind that any powerful person 
or organ may change traditions inherited from the ancestors by a certain decision 
from one day to another. Giving orders is the only area in which the commander can
" Tibor Huszár (1930—): Hungarian sociologist, former director of the Sociology Department 
at Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest.
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change the commands emitted by him in the same natural way he issued them. It is 
only from the emergence o f the absolute kingdom onwards that rules, in particular 
legal rules began to be interpreted as the rulers' personal commands and it is only 
from this time onwards that the discretional modification o f social rules, primarily 
legal rules, becomes usual. This opportunity was taken over from the absolute 
kingdom by the democratised power organs o f society and that is how the public 
belief and public practice emerged that society [is mostly governed] not by rule 
originating and developed from ancient times but by rules made by competent 
orgatis, rational, reasonable rules that can be made and revoked the same way” (AM 
HAS MS 5 1 16/12: II. 36-38).
Thus, rationality shows its positive side here: the Enlzauberung of politics in the 
Weberian sense of the word. For Bibó, differently from Weber, it is clear that the 
only system qualified for this purpose is democracy, and this is based on the mature 
considerations o f a theoretician, and not of a political writer, educator or therapist: 
„Democracy is a form o f government in which the creation o f state power and 
authority is not something beyond our reason and view but something clear and 
reasonable. In democracy people know that power is created through cooperation 
and consent” (AM HAS MS 51 16/20: 9-10). Besides, Bibó drew the lesson from the 
other diametrical bias of Hajnal that rationality has a Jekyll and Hyde character. Ifit 
is only the Zweckrationalilcil of those in power that becomes manifest, the effect on 
society can only be irrationality.
One source o f rationality resulting in irrationality can be the relation between 
society and the state: „This relation has two marginal cases: one in which society 
simply depends on the state is characterised by simple conquering power (blind 
discipline, despotism etc.). This kind of organisation is rational in a bad sense; here, 
this word means that the higher will needs not cope with any irrational resistance but 
it can command things” (AM HAS MS 5 1 16/19: 24). „ ...A t the same time when the 
conquering, imperative, rational state is omnipotent, it is unbearably hollow inside. 
The contribution o f  the individual in the functioning o f  the state is limited to the 
fulfilment of commands... If such a state goes through a crisis, it is overthrown 
quite easily...” (AM HAS MS 5116/19: 27). It is instructive to observe how Bibó 
views the achievements o f the European economy and bureaucracy from a position 
between Weber and Hajnal- one o f whom attributes these achievements to 
calculative rationality and the other to the „irrational" professionalism o f guilds: 
„The European organisation of the state... vigorously intervenes into the web of 
society and is able to exert its effects but the whole system is based on the refined 
detail work of the small units o f society. The European state can make accurate 
accounts and reports not because it kept society under a strict discipline but because 
it was built on small units that had already constructed the methods o f correctness, 
managerialism and professionalism for their own use. The state organisation was 
constructed to use the union, guild and other bureaucracies” (AM HAS MS 
5116/19: 26).
The connection between the withdrawal of Enlzauberung and the unlimited 
power of ZweckrationaliUit is based on a lack of the distribution of power as well: 
„Although Hitler came to power in a republic, it would be false to claim that he 
exerted his power in a rational state because the magical respect for the Führer was
very important... Rough articulation was a very conspicuous feature o f the Hitlerian 
state organisation... The difference here can be formulated as the contrast between 
m erely Zweckrational states and states somehow deeply articulated by long- 
established customs. The Hitlerian state was a brutally Zweckrational state limited 
by no consideration (piety, humanity etc.). To find a similarly inarticulate state 
organisation one would have to go back to the Turkish and Tartarian states that were 
controlled by a rigid and ad hoc Zweckrationalitát and each function is fitted to the 
a d  hoc  needs of an actual conquest, o f the Party, o f those in power e tc ...” (AM HAS 
MS 51 16/20: 10-11).
IV.
To what extent is the comparison with Weber suitable to test Bibo's merit as a 
scientist? While compared to Ferrero, another great expert o f legitimacy, Bibo's 
admiration for his late master from Geneva reminds us o f Petőfi's idolatry toward 
Béranger (that is. when the original and talented Hungarian author adores his 
m ediocre but better-known Western colleague), the case o f Weber is the reverse. 
Here, the Hungarian Bibó „fans” may have the feeling o f the underdeveloped: ,,we 
are late for everything” . Unfortunately, history and Bibo's aspirations oriented him 
aw ay from the course his abilities seemed to prescribe.
In one respect, the two authors are both late: they are the children o f the 20th 
century, of course, not chronologically (1900-2000) but historically (1914-1989). 
Both Weber's (Somlai 1999) and Bibo's work was conceived in the framework of 
modernisation and rationalisation but post-modernity revised both narratives and 
exceeded both agendas. This can be a challenging state o f affairs for the guardians 
o f  Bibo's heritage because it demonstrates an increasing outdatedness that is the 
logical result of a natural process and not o f an unwillingness to face our past.
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Roland Habich-Zsolt Spider
CONTINUOUS CHANGES -  DIFFERENT VARIATIONS
Income distribution and income dynamics in three societies*
The study of income distribution and income dynamics can hardly be seen as the 
stepchild o f sociological, economic and „transitological” research. The use o f the 
Gini coefficient, decile ratios, or poverty head counts became obligatory scientific 
exercise in works studying the character of transformation from state socialism to 
m arket economies. Undoubtedly, many of these analyses use other, more subtle, 
indices as well, giving a more detailed account o f  the story o f the past few years 
(M edgyesi et al. 1998). Although there is an ongoing debate about which East 
European country experienced the highest increase in income inequality, but the fact 
that there is such an increase is beyond question. (W orld Bank 1996; Andorka et al. 
1997). In the first part o f our study we carry out the above-mentioned „obligatory” 
exercises. The novelty o f our analysis, thus, lies not in the manner we treat the 
question, but in the selection o f  countries (Hungary, the Western and the Eastern 
halves o f  Germany),1 and in the attempt to (also) use (graphic) approaches as yet not 
applied in this field. We hope that the comparisons and new approaches will 
contribute to a more subtle understanding of the meanings o f  income inequalities.
The topic we discuss next — how income dynamics changed between earlier and 
later dates of the transition — is much less commonly made the focus of 
investigations. Although the presentation of the development o f real income is 
unavoidable, and it is also true that in countries -  as in Hungary -  where 
longitudinal panel surveys have been carried out the dynamics shown by the results 
o f  the transition matrix calculations, just as the frequency of changes o f  income 
positions, caused unanimous astonishment (Kolosi et al. 1996; Spéder 1996), yet we 
cannot say that we have an accurate idea o f the temporal changes in income 
distribution. In the second part o f  our study we would like to describe and interpret 
this aspect o f income dynamics with the help of as yet infrequently used methods.
That this introduction is in some ways technical in character may suggest that our 
article is methodologically motivated. We do not deny that one aspect of our 
investigation was to make as much use as we could o f the possibilities granted by 
our longitudinal panel data. This decision derives from our ambition to join the 
endeavours that aim to restructure and revise the system o f social indicators (N oll- 
Z ap f 1994; Zapf 1989). Nonetheless, throughout our investigation we were careful 
not to lose sight of the initial question of our research, which is as follows: What do
' Phis paper was prepared for the workshop „Social Change in an Enlarging Europe: Welfare 
Development, Structural Changes and Theoretical Approaches" held at Collegium Budapest 
Institute for Advanced Study, 15-16 May, 1998. Some of the papers presented at the 
workshop will be published in the discussion paper series of the WZB. This article is a new 
version of the WZB Working Papers FS III 99-402, „Income Dynamics in Three Societies"
1 We regard the two parts of Germany as two different societies, thus henceforth we will be 
speaking of East and West Germany.
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the changes o f  income inequalities and the curve o f  income dynamics tell us about 
the first decade o f  the transition? In other words, we want to grasp the 
characteristics o f  transformation through the interrelations o f  structural shifts and  
the dynamics o f  a chosen dimension (which, in our case, is income1).
It is important to call attention to how the two points of view -  the structural and  
the dynamic -  differ. In following the changes o f  structure, what we measure is the 
net change between the selected points of time (the increase in the Gini coefficient), 
while the dynamic aspect summarises the gross change (what proportions o f  the 
population experienced income increase and decrease). Dynamics throws light on 
the processes by which new structures are created. This means a shift both in terms 
o f analysis and in terms o f understanding: a shift from structural figures towards 
processes. In other words, we focus first on structural changes, and then on the 
mobility among changing structures. The dynamic approach -  especially mobility at 
the household and the individual level characterising the entire period -  has rarely 
been applied (Machtwig-Habich 1997; Miiller-Frick 1996). Although very valuable 
descriptions have been produced o f the patterns o f household and individual 
mobility (Kolosi-Sági 1998), the temporal characteristics of the transition can be 
revealed only by analysing and understanding the alterations that take place year by 
year and throughout the entire period. The approach taken in the present paper 
applies this method.
Our analyses are in line with the system Zapf has worked out for social change in 
general, and for transformation3 in particular (Zapf 1994). While measuring it, he 
reduces social change to its components, and differentiates between its units (its 
structures and institutions), levels (macro- meso and micro levels), and dimensions 
(pace, depth,aim s, and controllability) (Zapf 1994, 14ff). In our analyses we will be 
able to formulate assertions concerning the last group of factors, because -  in our 
opinion -  the indices o f income dynamics may be interpreted as the valid 
measurements o f the pace and depth o f social change. The levels of change must 
also be mentioned, since measuring inequality and dynamics also reveals the 
differences between macro- and micro-level approaches. We will, however, bracket 
the first component, the structural and institutional factors, because we ignore 
political, economic, legal, and institutional changes, and do not deal with the 
interests and motivations o f  individuals, even if we are aware of the fact that income 
inequalities may be regarded as resulting from these structures. Yet even so, we 
hope to be able to present new aspects of the system changes that occurred in the 
nineties.
3 We should note that income is not simply one of several indicators, but the most important 
one of them all. Because equivalent income is the most widely used and perhaps the most 
accurate indicator in measuring economic well-being, throughout our study, we use the 
concept as an indicator of economic well being. In order to take into consideration the 
economies of scale in household consumption wc use the 0.73 elasticity.
’ For Zapf, the reconstruction of West Germany and Italy after 1945, or Spain’s and 
Portugal’s transition from dictatorship into democracy are just as much a cases of 
transformation as is the changing of the system in the beginning of the nineties in ex­
socialist countries.
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The advantages o f  a comparative study are obvious (Atkinson-Micklewright 
1992; van den Bosch et al. 1996; Förster-Tóth 1997; Immerfall 1995). Comparing 
the societies of Hungary and East Germany highlights the general and the particular 
(country-specific) features o f  the process of transition. West Germany serves as a 
point o f reference, since it can be regarded a case o f  normal social change occurring 
in a modern industrial society. This helps to reveal what significant differences exist 
between usual social change and processes associated with transformation.
We begin by presenting some figures for income development, using structural 
(static) income-inequality indicators.4 Then follows a more detailed description of 
data for individual mobility over time. The interconnections revealed by the analysis 
o f  dynamics allow us to formulate some assertions and hypotheses concerning the 
features of social change. After the discussion o f  change in society as a whole, the 
focus shifts to the level o f  the individual.
Income distribution and income inequality in the 1990s
As mentioned before, it is a widely shared opinion that income inequality increases 
in the process of transformation (Förster-Tóth 1997). The changes that have taken 
place are not uniform; several different types o f  transformation have occurred, 
which we will not detail here; it will suffice to list some of those phenomena 
mentioned by other studies on the transition (Kornai 1993; Offe 1994; Zapf 1995). 
N ew  markets replaced redistribution in income regulation; new firms have been 
established; state property has been privatised; the labour market has shrunk and has 
been restructured; as a consequence, unemployment has emerged; efforts have been 
made to strengthen the means-tested character o f  welfare programmes, etc. The 
focus here is on the consequences these changes have fo r  income inequality in 
transformation societies. The worst o f these are commonly agreed to be rising 
poverty and mounting inequalities. The account o f  the transition provided by the 
commonly used inequality indices, and the ways in which the new types o f income- 
trend indicators introduced here can contribute to these accounts, will presently be 
shown; precisely this is the purpose of the present section of the paper.
The distribution o f  income can be reshaped in a number of different ways. One 
possibility is that the rich become richer and the poor become poorer. Another -  the 
view that is more commonly held in the Hungarian scientific community -  is that the 
increase of inequality is a result of the fall o f  the middle income classes. Which 
hypothesis offers a more accurate description o f  the development taking place in 
countries under transition? Or should the analysis impel us to work out a new 
hypothesis? Are we witnessing the same developments in Hungary and in East 
Germany in the first place, and can we confidently state that in the western part o f 
unified Germany no changes occurred in the period under investigation?
4 The investigation is based on the German Socio-Economic Panel (henceforth GSOEP) and 
the Hungarian Household Panel (henceforth HHP). These two data bases are identical or 
very similar in terms of their crtiteria of representatives and the structuring and contents of 
their questionnaires. For further details on the German panel, cf. Hanefled 1987; Wagner et 
al. 1994. On the Hungarian HHP, see the annual reports: Sik-Tóth 1992. 1993, 1995, 1996. 
1997; Tóth 1994.
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Before moving on to the details of the analysis, it must be mentioned that real 
incomes in East Germany increased enormously, mainly as a result of W est German 
state transfers (Hauser et. al. 1996), and that the equivalent incomes in West 
Germany also increased, but on a much lower scale. Conversely, in Hungary, where 
„transformational recession” (Kornai) occurred without any international subsidies, 
consumer opportunities decreased.
Table 1 shows the developments between 1990 and 1996 reflected by two 
commonly used indices, P90/P10 and the Gini Coefficient.5 Both indices indicate 
clear differences, whichever year we look at, income inequality being highest in 
Hungary and lowest in East Germany.6 In West Germany, that is in a well 
functioning developed market economy, inequalities are lower than in Hungary at 
the beginning o f the transformation process.7 In terms of the levels o f inequality, the 
Gini Coefficient and the more sensitive P90/P10 ratio produce almot, t the same 
picture. However, if  we consider changes o f  income, it seems that transformation 
does create a more intensive change in income distribution in the countries in 
transition. It is especially the P90/P10 ratios that indicate increase in income 
inequality. This index shows evident increase in Hungary, and until 19' 5 also in 
East Germany. (W hether this increase can be deemed high or not is a relative 
question.) The Gini shows no changes in East Germany, which suggests that the 
West German welfare system has played an important role in the East German 
transition by blocking some of the negative effects. As we have anticipated, income 
inequality has barely altered in West G erm any here society seems to have been 
unaffected by the transformation and reunification.
5 For Hungary we only have data from after 1992
6 For a detailed analysis of income inequality in the former socialist countries, see Fleming 
and Micklcwright 1997, and Försterand Tóth 1997.
7 This is in keeping with the data of Förster el al. 1998, which tell us that income .tequaity 
observed in Hungary is higher than in many other developed industrial countries of Europe. 
Considering the 1987 income surveys of HCSO. we can conclude that increase of income 
inequality was most intensive at the end of the eighties and at the beginning of the nineties, 
since according to these data, the Gini was around 0.23, and the P90/PI0 around 2.7 (cf. 
Spéder 1998). Unfortunately, the HCSO income surveys and the HHP survey are not 
entirely compatible, but it is fair to suppose that the trends are not misleading.
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Table 1 Inequality indicators for West Germany, East Germany, and Hungary.










1990 3.01 2.49 0.25 0.18
1991 3.08 2.44 0.25 0.20
1992 3.02 2.53 3.36 0.25 0.20 0.28
1993 3.03 2.50 3.25 0.25 0.20 0.28
1994 3.08 2.50 3.48 0.25 0.20 0.29
1995 3.05 2.65 3.63 0.26 0.20 0.30
1996 3.09 2.47 3.62 0.24 0.19 0.30
(Note: Equivalent household net income; e: 0.73; individual level, children included.
Data base: GSEP. 1990-96. and HHP 1992-6. Authors' calculations.)
The indices used above are well known indicators o f  income inequality, but it is 
worth looking at some other structural measures as well. Another classic measure is 
the distribution of individuals among income categories (classes). We created six 
relative income categories for each country and each year based on annual mean 
equivalent net household income. Those in the bottom category -  the group whose 
m embers we regard to be the poor -  receive less than 50 per cent of the mean 
equivalent income. The second poorest category has incomes between 50 and 75 per 
cent o f  the mean. The next group contains those whose income is between 75 per 
cent o f  the mean and the mean itself. This is followed by groups reaching 125, and 
than 150 per cent o f the mean. Thus, those who belong to the richest category 
receive one and a half times the mean income. For the sake of clarity, we present the 
distribution of the population among these categories graphically.
Looking at the results o f  Figure /, our first impression is similar to the one 
obtained from Table 1. The differences among the three societies are clear, as is the 
relative stability of income distribution over time. Closer examination shows that the 
increase in income inequality in Hungary results from mounting poverty and from 
the rising proportion of the rich in the population. At the same time, the middle 
income category is shrinking, which phenomenon is especially conspicuous by 
comparison with Germany.
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Figure I. Relative income positions, 1990-96
West Germany 1990-96

















I------ 1------ 1------1---------- 1------1------ 1------ 1------ 1------1------ 1
20% 40% 60% 80%
Database: German Socio-Economic Panel 1990-96; Hungarian 
Household Panel 1992-96. Own calculations.
W hich o f our initial hypotheses is supported by the above distribution measures? 
The fu st hypothesis was that the rich are becoming richer and the poor poorer. If 
this is the case, the position o f  those in the middle will be relatively stable, and 
changes will be confined to the extremes of the income distribution: we will observe 
falling incomes of the poor and rising incomes o f the rich. The other hypothesis is 
that Hungary has a shrinking middle category. Here mounting inequality will result 
from shifts that cause households in a middle-class position to slip into poverty 
and/or to become rich. As already mentioned, Figure 1 seems to suggest that the 
second case applies to Hungary. Further evidence for deciding between the two 
hypotheses is provided by trends observed in the so-called poverty gap. This 
param eter describes the distance between the income o f  the poor and the poverty­
line. Poverty deepens when this distance grows. The analysis o f the data from the 
HHP failed to reveal any noticeable increase in the poverty gap (Andorka et al. 
1995; Szívós and Tóth 1998), that is, there is no increase in the gap between the 
average and the poor. So far, thus, our evidence supports the thesis o f a shrinking 
m iddle income class in Hungary; we will return to the above two hypotheses after 
analysing the mobility between the income categories.
W e also have to note, however, that the shifts we have observed are somewhat 
less intensive than we have anticipated. Although the differences can be seen more 
clearly through observing income categories than by studying the Gini Coefficient, 
the picture remains very similar, especially with regards to developments over time. 
Let us now look at a final structural indicator, the Kernel Density Estimate (Cowell 
et al. 1994; Becker and Hauser 1997). This is a very simple method, for all we have 
to do is to estimate the function which best approximates the density estimate o f  our 
empirical data. The result we get shows what proportion of the population falls into 
a given income position when we have a given empirical distribution.8 In the case of 
the three countries under consideration, we used equivalent incomes deflated by 
inflation rates. We, however, have not converted German and Hungarian incomes, 
the estimate-functions thus are to be interpreted within each country. The results 
speak for themselves, telling a different story than did the results obtained from the 
analysis o f the Gini Coefficient and the income categories (Figures 2-4).
East and West Germany clearly experienced a real income increase in the general 
income level during the period of the survey (the curves shift to the right), while 
Hungary saw a decrease in the income level (a shift to the left). With respect to the 
question posed in the present article, it is even more interesting to observe the 
relatively large alteration in the shape of the curves (if  we compare the shape o f  the 
curves for the first and the last years investigated in each country). It is the two West 
German curves that seem to resemble each other the most, and it is the East German 
curves where the biggest differences can be observed. In East Germany the 
mountain has shrunk into a hill in six short years, in Hungary the shift is just the 
opposite, with the income-distribution mountain becoming higher and steeper. 
Furthermore, there is a longer slope on the right, and a steeper one on the left. What
8 On this method and on its use in analysing income inequality, see the study by Cowell et al. 
1994. referred to above.
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do the changes in the shapes of the curves suggest, especially with respect to East 
Germany and Hungary?
Figures 2-4. Kernel density estimates
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Data base: HHP 1992-96. Authors’ calculations. •
A great majority of Hungarian society has moved closer to the mode o f the income 
distribution and to each other (Figure 4). If we considered only the (bottom) four- 
fifths of the society, we could perhaps register a decrease over a five year period in 
income differences. However, if we also consider that the income position o f those 
in the upper-middle and upper income categories have barely deteriorated, what is 
more, at one point o f  the distribution an interval was found where real income had 
even increased, then the nature of the increase in inequality in Hungary becomes 
readily visible. The increasing Gini Coefficients and P90/P10 ratios in Hungary thus 
are explained by both o f the two different shifts.
Meanwhile individuals in East German society have tended to diverge from the 
mode income (they have „spurted”). Two low peaks have appeared in the middle, 
that is, the distribution has two modes. The height of the hill is barely larger than 
half the height o f the mountain of 1990. The two slopes of the curve are quite 
similar, and smoother than they were before. At the same time, a considerable 
number of individuals were found on the right slope o f the income distribution (this 
perhaps is the upper-middle income category). The evening and lengthening o f the
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curve also tells us that members o f the society are distributed on a larger income 
scale, which coincides with a w ider real income distance among families. That is, if 
we assumed that the same order o f income categories could be set up in 1996 as in 
1990 -  which, as we will see, is not the case, although the constancy o f the Gini- 
index allows such a assumption -  then we could conclude that the distance between 
the neighbouring families has grown. (In contrast, considering the large majority, 
real income distances have narrowed in Hungary.) In general it is surprising that 
behind the quite stable Gini measures we found such a large difference in the Kernel 
density income distribution.
The shape of the curve has also changed in the case o f  West Germany. There is a 
slight decrease in its height, as well as in the density around the mode income. At 
the sam e time, steepness has decreased on the left, while increased on the right side. 
The figure suggests the assumption that -  although the stability o f  the Gini 
Coefficient hides this -  West Germany has also experienced a minor transformation: 
those above the average have moved closer to the mode, while the poor have moved 
aw ay from it (Figure 2).
According to the above figures one may say that the Kernel density estimates 
narrate „a new chapter o f  the transition story”, with a new meaning. It tells us that 
the greatest changes took place in East Germany. This is where the greatest increase 
in mean income occurred (shift to the left), and the Kernel density describing 
incom e distribution completely modified. One possible sociological interpretation is 
that the distance between East German families has grown. Hungarian and V est 
G erm an changes -  as compared to each other -  occurred in the opposite direction. 
However, the Hungarian data show that while a significant part of the society (two- 
thirds, four-fifth?) has moved closer to each other, we can find condensations on the 
right side o f the curve as well. We suppose that this is where those upper-middle and 
upper class individuals can be found whose income has deteriorated to a n 
degree than the average has, or even improved in absolute terms. This (sn 
group o f  society has moved further away from the middle (the average) am.' 
distance between its members has also grown.
An evident methodological lesson to be learned from the foregoing discussir 
that it is worth approaching the same problem from various directions, because U ' 
leads to  a more subtle -  and sometimes more contradictory — account o f the subject 
o f  research. On the basis o f  these considerations -  and in order to continue our 
„incom e story” -  we will observe the components o f the structural changes 
described above. The question to answer now is what individual and group- 
movem ents led to the occurrence o f  these changes, or put differently: What shifts in 
income trends can be found behind the structural changes.
Change at the micro level between two points o f  time: year-to-year mobility
Authors analysing panel data usually observe that the movements and fluctuatiov of 
households between income categories frequently explains the relative sf.V lity  of 
income distribution (Duncan 1984; Hauser and Wagner 1995; Headey, Habich and 
K rause 1994a, and 1994b). Before analysing our data with this in mind, it is a good 
idea to formulate, through invoking some well-known theoretical models, our own
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hypotheses regarding the dynamics o f  income inequality and the pace o f  social 
change. Our point o f departure is modernisation theory (Zapf 1994a). We start with 
the assumption that the pace o f social change and the dynamics of income-position 
movements are very different in the three societies. (As mentioned earlier, the West 
German pattern basically served as a reference category.) We accepted as a fact that 
in industrial societies continuous social changes are taking place as a result o f the 
operation of the labour market, ongoing innovations in other spheres o f  life, as well 
as the fluctuations o f family cycles. Because we have assumed „stable dynam ics” in 
developed industrial societies, we expected to find that there would be changes 
among income positions, but that the dynamics o f these changes (the mobility 
pattern) would remain unaltered. In contrast, a much stronger mobility was 
anticipated for the countries in transition than for West Germany. We also expected 
to find differences between the two former socialist countries. The dynamics of 
change should be influenced by the different paths o f transformation, including the 
strategies involved in changing the regime, the rebuilding of institutions, and the 
recovery o f the economy (Balcerowicz 1995; Offe 1994; Stark 1992). We expected 
to see that mobility in the beginning will be higher, and that it will then slow down 
earlier in East Germany than in Hungary.9 We have also worked out an alternative 
hypothesis concerning the degree of the transition completion. If it is true that the 
transition (and change o f regime) is a special type o f change that is quicker and 
more comprehensive than those normally observed, then it must also be present in 
micro level dynamics. Transition may be regarded as accomplished when dynamics 
comes to a rest.
One simple method o f showing this is the use of a transition matrix to analyse the 
turnover from one year to the next, or from the starting to the closing date .10 *The 
ratios o f the transition matrix show whether people retain their income position over 
time, or whether they move upwards or downwards. Table 2 presents the movements 
o f individuals between income categories from an outflow perspective." Income 
categories featured in this table are identical with the ones we have used earlier (see 
Figure 1). As an example, let us take a closer look at one of the income categories, 
and at the outflow from that category.12
9 We note here that in our research we have regarded the degree of mobility as a valid 
measure for the quality of social change.
10 The datum relating to the whole of the period indicates the income position at the end of the 
period gained by individuals who belonged to a certain income category at the beginning 
of the period.
" In principle, transition matrices can be analysed from two points of view. The outflow 
perspective gives information about movements from the beginning to the end of the 
period. The inflow perspective looks specifically at the pattern of recruitment of current 
income positions.
12 The distribution if the transition matrix also depends on the length of the period considered. 
This means that we will have to analyse periods of the same length. In the case of 
Hungary, we have looked at the period between 1992-96. and in the case of Germany, we 
analysed the years between 1990-94 -  a decision based on considerations mentioned 
above.
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Table 2 Distribution of individuals among income categories, by former 
income position (outflow perspective)
Income Income categories 1994/1996
categories West Germany 1990-94
1990 <50% 50-75% 75-100% 100-125% 125-150% >150% Total
<50% 49.7 29 11.6 7.0 1.9 0.8 8.3
50-75% 14.6 50.2 24.9 6.6 2.1 1.5 25.7
75-100% 4 21.3 43.9 20.6 6.1 4 25.2
100-125% 3.8 10.4 29 33.8 14.7 8.3 19.2
125-150% 0.9 7.1 11.7 28.4 32.9 19.1 10.4
>150% 0.9 3.8 8.8 11.8 16.5 58.1 11.2
N 869 2112 2320 1616 916 1022 8856
% 9.8 23.9 26.2 18.2 10.3 11.5 100
East Germany 1990-94
<50% 29.6 36.9 21.1 7.9 1.8 2.8 3.8
50-75% 11.8 31.5 31.1 17.9 6.4 1.3 20.2
75-100% 6.3 20 40.4 22.3 7.6 3.3 31.9
100-125% 3.3 12 33.2 25.6 19.5 6.5 22.8
125-150% 3.7 8 17.5 28.6 19.5 22.7 14.5
>150% 0.6 4.6 11.8 19.5 24.3 39.2 6.8
N 176 471 792 574 327 229 2569
% 6.9 18.3 30.9 22.3 12.7 8.9 100
Hungary 1992--96
<50% 45.5 28.8 14.8 5 2.1 3.7 9.4
50-75% 16.7 43.5 25.4 9.6 1.9 2.9 24.8
75-100% 9.8 27.7 39.3 12.7 3.2 7.2 25.6
100-125% 4.2 17.8 24.5 23.5 15.2 14.9 17.9
125-150% 6 1 1 18.2 19.8 20.7 24.4 8.6
>150% 6.6 6.1 1 1.4 15.6 16.7 43.5 14.1
N 565 1 101 1088 609 357 593 4314
% 13.1 25.5 25.2 14.1 8.3 13.7 100
Data base: GSOEP, 1990-96 and HHP 1992-96. Authors’ calculations.
In W est Germany, 44 per cent o f those who in 1990 belonged to the lower middle 
income category (75-100 per cent of the mean) remained in the same income 
category in 1994. The others changed their relative income positions in the course of 
five years: about 25 per cent slipped downwards and the remaining 30 per cent 
improved their position. About a twentieth of those who in 1990 belonged to this 
lower middle income category became rich by 1994 (Table 2). Comparing the same 
categories in East Germany and Hungary we can observe that 40 per cent o f the 
respondents retained their income position. In terms o f  mobility, mobility downward 
was higher in Hungary than in East Germany, while a higher number of people were 
capable of improving their relative income position in East Germany than in 
Hungary.
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It is not easy to compare the transition matrices of the different countries, because 
the relations between the countries are not identical in the case o f  each cell o f  the 
matrix. Comparison becomes somewhat easier if we consider only the cells in the 
diagonal. In this case we compare the proportion of those individuals who belonged 
to the same income category at both the observed points in time (the beginning and 
the end o f the period).13 According to our data, this proportion is the highest in the 
income categories in West Germany. In comparing East Germany and Hungary, the 
results do not always correspond. The proportion o f those leaving the lower income 
categories was higher in East Germany, while with regards to average and above- 
average income categories the distributions vary.
How can these changes be interpreted with our initial questions in mind? After 
studying the figures it seems to be evident that the societies undergoing 
transformation contain a fa r  higher number o f  people whose relative income 
position has changed over time than does West Germany. Behind the macro­
structure o f income distribution and income inequality that changes only very slowly 
we found an unexpectedly intensive and unceasing shift in income positions. It 
seems that the transformation is a more dynamic process than the „normal” changes 
taking place in modern industrial societies. The comparison o f Hungary and East 
Germany shows that the latter country has a somewhat higher income mobility. This 
seems to contradict the results provided by the classic inequality indicators, but ties 
in with what the changes in the shape o f the income distribution drawn by the 
Kernel Density Estimate suggested. We would also like to call attention to the fact 
that this flow also takes place under relatively stable economic and social 
conditions. Regarding theories o f modernisation or social change, this is clear 
evidence for continuous social change in modern industrial societies (Hauser and 
Fabig 1998).
We have seen that transition matrices are not easy to handle and that they 
disregard structural changes. To resolve these problems, we have constructed what 
is known as the Glass/Prais Mobility Index, which serves to characterise the outflow 
from certain income categories (Machtwig-Habich 1997; MUller-Frick 1996). The 
Glass/Prais Index measures how mobility observed in a given income category in a 
given period of time relates to total (the whole o f possible)14 mobility.15 Its value can 
be between 0 and 1, and the higher it is in an income category, the higher year-to- 
year mobility is in that category. This is a good way of illustrating change in 
mobility-stability patterns.
For the sake of greater clarity, we present the Glass/Prais Index graphically. In 
comparison with the shifts in the transition matrices, we have altered our procedure 
inasmuch as we here calculate and show the Glass/Prais Mobility Index for all the 
year-to-year periods. For the sake o f arriving at conclusions in terms o f  contents, we 
here do not confine ourselves to characterising each country only by the four figures
13 We disregard the distances of the movements.
14 As if the final position were independent of initial group positions.
15 Ways of computing the Glass/Prais index are detailed by Machtwig-Habich 1997: 28ff. 
This index, as far as we can tell was used to measure the tempo of social change for the first 
time in the mentioned study.
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w ithin the five year period. With all these considerations in mind, we can now 
expand the comparison between the countries. Thus we hope to be able to better 
com pare
— the changes the selected societies have undergone between two points o f the 
year-to-year period;
— whether there occurs a change with the passing o f  time in the curves o f the 
studied societies, in other words, if  there were changes in dynamics („the changes o f 
changes”);
— whether there are sim ilarities or dissimilarities in the changes of the mobility 
patterns.
W hat are the most interesting results obtained from the Glass/Prais Mobility 
Index?
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The degree of income mobility in West Germany, a country not in transition, was 
quite high. Looking at the various income categories, there was not much change in 
the mobility pattern over the period investigated: the pattern in 1990 was very 
sim ilar to the pattern six years later. The mobility was somewhat higher in the 
m iddle categories, partly because those at the ends o f  the scale had the chance to 
m ove only in one direction.
In East Germany, we find much higher mobility rates, which are confined to the 
very beginning of the transformation. According to the income-mobility patterns, the 
transformation slowed down to West German levels around 1993. In the ensuing 
years we can observe one special feature: the two bottom categories, the poor and 
the alm ost poor, had much better chances o f escaping from poverty than the same 
categories did in West Germany. From this we can conclude that the segmentation o f  
the population into poor and not poor was less sharp in East Germany than it was in 
West Germany.
M obility in Hungary was higher than in East Germany (and of course also higher 
than in West Germany) in each o f the four periods under investigation. However, if 
we observe the first periods we have data for in each country (1990-91 in Germany 
and 1992-93 in Hungary), a very similar pattern emerges in the two transitional 
countries. On the one hand, we know that the increase in inequality started at the 
very beginning of the 90s, that is, before the time for which we have longitudinal 
data in Hungary. We can thus conjecture that mobility in the earliest times o f  the 
transition must have been even more intensive than in the first period we have here 
investigated (1992-93). On the other hand, unemployment emerged in 1992, and the 
differentiating effect o f the labour market probably became stronger in the period we 
have analysed. On these grounds, we have to assume that in the period when 
transition began in Hungary, and for which we have no panel data, income-position 
m obility probably was no higher than that observed in 1992. What we can state with 
certainty is that the period o f  transformation was characterised by very high income 
m obility in every income category.
In Hungary we cannot observe the same process of slowing down that 
characterises East Germany. This phenomenon leaves room for differing hypothesis 
about the Hungarian development. It can be assumed that in Hungary the 
transformation lasted somewhat longer than in East Germany, and has not yet 
finished in 1996,16 but it can also be postulated that the „normal” mobility pattern of 
H ungary may be different from that o f Germany, and that it will also be higher than 
G erm any’s in the future. It is worthwhile to quote at this point some o f the results of 
the study o f Hauser and Fabig (Hauser-Fabig 1998:4). They state, drawing on 
com parative studies, that income dynamics are very similar, in fact almost identical, 
in societies with as dissimilar welfare regimes and labour market systems as those of 
the USA and West Germany. In our case, the higher Hungarian mobility pattern is 
an indication of ongoing transformation.
16 We are aware that this is in contradiction with the views of several researchers involved in 
the HHP project, but in our case, it is the stabilising of mobility patterns that means th,e 
completion of the process.
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Clear differences between the countries become apparent in terms o f  income 
categories, if the curves for the last period are considered. While the upper-income 
categories show the highest degree of stability in each country, with regard to the 
poorest, in Hungary stability seems greater than in Germany. The middle-income 
categories, on the other hand, show very high mobility. These observations suggest 
that the nature of transformation differs in these countries. In Hungary, in 
comparison with other countries, the poor seem to have become a strongly 
disadvantaged group in the last year. However, it is not impossible that this is due to 
a ,,one-off’ instance o f hardship, caused by the Bokros package of stabilisation 
measures introduced in 1995. By contrast, the West German welfare system seems 
to have functioned efficiently in East Germany, where people had the best chance of 
escaping poverty.17
High mobility rates in the middle categories in Hungary indicate that this 
category was „volatile” -  not a place of „arrival”, but one of „departure”. Although 
the direction of movement was usually downward, there were paths leading upward 
as well.
Income dynamics during the whole period: overall income mobility pattern
We are still trying to understand income dynamics/mobility, but we would like to be 
able to treat year-to-year periods and the whole period simultaneously. We now 
want to illustrate and sum up the overall mobility patterns between 1990 and 1994 
(in Germany) and between 1992 and 1996 (in Hungary). For this, it is necessary to 
modify both the analytical strategy and the methodological perspective and we have 
to introduce yet another method. For this reason, we have divided individuals’ 
income careers into annual units o f observation, and we have based our analyses on 
these units (observations). The tables that follow present the results o f analysis o f  all 
„observations”, which means that they report at an analytical level on „person- 
years” 18, This angle allows us to examine in more detail whether or not total 
mobility in the three societies differed significantly.
Let us look more closely at the mobility and stability o f all income-category 
positions across the period o f transformation (first step). The unit is „person-years” 
observed. The findings o f Table 3 are to be understood as referring to the 
distribution and the stability/mobility pattern o f  the relative income positions over 
time, as follows:
17 This apparently contradicts the statements of Hauser and Fabig, who conclude that German 
welfare and tax system had the effect of decreasing mobility. However, they used an 
aggregate, and not an income-category-specific index.
18 This change of perspective is to be noted. The level of analysis here is not the individual, 
but the sum of all yearly „events’" happening to the individual.
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Table 3 Income positions over time: breakdown of proportions (percentage)
Income Proportion of all Proportion of persons Proportion of the time a given
positions observations in total time experiencing income category person remains in the same
in income category („between”) income category („within”)
(„overall”)
West East Hun­ West East Hun­ West East Hun­
Germany gary Germany gary Germany gary
<50 8 5 9 17 15 24 63 41 56
50-75 25 19 25 47 47 54 69 53 61
75-100 25 32 25 53 71 60 62 57 55
100-125 19 23 15 43 59 44 57 50 45
125-150 11 12 9 28 35 29 51 44 40
>150 12 8 16 22 20 32 73 55 68
Overall++ 210 247 242
Notes:
+ „Overall”: distribution of all observations (person-years) in each income category; 
„between”: proportion of persons found at least once in a particular income position;
„within”: proportion of observations per person in the given income category 
(fraction of time).
++ „Overall between”: the sum of the „between” percentages 
Data base: GSOEP 1990-94; HHP, 1992-96. Authors’ calculations.
a) The „overall” percentage sheds light on the total distribution of all person-years -  
all yearly income class experiences of all the individuals -  in the income position 
concerned. This could be regarded as a generalisation o f  the annual distributions.19 
These three columns are significant, because they show how many times individuals 
have been classified in certain income categories over the whole period.
b) The next three columns again regard individuals as points of reference. The 
„between” percentage shows the proportion o f all persons who have ever been -  
regardless of duration — in the income position in question. In other words, we learn 
what proportion of persons experienced a certain income position at least once.
c) The „overall between” in the bottom row o f  the three middle columns is a 
measure that can be interpreted as contrasting overall mobility over the whole period 
between the countries. The higher the value, the higher the proportion o f  the 
population involved in total mobility is.
d) The last three columns report on how many times (for how long) individuals 
stayed in a particular income category. These „within” percentages denote the 
fraction of time as compared to the whole period -  five years -  which a person has 
spent in a specific position. If  only the same people belonged to a given income 
category in every observed year, then we would have 100 here.
To make things clearer, let us take an example. We assume that in the three 
societies the proportions o f  all observations which fall either into the under­
privileged or into the privileged positions vary. This expectation is confirmed when 
we see that in West Germany only 8 per cent o f  observations fell into the lowest
19 A way of summing up the distribution tares indicated in the diagrams of the first figure.
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income category (poverty), while in East Germany this proportion was about 5. and 
in Hungary about 9 per cent. As for the wealthiest category, the proportions were 12 
per cent for West Germans, 8 per cent for East Germans and 16 per cent for 
Hungarians. However, these different figures tell only parts of the story.
Let us see what we can learn from the proportions in the „between” category. 
These percentages add to our discussion by documenting the proportion o f  people 
involved -  at any time and for any duration -  in the lowest and highest income 
categories. In West Germany 17 per cent o f the total population fell at least once 
into poverty position. The equivalent proportion for East Germans was around 15 
per cent, while in Hungary it was 24 per cent. The relative figures for the wealthiest 
position were very similar to these, only at a different level.
This picture, however, is incomplete without considering the „duration” o f  the 
state o f poverty and wealth. This is supplied by the „within” percentage, which 
denotes the number of observations of a person in a certain income category, as 
compared to the whole period. This figure is a measure of the stability o f  income 
classes. If we compare the two extreme positions, we find that the top (the 
privileged) position seems more stable than the bottom one (that o f poverty). Put 
differently: poverty proved to be less stable than wealth.
What do these figures and proportions then mean with respect to the particular 
counties? The point to note from this analytical framework is that there were 
different chances and risks associated with winning or losing a specific income 
position in the course o f time.
In general, it seems clear that in Hungary the lower and the top positions were 
more stable than the others. The second highest position (125 to 150 per cent) was 
the most precarious. A very low percentage o f all observations and only a minority 
o f people fell into this category, and they had a relatively small chance o f  remaining 
there over time. Perhaps one could interpret this as the presence of a new, unstable, 
Hungarian upper-middle class. When the various documented indicators are 
compared, a segmentation o f income positions seems to have begun. The stability 
patterns („within”) lead us to suppose -  especially when compared to the 
proportions in the two parts o f Germany -  that in Hungary the position o f  the lowest 
and the topmost income categories have stabilised, almost to the same degree that 
we find in West Germany.
In East Germany we find a different story. Here the figures do not indicate that 
borders between income categories would be becoming rigid. Unlike in Hungary, 
the overall East German trend seems to be towards the average. We find a higher 
number o f  person-years around the mean income category than we do in West 
Germany. A vast majority o f East Germans (>75 per cent) have at some point in 
time occupied lower-middle income position.
As already mentioned, even in the reference case o f West Germany there was 
much greater fluctuation than could have been anticipated. We, therefore, want to 
stress again that societies undergoing „usual” social change display processes of 
considerable mobility at the micro level and stable income distribution at the macro 
level.
All in all, we have eventually come up with further evidence showing that total 
income mobility in East Germany and in Hungary was higher (240 per cent) than in
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West Germany (210 per cent). Furthermore, behind proportions of mobility almost 
identical in the two former socialist countries we found different patterns in income 
position mobility: in Hungary -  in comparison with East Germany -  a very high 
num ber of people experienced lower income categories, and have stayed there for 
much longer spans o f time.
As a last step -  and only for the sake of completing the picture since we do not 
expect to get different results — let us examine the generalised probability matrices. 
This differs from the previously presented matrix in that here there is a 
„generalisation” o f year-to-year transitions. In other words, this method filters the 
undulations of the yearly eventualities which the Glass/Prais index made visible for 
the countries in transition. The matrix presents chances for transitions relative to the 
whole o f the period. The probabilities can be interpreted as the proportion of 
individuals remaining in a given position (diagonally) in each year, and as the 
chances for someone to move from one income category into another. Let us look 
once more at an example.
Table 4 illustrates the probability of transition between income categories. The 
line for West Germany shows that the population in poverty has an „annual risk” o f 
59 per cent of remaining poor in each of the following years, and a 41 per cent 
chance for escaping poverty. Chances of moving to the neighbouring income 
category (into the 50-75 per cent category) are 32 per cent, and there is no chance 
for jum ping into, for example, the income category o f  the wealthiest.
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Lowest 59 32 6 2 1 0
2 9 66 20 4 1 1
3 2 18 59 17 3 1
4 1 5 21 52 16 5
5 1 3 7 24 45 21
Highest 1 1 3 8 16 71
East Germany 1990-96
Lowest 35 44 16 3 1 1
2 10 50 31 7 1 1
3 3 18 53 21 4 1
4 1 7 26 46 16 5
5 1 2 9 31 38 19
Highest 1 2 5 11 25 56
Hungary 1992-96
Lowest 50 32 11 3 1 3
2 14 53 26 6 1 1
3 4 26 46 16 4 4
4 2 9 28 34 16 11
5 1 5 13 27 27 28
Highest 1 3 6 9 16 65
Data base: GSOEP, 1990-94 and HHP, 1992-96. Authors’ calculations.
As we have indicated, no surprising novelties are to be found in Table 4. But some 
o f its results are worth repeating. One is that in the two countries in transition the 
numbers in the diagonal -  the probability o f staying in the income class in question 
-  are always lower than in West Germany. Another feature that emerges here is that 
there are differing outflow probabilities in the two countries in transition. When 
these two countries are compared, we find that in East Germany there is a greater 
chance o f outflow in the case of those who are in the two bottom (the poor) and in 
the topmost (the wealthy) categories. At the same time, in Hungary the probability 
o f  staying in a category is the lowest in the middle and the upper-middle positions.
In our concluding remarks to this section we would like to suggest a new 
possibility for interpreting transition matrices. The fact of mobility processes and 
their empirical patterns could, in a theoretical sense, be seen as valid indicators o f  
the ,, openness" o f  a society. These data reveal whether or not borders exist between 
certain income positions, between certain conditions o f material well-being, and if 
they do, how easily they can be crossed. Do people living at a certain level o f  wealth 
have a future chance o f finding themselves in more favourable circumstances? The 
case o f  West Germany -  especially if we also consider the fact that researchers have
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found quite similar outflow probabilities in the rather different social structure o f the 
U.S.A. (Hauser-Fabig 1998) — shows us the degree o f  „openness” and the kind of 
income mobility „pattern” that characterise developed industrial countries, „open” 
societies. Upward leaps are not impossible, but the most probable mobility pattern in 
each income category is a transition to the neighbouring category. It is important to 
state this because as a result o f  the transformation in the former socialist countries 
the opportunities for changing income categories in a given period of time have 
opened up to an even greater degree than is common in Western societies. In the 
proceeding period -  although we do not have empirical data for substantiating this 
assumption -  these countries were most likely characterised by lower mobility 
dynamics than modern industrial societies.20 The point is, however, that the income 
m obility patterns in the two countries in transition are different from those o f  a 
stable Western capitalist society.
Summary
Here we restrict ourselves to the summary o f some o f our findings about social 
change in general, and o f  those made specifically about the transformation of 
systems, while we also call attention to some unresolved problems.
(1) The literature on inequality (Atkinson-Micklewright 1992; Becker-Hauser 
1997; Förster-Tóth 1997) confirms that according to commonly used inequality 
indicators (Gini coefficient and/or decile distribution) the rate of change is rather 
moderate. The data o f our study have also confirmed this view. At the same time, 
these data have also clearly demonstrated that there are very frequent shifts of 
individual positions underlying the stability of macro-social distribution. This is in 
keeping with the present authors’ understanding o f  social change and with their 
everyday experiences. The pertinent theory o f  social change holds that modern 
industrial societies may be characterised by constant modifications taking place in 
the economy and in social life (Zapf 1994). Consider such background factors as the 
dynamics of the labour market (entrance, exit, career), or planned and unforeseen 
changes in family life and family cycle (birth o f  children, moving in and out, 
divorce, death). The role o f  innovation in the economy and society should not be 
forgotten either (Zapf 1994d). The macro level stability of developed industrial 
societies -  as for instance that o f  West Germany -  is the result o f this constant micro 
level mobility.
(2) The post-socialist societies we examined are countries in transition, which 
show significantly higher mobility than does West Germany. This statement has 
been verified both by using Glass/Prais mobility indices and by applying the index 
o f  total mobility. This high degree of dynamics is motivated partly by structural and 
institutional changes (economic, political, legal, institutional transformations)
20 At this point it is a valid objection that the income mobility analysed in our article is 
connected to social mobility, which describes the restructuring of social status and the 
individual and group movements between them. To reflect on this problem even on the 
level of mentioning it in passing would have led us far beyond the scope of the present 
study.
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typical o f  the system change, which we did not treat in this paper, and also by the 
fact that as a result of the transformation, micro level processes characteristic o f 
modern industrial societies emerged and began to operate.
(3) The similarities and differences between mobility in Hungary and in East 
Germany provide grounds for the formulation o f  a new hypothesis. Bearing in mind 
the entire income mobility o f the two countries, one may say that the dynamics o f  
changes in income positions -  the circulation within the income distribution system  
— is ju s t as characteristic o f  the transformation as the increase o f income inequality.
(4) Clear differences were found in the pace o f transformation in the two post­
socialist countries. East Germany showed very fast change only in the first two years 
o f transformation, while in Hungary a higher degree of mobility lasted longer. It can 
be assumed that the „unification effect” on East Germany was to som e extent 
responsible for high mobility (Miiller-Frick 1996), and consequently the effect of 
transformation has been weaker than in Hungary.
(5) The analysis shows that using traditional inequality measures we find no 
difference between West and East Germany concerning the trends, but variation 
emerged in the shape o f the income distribution and the pattern o f  individual 
mobility. Thus, the invariance o f  income distribution may have resulted fro m  very 
different individual mobility regimes.
(6) Over the whole period, there was less chance to escape poverty in Hungary 
than in East Germany, where we also find higher stability among the rich. East 
Germany’s adoption o f the West German social system -  heavy taxation for the rich 
and the support for the poor -  seems to have been effective in avoiding breaches in 
society.
(7) In East Germany, a robust middle-income category seems to have emerged. In 
contrast, in Hungary a process of polarisation seems to have taken place. The 
middle-category is very „fragile” in Hungary.
(8) We have also noted the possibility o f an interpretation that naturally needs to 
be substantiated by further research. We have suggested that the indices measuring 
the dynamics and patterns o f income mobility could be regarded as indicators o f the 
„openness” of a society. O f course, we do not believe that there are „closed” 
societies where nobody changes his/her position, or that there would be societies 
which are entirely open, where an individual’s position in the next year is a matter of 
pure chance. What we do hypothesise, however, is that the differences in the 
dynamics o f societies may be constant, which may indicate the degree o f  openness 
o f a given society.
We conclude this summary by acknowledging that our analyses must by no 
means be regarded as complete. It is our opinion that both the relative stability at the 
macro level and the steady dynamics at the micro level are interrelated in ways that 
require further explanatory investigations.
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Agnes Kelemen
NATIONAL SENTIMENTS AND ATTITUDES 
TOWARD MINORITIES
Introduction
There are numerous investigational approaches to the phenomenon of Nationalism 
in the relevant literature o f  political science, international relations or sociology, all 
dealing with various aspects o f  the problem. Conceptualisations o f nationalism 
cover aspects of political ideology and political movement as well as the process of 
nation-building and also the particular political orientation of individuals.
Purpose o f the study
The purpose of the work presented in this paper was to examine the structure of 
attitudes organised around the notion of the nation and explore the structural 
relationship between national sentiments and attitudes toward cohabitant minority 
groups connected to the concept o f nation. The present work is an attempt to study 
the structure and interrelatedness of attitudes toward one’s own dominant national 
group and attitudinal strategies toward cohabitant minority groups.
Among the few empirical investigations focused on nationalism as a political 
orientation the work o f H. Dekker and D. Malova (1997) stands out. According to 
their approach national attitudes can be conceptualized as a set of attitudes toward 
o n e’s people and country, differing in strength and affect. Nationalism is merely one 
o f  the component attitudes o f  the set. Empirical research has shown that the 
component attitudes o f  the model (National Feeling, National Liking, National 
Pride, National Preference, National Superiority and Nationalism) are discrete 
sentiments organised into a cumulative hierarchy.
Although this model is focused on attitudes related to the concept of the nation, it 
is plausible that these attitudes are closely connected to opinions about issues 
concerning the relationship between the national majority and minority groups. 
Therefore, the aim o f the present work was twofold. First, we set out to test the 
Dekker-M alova model on a Hungarian sample, to show that in spite of the fact that 
the applied scale contains several items with highly country-specific connotations 
the model itself is valid in the Hungarian context as well. The second aim was to 
reveal the structural relationships between the above mentioned national attitudes of 
the model and certain attitudes toward minority groups.
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Definitions and Hypotheses
Historians, sociologist, political scientists and social psychologists have proposed 
several definitions for the concept o f a „minority” . One approach is to find relatively 
objective, observable criteria, analysing cultural, historical or physical 
characteristics (see e.g. Kővágó 1983) emphasizing the numerical disadvantage of 
the minority group. Other definitions (see e.g. Wagley and Harris, quoted by 
Simpson and Yinger 1985: 17) are less concerned with objective differences but 
include aspects of minority existence, which arise from the disadvantageous social 
position of minorities, from the majority-minority relations and from attitudes 
toward the minority group. In this paper we use a minority definition (in the context 
o f  examining respondents’ attitudes towards minority groups) which is closest to the 
approach o f Tajfel: „[minority is] a category o f people... at the receiving end of 
certain attitudes and treatment from the »outside«” (Tajfel 1981).
Simpson and Yinger (1985) describe majority policies toward minorities as 
belonging to three main clusters: the acceptance or even support o f multiculturalism, 
the attempt to eliminate the minority group and in between the two extremities is 
assimilation or -  contrary to that -  a parasitic exploitation of a subordinate group 
deliberately restrained to this position. Translated to the level of individual attitudes 
o f  the members o f a majority group we might also find the corresponding three 
general attitudinal stances toward minority groups, namely tolerance, assimilationist, 
and discriminatory or exclusionist tendencies.
Hypothesis I. Attitudes are expressions or manifestations o f representations of 
complex interpersonal/intergroup relations, in the present case the relations 
between a dominant majority group and minorities. In a number o f respects 
attitudes toward out-groups can reveal the preferred „strategy” toward these 
groups and therefore can he arranged on a continuum ranging from  tolerance 
through assimilationist tendencies to discrimination/exclusion.
Hypothesis 2. Intergroup relations are determined by several factors -  
historical, societal, economic and psychological -  and therefore attitudes 
toward specific groups in a society show great intergroup variation. However a 
regular pattern determining the direction o f  the attitudes can be detected that 
reveals a generally preferred strategy toward minorities, a ,,meta-attitude", 
that is not specific to the actual minority group in question but a general 
disposition characteristic o f  a person.
Definitions of minorities inherently relate this concept to the concept o f the nation 
the minority group belongs to, since the concept o f the minority is meaningful only 
in relation to the latter. Based on theories o f  cognitive consistency (see e.g. Abelson 
et al. 1968) it is reasonable to assume that these concepts are similarly related in the 
attitude structure of the cognitive organisation. We proposed a model where the 
concepts o f the minorities and the nation as well as the associated attitudes and 
emotions are inseparably interwoven in the representational structure of the mind.
Hypothesis 3. A regular relationship can be detected between attitudes toward 
one’s nation and preferred strategies toward minorities -  operationalised as the
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relationship between the component attitudes o f  the hierarchical model of 
nationalism formulated by Dekker and Malova on one hand, and attitudes 
toward minorities organised on the tolerance-exclusion dimension on the other.
Method
In order to test the above hypotheses we first use largely unanalysed data from two 
surveys conducted in 1994 and 1995 on the topic o f  ethnic attitudes. Both surveys 
used representative samples o f  the population. Based partly on the results o f this first 
phase, we developed a questionnaire which targeted our hypotheses more precisely.
This questionnaire was employed in a non-representative, self-administered 
survey consisting o f 405 secondary school students. The respondents were students 
o f  seven secondary schools in Budapest, 62 per cent in academic secondary schools 
(or „grammar schools”) and 38 per cent in vocational schools. The target age group 
was the 17-18 years old (grade 3 and 4); this age section made up 85 per cent o f the 
sample, however, the total range of the age o f the respondents varied between years 
o f  16-21. The gender representation was not totally balanced -  the sample consisted 
o f  55 per cent females and 45 per cent males.
The Q uestionnaire. The questionnaire consisted o f  5 sections and a total o f 108 
items. The sections were related to the following five topics. One section included 
34 items related to attitudes toward the Roma population in Hungary, another 
section was similar but related to the Hungarian Jewry. These two sections were 
presented at the beginning o f  the questionnaire; in order to filter out the sequential 
effect we have varied the order of the two sections -  half o f the respondents received 
a version where the Jewish section was followed by the Roma one and the other half 
an inverse version. These two sections consisted o f  items assumed to be related to 
the three attitudinal stances o f  Hypothesis 1 -  namely assimilation, discrimination 
and tolerance.
The third section was a revised version o f  the Nationalism questionnaire 
constructed by Dekker and Malova consisting o f  nineteen items related to various 
forms o f national affiliations. That was followed by a nine-item section, included in 
order to investigate in more detail the concept o f  the nation held by the respondents, 
and finally seventeen items related to socio-economic variables.
Preparatory analysis
The first phase o f the research involved the secondary analysis o f databases 
provided by two sociological surveys conducted in 1994 and 1995 on topics of 
ethnic attitudes.1 The purpose of this phase was to carry out a preliminary test of
1 The 1994 survey has been conducted by Ferenc Erős, Zsolt Enyedi, Zoltán Fleck and Zoltán 
Fábián on attitudes toward the Roma, anti-Semitism, attitudes toward various outgroups and 
Authoritarianism; the 1995 survey has been conducted by András Kovács primarily on anti- 
Semitism but also involving a few attitude items related to the Roma.
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Hypotheses 1 and 2 in order to gain some knowledge regarding the assumed attitude 
structure prior to the construction and fielding o f  our questionnaire.
The item analysis of the data offered by the 1995 anti-Semitism research revealed 
that attitudes towards Jews in Hungary with regards to strategies of cohabitation are 
indeed arranged into the three main hypothesised clusters. A similar analysis 
conducted on the data of the 1994 survey -  containing items related to the Roma and 
the Jews as well -  further validated this hypothesis. This survey contained enough 
items related to the Roma to give a preliminary picture o f the three main clusters in 
both contexts. These results gave a firm base for Hypothesis 1 concerning the 
existence of the three main attitudinal stances -  namely assimilation, discrimination 
and tolerance -  for the consecutive phases of research.
A further analysis aimed to gain some insight into the place of the above 
described attitude clusters in different contexts, that is to test Hypothesis 2 
concerning a general preferred strategy toward minorities. Although the two surveys 
serving as bases for the present investigation were constructed for hypotheses 
considerably different from ours and therefore contained only a fraction of the items 
that would have been necessary for a thorough testing, the results quite clearly 
disproved Hypothesis 2.
The 1995 anti-Semitism survey contained only three items related to the Roma, 
all three of highly discriminatory tone. The correlation o f these three items with 
exclusionist attitude toward the Jews was significant but low (values in the range of 
.126 -  .172, p<.001). The 1995 survey allowed a comparison between the three 
attitude clusters toward the Roma and tolerant and exclusionist attitude toward Jews, 







Exclusionist .219** .500**5 -.121*
Tolerant .145* .014 .163**
*p<.OI **p<.001
The above results point to the conclusion that attitudes toward Jews and the Roma 
are interrelated but not equivalent, therefore, the assumption concerning one „meta­
attitude” independent o f the actual target of the attitude is not justified.
As a conclusion we opted to include in the questionnaire attitude items about the 
Roma and the Jews separately but not including ones about minorities in general. 
The reason behind choosing these two groups to be investigated originated in the 
concept o f the minority given by Tajfel at the beginning of this section. The Jews 2
2 Since both surveys focused principally on hostile attitudes toward the investigated groups 
the exclusionist cluster was the most refined and that fact probably contributed to the 
relatively high correlation of these clusters.
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and the Roma were the groups most often „at the receiving end of certain attitudes” 
and therefore examination o f these attitudes is more than reasonable.
Nation and nationalism
The Dekker-Malova Model o f  Nationalism
The concept o f nationalism used in the present paper had been developed by Dekker 
(1997) and his colleagues. They argued that in the field of nationalism research 
poorly defined conceptualisations are the largest obstacle for research and showed 
that the concept o f nationalism is used in the literature to cover four main categories, 
often in a rather confusing way. Nationalism in some contexts means a political 
ideology or a political movement, for others it indicates the process o f  nation­
building and finally, in other contexts it stands for a particular political orientation o f 
individuals.
Focusing on the fourth category -  on individual political orientation -  they 
pointed out that the concept o f  nationalism in this sense is frequently used as if  it 
were identical to a number o f  different national orientations such as national 
consciousness or national feeling, national identity, loyalty to the nation, patriotism, 
and also as an „umbrella concept” intermingling separate dimensions such as belief 
in kinship or blood-tie, the desire for separation, the wish for pure or homogenous 
nations, ethnocentrism and so on.
In order to further clarify the concept of nationalism -  as an attitude o f  certain 
individuals -  Dekker and Malova introduced a complex structural model o f national 
attitudes o f which nationalism is one o f the building blocks. They hypothesised -  
and empirically validated -  six main attitudes related to the concept o f  one’s own 
country and people. The six attitudes differ in the kind o f affect (positive, negative 
or neutral) and in the strength o f the feeling. The most basic one -  national feeling -  
is neutral and denotes the feeling of being part o f  the nation. The five others are 
assum ed to be positive in the basic model although trajectories for negative attitudes 
are hypothesizsd as „escape routes” for subjects with a negative identification 
pattern. The five positive attitudes are national liking, national pride, national 
preference, national superiority and nationalism.
The above mentioned attitudes are arranged into a cumulative hierarchy, that is, 
they indicate separate and hierarchically arranged stages o f attitude development in 
the context of the nation. Each stage requires its fulfilment before the next can be 








The model had been empirically tested and verified on student samples in the 
Netherlands, in Slovakia and in the Basque Autonomous Community in Spain. The 
results confirm both the existence of the hypothesized six attitudes and their 
structural relationships.
The procedure had been repeated in our survey in order to test the validity o f  the 
model in Hungary on one hand and also to use it as a reference model in determining 
the relation o f national orientations and attitudinal stances toward minorities.
The nationalism scale has been constructed by selecting and translating 19 
relevant items from the 1995 Dutch survey and also from the questionnaire used in 
Slovakia in 1995/1996.
Tabic 2. National attitudes in Hungary
Score 1 2 3 4 5
National feeling oc=83
1 .1 feel I am Hungarian 1 3 12 20 64
2. 1 feel Hungary is my country 2 3 7 17 71
National liking a=.776
3. 1 like the Hungarian language 1 2 4 19 74
4. 1 like Hungary 1 4 11 24 60
5. It is good to be a Hungarian 3 8 20 30 39
6. In general 1 like Hungarian people 0 3 22 37 38
National pride a=.788
7 .1 am proud of Hungary 4 12 23 28 33
8. 1 am proud to be Hungarian 3 7 21 27 42
9.1 am proud of what the Hungarian people 4 7 27 27 35
achieved
National preference a=.552
10. In general I prefer to have Hungarian people as
my personal contacts than people from other 
countries
20 14 32 17 17
11.1 prefer to live most of my life in Hungary than
in any other country 11 15 31 17 26
National superiority a=.65
12. In general I like Hungarian people more than 
people from other countries
13. In general Hungarian people are better than
18 18 31 20 13
their nationalities 35 18 25 14 8
14. Hungary is the best country to live in 30 20 30 10 10
Nationalisma=.759
15. I feel I share common roots, common origins 
with other Hungarians
16. I feel all Hungarians are members of a big
15 18 25 20 22
family which 1 also belong to 19 24 26 17 14
17.1 think all Hungarian people should live in 33 24 20 9 14
Hungary
18. Hungarians should not mix with other nations
19. People of other than Hungarian nationality
49 18 14 8 11
should leave the country 45 15 16 8 16
(percentage of respondents; score l=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree)
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The survey confirmed that the scale was suitable for our sample as well -  yielding 
sim ilar results as the previous studies conducted in three other countries. The whole 
national attitude scale proved to be highly reliable (Crombach ot=. 856 for all 
n ineteen items) as well as most o f the subscales, yielding Cronbach alfas ranging 
from  .83 to .65 with the exception of the National Preference scale with a low alfa 
o f  .552.
These results -  proving that the model works in several countries and languages 
regardless of the fact that various items have substantially different connotations in 
the different national contexts — further contribute to the strength of the validity of 
the model. The particular patterns of support the various items received in different 
countries are comparable but significant local variances do show up. For example, 
the item that received by far the highest support in Hungary -  in contrast to all the 
surveys done in other countries -  was item 3 (1 like the Hungarian language) 
pointing to a special role language plays in the Hungarian national consciousness.
Investigating the other end o f  the distribution pattern we find statements with 
very low support, items that required a more or less objective comparison between 
H ungary or the Hungarians and other countries or nations -  items 13 and 14 o f  the 
N ational Superiority subscale. While the respondents showed considerably stronger 
preference for Hungary or the Hungarian people where their emotional identification 
w as concerned -  see especially item 10 -  they clearly do not think their country or 
their compatriots stand the test o f  international comparison.
N ext we test the hypothesis that the structure o f  this attitude group is arranged 
into a cumulative hierarchy. To do this, we first measured the level of support for 
each attitude group represented by the six subscales by computing the average o f  the 
cum ulative percentages o f  ratings 4 and 5 (agreement and strong agreement).







(percentage of respondents scoring 4-5 on the subscales)
The results show indeed a gradual decline of support for the attitudes positioned 
higher in the hierarchy except for the last two levels -  National Superiority and 
N ationalism  -  where the distance is smaller. The fact that Nationalism scores 
som ew hat higher than National Superiority -  as opposed to the prediction o f  the 
model -  probably arises from the above mentioned difference between emotional 
identification with certain concepts related to the nation and the evaluation o f  the 
sam e issues. While Hungarians strongly identify with their country as expressed by 
certain items of National Preference and Nationalism they do not think their country 
is the best or their compatriots are better than other nations -  therefore their feeling 
o f  National Superiority is too weak to form the fifth stage of the Pyramid.
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The next test to validate the hypothesis was to investigate the correlations 
between the subscales. The correlations were in the moderate range, varying from 
.35 to .72, none of them exceeding .80, which justified the separate but interrelated 
treatment o f  the subscales.
Assuming that the previously confirmed hierarchy is a cumulative one -  that is 
each stage must be reached before the next can be developed -  would ideally mean 
that differences between attitudes at the shortest distance are lower than those 
between attitudes at a larger distance in the hierarchy. Computing the dissimilarity 
of the attitudes represented by the subscales was very successful in proving the 
hypothesised structure o f the hierarchy -  the larger the assumed distance between 
the levels, the more dissimilar the attitudes are. These results appear in the 
dissimilarity matrix below as a pattern where figures become higher reading the 
matrix from top to bottom and from right to left.
Table 4. Euclidean dissimilarity coefficient matrix of the national attitude subscales
Г 2. 3. 4. 5.
National National National National National
Feeling Liking Pride Preference Superiority
1. National Feeling
2. National Liking 13.0
3. National Pride 20.0 14.9
4. National Preference 33.8 29.0 25.4
5. National Superiority 41.4 36.6 30.8 18.8
6. Nationalism 41.3 37.2 31.4 22.5 17.2
To sum up, we have successfully validated the Dekker-Malova model of 
Nationalism on a Hungarian sample. Despite the differences in the amount of 
support expressed in relation to some of the items o f the scale in different countries 
the model in itself proved to be applicable in Hungary, exhibiting similar structural 
characteristics as those formulated in the original theory.
The concept o f the nation
One o f the most important intercultural problems o f the Central-Eastern European 
region is the disparity o f  national and ethnic boundaries, the often ambiguous 
relationship between ethnic/national affiliation and citizenship and the conflicts 
arising from these two aspects o f national identification. One element o f  the above 
described phenomenon is the ambiguous perception o f the concepts such as nation, 
state and nationality. In order to reveal in detail the attitude structure organised 
around the notion o f the nation in the next phase o f the research we investigated how 
the respondents perceive concepts such as nation, state and nationality. Empirical 
investigations have been conducted in that area since the early seventies in Hungary 
revealing an ambiguous and inconsistent comprehension o f these notions. This 
ambiguity can be detected both in relation to the defining criteria of the nation as 
people -  i.e. what criteria one has to meet in order to be considered Hungarian -  and 
also in the definition o f the nation in cultural versus political terms as captured by
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the perception of the role o f  the minorities in relation to the nation, that is whether 
different ethnic groups in Hungary and Hungarian minorities outside the borders of 
the country are considered to be members of the Hungarian nation.
As regards to the cultural versus political concept o f  the nation a series o f  surveys 
starting from 1973 revealed the dominance o f  the political nation-concept in the 
seventies (for a summary see Lázár 1996). At the same time the studies conducted 
by Hunyadi and his colleagues (1974, 1975) investigated the defining criteria o f the 
nation. Their analysis revealed two main types o f  definitions: one segment o f  the 
respondents considered „Hungarianness” as a natural or ascribed attribute, defined 
by birthplace or mother language, while others regarded it rather as something that 
can be achieved by learning or chosen by self-definition.
The past 25 years brought the gradual strengthening o f a cultural-linguistic-ethnic 
concept beside the still existing political one, reflected in the increasing portion of 
the population considering Hungarians living in other countries belonging to the 
nation while ethnic-national groups living in Hungary are also still regarded as part 
o f  the Hungarian nation.
We have repeated the procedure in our survey with the same set o f categories 
used in earlier studies to clarify the concept o f the nation held by the respondents in 
our study.
Table 5. The role of minorities in the definition of the nation
Hungarians living in West-European countries 72
Hungarians living in neighbouring countries 82
Nationalities living in Hungary 47
Jews living in Hungary 68
Gypsies living in Hungary 46
(percentage of respondents indicating that he or she considers one or more groups 
out of the above five to be constituent of the nation)
O ur results indicate the dominance of the ethnic-cultural concept o f the nation 
am ong the respondents. Around three quarter o f  the respondents considered 
Hungarians living in other countries belonging to the Hungarian nation while less 
than half of them think the same way about national minorities and Gypsies living in 
Hungary. Altogether 25 per cent of the respondents considered only Hungarians 
living outside Hungary part o f  the nation but no members o f other minorities -  thus 
revealing a purely ethnic-cultural concept o f the nation.
The results also show a relatively strong tendency to exclude Gypsies from being 
an integral part of the nation but not considerably more so than other ethnic groups. 
A lthough a .56 correlation between considering Gypsies or other national minorities 
as part of the nation indicates that there might be different acceptance patterns 
behind the similar numbers. Jews are somewhat in the middle, around two-thirds of 
the respondents considered them to be a part o f the nation, a result that might imply 
the highly assimilated-integrated status of Jews and also the ambiguity o f  their 
perception as an ethnic group.
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Parallel to the shift from a political to a cultural conceptualisation o f  the nation, in 
the past 30 years a similar transformation process went on concerning the key 
criterion for membership in a nation. According to the above cited investigations 
being Hungarian was mostly defined as some sort o f attachment to the country in the 
early seventies while in the next twenty years more and more people considered 
linguistic-cultural attachment and self-definition also important elements. In our 
sample the results were the followings.
Table 6. Defining criteria of being Hungarian
Those born in Hungary 38
Hungarian citizens 39
Whose mother tongue is Hungarian 60
Who considers him /herself Hungarian 78
(percentage o f respondents indicating that he/she considers one or more 
o f these groups Hungarian)
These results are consistent with that o f the previous section: the defining criteria for 
being Hungarian also reflect a cultural rather than a political conceptualisation o f the 
nation, with an even stronger emphasis on self-definition. These results are in 
accordance with the outcome o f an 1985 survey by Lázár and Dobossy revealing a 
rank order of importance o f  defining factors „indicating that the criteria o f  being 
considered Hungarian are arranged in the minds o f  people according to the degree of 
conscious choice, o f the identification with being Hungarian versus the outcome of 
chance” (Lázár 1996: 57). Looking at the data in a more detailed analysis supports 
these results: according to 23 per cent o f the sample self-definition in itself is an 
adequate criterion while another 16 per cent considered self-definition coupled with 
mother tongue to be a sufficient basis for accepting someone as Hungarian.
Investigating the interrelation o f the two nation-concepts we found that those who 
only accept self-definition combined with language -  strong cultural criteria -  as the 
basis for belonging to the nation actually do have a cultural rather than a political 
concept of the nation, expressed in a lower-than-average acceptance o f  ethnic and 
national minorities and above-average recognition o f Hungarians living outside the 
borders. On the other hand indicating all four items -  self-definition, language, place 
o f birth and citizenship -  as defining criteria implies a tolerant rather than 
constraining attitude expressed by an above-average acceptance rate for all five 
minority categories.
Having the two nation-concepts defined on the sample as a whole we tested the 
assumption that respondents o f different levels o f  national identification might hold 
different concepts about the nation. In other words, we investigated whether 
different scores achieved on the nationalism scale correspond to differences in the 
views concerning the defining criteria and conceptualization of the nation.
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Table 7. The changing concept of the nation by degree of nationalism
Sample Scores on the Nationalism scale
average
1 2 3 4 5
Hungarians living in West-European countries 72 63 77 68 71 76
Hungarians living in neighbouring countries 82 74 83 82 84 86
Nationalities living in Hungary 47 72 54 44 22 9
Jews living in Hungary 68 96 79 60 40 9
Gypsies living in Hungary 46 75 59 40 14 0
(percentage of respondents; score l=refusal of all nationalistic items, 
5=acceptance of nationalistic items)
The results show that respondents who completely refuse nationalistic views have a 
relatively strong political concept of the nation as compared to the sample average. 
This is indicated in a relatively lower acceptance rate for Hungarian minorities 
living outside the borders o f  Hungary as part o f  the nation but a very high 
acceptance level -  72-96 per cent -  for ethnic and national minorities within the 
country. As identification w ith nationalistic attitudes increases we see an abrupt 
decrease of acceptance concerning minorities in Hungary — resulting in less than 10 
percent for Jews and national minorities and zero (!) for Gypsies -  indicating an 
alm ost total rejection o f  a political definition of the nation but largely accepting it in 
ethnic terms as a correlate of strong nationalistic attitudes. Overall the 
transformation of the nation-concepts parallel to the strengthening of nationalistic 
attitudes is very clear in the case o f the vanishing political concept of the nation but 
less so in the case of the increasing ethnic-cultural concept.
In terms of the defining criteria of who is considered Hungarian, the picture is 
less clear. The first variable — being born in Hungary — is basically accepted by 
roughly a third of the respondents in all subgroups and in the whole sample as well. 
Citizenship is given a decreasing emphasise with growing nationalism, a process 
w hich is consistent with the simultaneous decline o f  the political nation-concept. 
Self-definition gets clearly limited as national affiliation increases and is most 
probably going also through a transformation o f  connotations. While people with 
non-nationalistic attitudes consider self-definition as an option to be chosen or not 
by minorities, nationalists expect certain groups, namely Hungarians living outside 
Hungary, to define themselves as Hungarians.
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Table 8. Acceptance of the various defining criteria of being Hungarian 
by degree of nationalism
Sample Scores on the Nationalism scale 
average
1 2 3 4 5
Those born in Hungary 38 35 37 43 38 38
Hungarian citizens 39 44 48 31 25 29
Whose mother tongue is 1 lungarian 60 51 68 56 53 67
Who considers him/herself Hungarian 78 84 86 72 67 67
(percentage of respondents; score l=refusal of all nationalistic items, 
5=acceptance of all nationalistic items)
The Dekker-Malova model o f Nationalism focused on the process o f developing 
and strengthening national attitudes culminating at the level of Nationalism. The 
above described investigation gave us some insight into the parallel processes as 
well: the changes in the meaning o f  some of the concepts and in the association of 
these views and the attitudes under study.
The above results further establish the hypothesis which posits systematic 
relationships between various national orientations and attitudes toward cohabitant 
minority groups. We have seen that strong identification with nationalistic attitudes 
correlates with an ethnic rather than political conceptualisation of the nation. That in 
itself indicates a strong obstacle to attempts for assimilation on the part o f  minority 
group members since such view emphasises the ascribed nature of the nation and 
does not leave much space for self-categorisation. Therefore, part o f the original 
hypothesis can be refined: we can assume that assimilationist views o f  the majority 
group are decreasing as national affiliations gather strength. On the other hand, we 
still do not know what stage one has to achieve with respect to national affiliations 
to support discrimination toward these non-assimilated groups rather than to tolerate 
their being an ethnically-culturally different fraction o f the society.
Attitudes toward minorities
Attitudes toward the Roma
The survey questionnaire contained 34 items related to majority attitudes toward the 
Roma population in Hungary. A factor analysis conducted on these items revealed 
four main clusters of attitudes: beside the originally hypothesised assimilationist, 
tolerant and discriminationist dispositions there was a fourth one expressing 
antiracist, positive discriminatory opinions.
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Table 9. Assimilationist attitudes toward the Roma
Assimilationist scale
(Cronbach a=.698)
1 2 3 4 5 Mean
score
1. Gypsies should be forced to live like 
others
15 16 22 18 29 3.3
2. Gypsies should be totally Magyarised
3. Intermarriages between Gypsies and
43 27 19 7 4 2.02
a non-Gypsies can only be lasting if the 
Gypsy partner completely conforms 
to the other
38 15 27 9 11 2.39
, FACTOR 1
4. There are decent Gypsies but the 
majority of them are not so
5. Although there are many poor people
6 11 17 22 44 3.87 f
among Gypsies and non-Gypsies 
as well, but Gypsies do much less 
to help their situation 
6. Gypsies should be primarily blamed
7 8 15 26 44 3.92
/
for the aversions toward them 
7. The problems of the Gypsies would be
3 10 21 25 41 3.92
3.57solved if they finally started to work 7 14 23 27 29
8. Rich Gypsies should support the 
poor ones
9. The main obstacle in the way of the Roma
8 4 22 21 45 3.93
у  FACTOR 11.
integration is their low level of education, 
the lack of professional training 
10. Gypsies can best integrate into the society
8 9 16 26 41 3.83
if they live dispersed and not in closed 
communities
11. The basic problem of the Gypsies arises
10 10 30 27 23 3.41
FACTOR Ш.
from their lack of a home country 24 12 19 20 25 3.07 У
Total3 0 9 47 42 2 3.37
Assimilationist attitudes toward the Roma can be grouped into three further 
subcategories according to a supplementary factor analysis performed on the eleven 
items of the scale. The largest factor consists o f items — the first six in the above 
table -  expressing very strong, even aggressive assimilationist claims coupled with 
the view that blames exclusively the Roma for their disadvantageous situation. The 
distribution of the answers shows that the latter element -  the „blame” -  received 
high agreement, while forced assimilation is supported only concerning life-style 
differences and the respondents would not accept total assimilation.
The second group o f attitudes -  numbered seven to ten in the above table -  
consists of opinions related to more or less objective factors influencing the life of 
the Roma, such as lack o f education, segregation and economical factors that hinder 
integration. Generally these statements received strong agreement. The one which 
received the least support was related to the question o f  segregation, an issue that
3 Total score has been calculated by the following procedure. First the scores given for the 
individual items had been summed, then ranges of these numbers recoded, whereby score of 
1 to 1.5 were recoded into score 1, scores between 1.6-2.5 were recoded into score 2 and so 
on to produce a 5 point scale again for comparison.
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roused heated debates in several towns and villages in Hungary in the past few 
years.
Finally, a third factor emerged consisting o f the single item related to the lack of 
a home country for the Roma, an item that had the lowest factor score on the 
assimilationist factor in the first analysis and one that could not elicit a marked 
rating pattern.
Distribution o f the total scores shows that assimilationist attitudes were largely 
accepted, nonetheless, only a very small fraction o f  the sample supported them 
wholeheartedly. The mean score of the scale for the whole sample is 3.37, the 
highest result among the four scales4.
Table 10. Tolerant attitudes toward the Roma
Tolerance scale 1 2 3 4 5 Mean
(Cronbach a=,854) score
1. Gypsies should be allowed to live their life according to 
their own customs and culture until it does not disturb others 2 3 11 21 63 4.37
2. The art of the Gypsies enriches Hungarian culture 19 16 22 21 22 3.11
3. Gypsies must not abandon their traditions 
4 Gypsies should be supported in their efforts to maintain their
10 12 24 2$ 29 3 51
traditions, language and culture
5. There should be a choice of schools for Gypsies to send their
17 15 ts> OC 20 20 3.14
children to, teaching in Roma language or in Hungarian 
6. Gypsy children should be able to learn also in their mother-tongue
21 11 24 21 23 3.13
in the school 19 16 28 19 18 3 02
7. Gypsies should be enabled to manage their affairs by themselves
8. Gypsies arc prepared in every way to pass decisions concerning
15 15 29 24 17 3.11
their own affairs
9. There is nothing wrong with teenage childbirth for example if this
18 21 22 22 17 2.98
is all right according to their customs 41 16 17 12 14 2.42
Total 5 19 38 32 6 3.14
Results related to the first item of the tolerance scale might suggest that our 
respondents would demonstrate a very high level o f  tolerance, at least in principle, 
were the différences between the way o f life o f  the Roma and the others not so 
disturbing. However, the sudden drop o f support shown for items related to any 
specific differences indicates that the reality is somewhat different.
Cultural differences are largely tolerated while autonomy is questioned and the 
different lifestyle is clearly refused. Respondents supported the maintenance of 
Roma culture and traditions but did not really consider it part of the colourful 
cultural life o f the country and were even less willing to support it.
As regards to statements concerning the education of Roma children in their 
mother tongue, these are neither really supported nor rejected and both are 
significantly and negatively correlated with the highly supported statement about 
segregated schools (see item 6 o f the Discrimination scale, r=-.319 and r=-.226 with 
item 5 and item 6 o f the Tolerance scale, p<.00l). This result implies that according
4 All means differ significantly (p<01) except in the case of tolerance and discrimination.
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to the view of a large proportion of our respondents Roma children should go to 
separate schools but what and how they learn there bears not much importance.
The strong refusal o f  teenage childbirth among the Roma clearly expresses an 
intolerance toward a markedly different life style but significant negative correlation 
with item 8 of the Discrimination scale (r=-282, p<.001) implies that it is a not so 
subtle expression o f  fear o f  the increasing proportion o f  Roma in the population of 
the country. 1
The general attitude the results of the above two scales reveals can be described 
as a strong inclination on the part o f members o f  the majority society to push the 
Roma in the direction o f  loosing their distinct attributes -  primarily fhose that are in 
contrast with the way non-Rom a people conduct their lives. The emphasis is not on 
cultural assimilation as regards to language usage or cultural traditions but on 
rem oving factors that hinder their ^absorption into mainstream society. The 
realisation of the assimilation process is largely seen as being the task o f the Roma 
community coupled with the view that unsuccessful assimilation originates there 
too.
Table 11. Discriminationist attitudes toward the Roma
Discrimination scale 1 2 3 4 5 Mean
(Cronbach a=923) score
1 The customs of the Gypsies and the non-Gypsies differ 
so much that intermarriages cannot be lasting 32 23 22 12 11 2.48
2. Gypsies will never integrate into Hungarian society 9 13 24 23 31 3.57
3. Gypsies do not deserve support
4. Gypsies should be totally separated from the rest of society
31 20 22 9 18 2.66
as they are incapable of coexistence 
5. It is laudable that there are still public places where Gypsies
40 17 14 10 19 2.52
are not welcome 24 16 16 13 31 3.16
6. Everyone has the right to send their children to schools where 
there are no Gypsy children
7. Residents of villages and towns in Hungary should have
13 12 17 11 47 3.67
the option to chose whether to let Gypsies to settle there 
8. The increase in the number of Gypsy population threatens
23 18 16 16 27 3.1
the security of the society 7 14 22 21 36 3.69
9. Criminal inclination is in the blood of the Gypsies
10. Policemen should have greater freedom of action against
23 19 16 18 24 3.03
Gypsy than non-Gypsy criminals 51 13 13 8 15 2.26
Total 8 33 26 21 12 2.97
The peaceful coexistence o f  Roma and non-Roma individuals in the private sphere 
seems possible in the views o f  the respondents as expressed in the strong rejection of 
the first item as opposed to their opinion about social integration -  see item 2 -  
w hich is rather pessimistic. W hile the two items are closely related (r=.447, p<.001), 
the rating patterns elicited by the two are mirror images.
The majority of the respondents accept the need for social support for the Roma 
but very strongly refuse positive discrimination, as shown in the case of item 2 of 
the anti-racist scale.
Segregation in various contexts receives different amounts of support. 
Segregation in schools is highly advocated, a result that is more weighty given that 
these ratings are given by secondary school students. This result differs from those 
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produced by adult samples where items measuring inclination for social distancing 
also often include a statement about the mixed education of Roma and non-Roma 
children but there it is usually rather easily accepted (see e.g. Tomka 1979). Tomka 
(1991) summarizing the results o f surveys conducted between 1978 and 1989 in this 
topic concludes that support for segregation in different contexts largely depends on 
the extent to which the issue in question concerns the respondents personally. 
Therefore, adults see Gypsies moving into their neighborhood as much less 
acceptable than integrated schooling or mixed marriage -  the latter is highly unlikely 
to occur, therefore not threatening -  while in our sample of students the question of 
segregated schooling was o f high personal involvement and received one o f  the 
highest agreement rate5.
Total social segregation is rather strongly rejected but at the same time 
acceptance of Gypsy inhabitants in neighborhoods is seen as a matter o f decision to 
be made by the residents -  that is implicitly a vote for settlement segregation. Issues 
concerning separation in public places are evaluated ambiguously yielding rather 
high frequencies o f total rejection and total agreement as well.
Statements implying racial discrimination receive different degrees o f  support. 
One o f the items receiving the highest agreement (mean=3.66) is the one related to 
the threat posed by the growing number o f  the Roma population -  an opinion that 
inherently connects the Roma with criminality. On the other hand the statement 
about Gypsy criminality being „genetic” -  the most racist item -  yields a „U” shape 
rating profile and a mean o f 3.00. Finally negative discrimination concerning police 
conduct is very strongly rejected. However, a discriminate analysis o f  the 
interrelations o f these three items reveals that a racist disposition does influence 
views on Roma criminality. Investigating the answer patterns of respondents giving 
a score o f five on item 9 -  strong racist diposition -  yields the following results: 
each such respondent (100 per cent) gave a score o f  four or five on item 8 — related 
to the threat to security o f  society -  and 62 percent rated item 10 -  different 
behaviour by the police -  with a score of 4 or 5.
Table 12. Anti-racist attitudes toward the Roma
Anti-racist, positive discriminatory scale
(Cronbach a=.923)
1 2 3 4 5 Mean
score
1. The Hungarian government should do more in favour 31 18 30 11 10 2.51
of the Roma
2. Gypsies should receive more help than non-Gypsies 64 17 12 5 2 1.65
3. The greatest obstacle for Gypsies in their integration efforts 20 19 20 20 21 3.03
into Hungarian society is people’s aversion to Gypsies
4 The Gypsy question is the result of racism 25 16 25 17 17 2.84
Total 18 38 33 10 1 2.38
5 These results seriously question the overall applicability of the Bogardus scale but support 
the view that the items of the scale might have different connotations relative to the context.
55
The last factor of the Roma-related attitudes is the collection of explicitly anti-racist 
and positive discriminatory statements that received the lowest level o f agreement 
am ong the four factors. Positive discriminatory actions are clearly rejected, the more 
explicitly they involve financial action, the more so. Although the negative role of 
anti-Gypsy attitudes in the integration process o f  the Roma are acknowledged by a 
considerable fraction o f  the respondents, the roots o f  the Roma problems seem to be 
found elsewhere.
Attitudes toward the Jews
The questionnaire involved 28 items related to attitudes toward Jews in Hungary. 
Factor analysis revealed that twenty-one of these belong to the three hypothesised 
attitudinal stances, namely assimilationist, tolerant and discriminationist directions 
while the remaining seven items either did not appear on these three factors with 
interpretable factor scores or belonged to two very small, further factors. The three 
scales presented below are products of the factor analysis; a consecutive item 
analysis had been conducted in addition on the items o f  the tolerance scale in order 
to create a scale with acceptable reliability measures.
Table 13. Discrinationist attitudes toward the Jews
Discrimination scale
(Cronbach a=.856)
1 2 3 4 5 Mean
Score
1. Jewish emigration from Hungary should be encouraged 61 13 11 4 11 1.92
2. Jews should better live in their own state, in Israel 32 22 19 10 17 2.56
3. Jews disintegrate and weaken nations that assimilate them 46 21 14 8 11 2.15
4. The number of Jews should be limited in certain professions 56 10 12 8 14 2.15
5. The interest of Jews in Hungary often differ from that 16 17 30 17 20 3.09
of non-Jews
6. Jews still have to change considerably for their differences 30 19 24 11 16 2.62
to disappear
7. Jews are not really willing to integrate into the Hungarian 29 22 28 14 7 2.5
society
8. Jews are primarily to be blamed for the aversion toward them 42 21 18 5 14 2.28
Total 26 35 23 12 4 2.34
Statements on the discrimination scale which questioned the relationship between 
the Hungarian Jewry and the nation generally received strong disapproval but we 
found some variation am ong the three items (see items 1-3 in the above table). 
W hile the majority o f  the respondents did not identify with ideas that deeply 
questioned the place o f  Jews among the population o f  the country, only over half o f 
them rejected (gave a score o f  1 or 2) the statement that said that Jews should live in 
Israel. Since this latter item correlates very strongly with the items supporting 
emigration (r=.69 with item 1., p<001) and regarding Jews as a threat to the nation 
(r=.66 with item 3., p<.001), we can conclude that it is not an expression o f support 
for Jewish nationalism but it belongs to the attitude group expressing ecxlusionist 
opinions, although in a subtler form.
56
Restrictions concerning the number o f Jews in certain fields of professions would 
be acceptable for a quarter o f the respondents while it is refused by two third of 
them.
As regard to differences or distance perceived between Jews and others, half of 
the respondents do not see Jews considerably different from the rest o f  society and 
see no problem with their integration efforts. Respondents’ views regarding the issue 
o f  potential interest conflict is rather neutral.
Finally almost three-quarters of the respondents would not blame the Jews for the 
negative attitudes directed against them.
Table 14. Assimilationist attitudes toward the Jews
Assimilationist scale
Cronbach a=. 832)
1 2 3 4 5 Mean
score
1. Intermarriage between a Jew and a non-Jew is only acceptable 
if the Jewish partner converts to Christianity
59 16 10 6 9 1.89
2. Intermarriages between Jews and non-Jews are not good 
for any of the partners
62 13 14 5 6 1.79
3. The customs of Jews and non-Jews differ so much that 
intermarriages cannot be lasting
48 23 18 5 6 2.0
4. Children of intermarriages should not be told that one 
of their parents is Jewish
73 8 7 3 9 1.68
5. Mixed marriages can only be lasting if the Jewish partner 
completely confonns to the other
46 21 19 6 8 2.07
Total 46 30 14 4 2 1.88
Items that fall into the factor o f assimilation seem to center around the issue of 
mixed marriages and concern various aspects of intermarriage that are relevant in the context 
of assimilation. Generally speaking all these items were strongly rejected, assuming 
that potentially perceived differences between Jews and others are not identified as 
obstacles in this respect and also expressing the view that intermarriages are not 
seen as tools for assimilation. This latter view is further reinforced by the fact that an 
item supporting more mixed marriages (see item 2 o f the next table) received strong 
negative factor score on the assimilation factor but clearly belonged to the tolerance 
scale.
Altogether the mean total score of the assimilation scale is by far the lowest not 
only in the Jewish context but among all the six scales including the Roma context 
as well. That fact most probably resulted from the highly assimilated status of 
Hungarian Jewry.
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Table. 15. Tolerant attitudes toward the Jews
Tolerance scale
(Cronbach a=. 739)
1 2 3 4 5 Mean
score
1. It is not interesting any more whether someone 19 18 19 22 22 3.10 ,.
is Jewish or not nowadays in Hungary 
2. More intermarriages between Jews and non-Jews 24 16 46 9 5 2.56
would be preferable
3. There is nothing wrong with tire fact that someone 26 10 20 17 27 3.09 У Factor 1.
feels and declares him/herself Jewish in one 
situation and Hungarian in others 
4. Jews belong to the Hungarian nation 13 11 16 20 40 3.58
5. Being Jewish or not has no significance 14 9 14 16 47 3.73
concerning marriage
6. Jewish integration into Hungarian society 14 15 25 25 21 3.22
is primarily hindered by anti-Semitism 
7. It is inconceivable why Jews are hated 14 10 19 18 39 3.22 '_ Factor II.
8. The Jewish question was invented by the 20 11 29 17 23 3.24
anti-Semites
Total 4 15 43 37 1
J
3.18
According to a further factor analysis conducted on the items of the tolerance scale 
attitudes expressing a tolerant disposition toward Jews can be grouped into two 
further subcategories. The first five statements in the above table express the view 
that differentiation between Jews and others is not relevant or interesting while the 
last three items are related to negative attitudes toward Jews which still create 
differences and hinder integration.
Altogether we can conclude that attitudes expressing tolerance toward Jews in 
Hungary received the highest rate of agreement, discriminationist views meet some 
disapproval, while assimilationist dispositions are the least supported by our 
respondents.
In this section we have examined the main clusters o f  attitudes articulated toward 
the Jews and the Roma in Hungary. The results further disproved our initial 
hypothesis related to the existence of a generally preferred attitudinal strategy 
toward all minorities -  irrespective of the actual nature o f  the group in question. We 
could see that support for the three main strategies -  assimilation, discrimination and 
tolerance -  differ considerably regarding the two minority groups we investigated. 
These results are in accordance with other comparative studies concerning national 
and ethnic minorities in Hungary, which were summarised by Lázár as follows: 
’’[A cceptance of minorities depends less on the cultural level... of the recipient but 
more on the cultural distance o f the recipients and the accepted, that is the cultural... 
level o f the accepted” (Lázár 1996: 54). Our findings of considerably different 
dispositions toward the two groups elicited from a sample which was relatively 
homogenous in terms o f  cultural level thus underline Lázár’s argument that the 
determining factor in this context is the perceived distance of the minority group 
from mainstream society.
Comparing the relative support for the three main strategies in relation to the two 
groups we studied we see an inverse pattern. Regarding the Jews tolerant attitudes 
proved to be the strongest, a result which can be attributed to the high cultural level
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of this group that makes acceptance relatively easy. Discriminationist attitudes were 
located in the middle while assimilationist strategies received very low support - 
probably due to the highly assimilated status of the Hungarian Jewry.
The same analysis revealed the opposite distribution of agreement concerning the 
Roma. In their case assimilation received significantly higher support than tolerance 
and discrimination, the two latter clusters yielding similar acceptance levels. These 
results can be accounted for, on one hand, by the fact that the content o f  negative 
prejudices concerning the Roma expresses mostly conflicts arising from the 
differences in the way o f life o f the Roma and the non-Roma. Respondents seem to 
think that to solve the problem, the differences between the Roma and non-Roma 
must be eradicated mostly through the Roma adapting a non-Roma life-style, a 
process many believe can be accelerated by forced assimilation. On the other hand, 
the Roma are often accepted as an ethnic group with distinct cultural traditions, the 
maintenance of which is supported and cultural assimilation to this extent is 
perceived as unnecessary, which is a factor which increases tolerance.
Investigation of Hypothesis 3 -  the structural relation of national 
orientations and attitudes toward the minorities
Lázár (1996) investigated various factors behind the different attitudes in relation to 
the problems o f the Roma and found that the concept o f the nation held by the 
respondent was the main determinant beside socio-economic variables.
Assuming that the relationship we found between the understanding o f the notion 
o f the nation and attitudes toward a minority group is o f high significance that can 
be further refined we investigated the relation o f national affiliation with attitudinal 
stances toward the Roma and the Jews. We have examined how the position 
achieved on the six levels o f national affiliation and the strength o f  support 
displayed on the three main attitude scales are related. The table below shows the 
correlations between the six Nationalism subscales and the three minority attitude 
scales -  separately for the Jewish and the Roma context.
Table 16. Correlation of national orientations anil attitudinal 
stances toward the Roma
Discrimination Assimilation Tolerance
National Feeling .2079** .2463** -.1009
National Liking .0989 .2103** -.0089
National Pride .1673* .2403** -.0583
National Preference .3098** .2973** -.2236**
National Superiority .4298** .3360** -.2898**
Nationalism .5434** .4112** -^1490*♦
*p<OI **p<.001
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Table 17. Correlation of national orientations anti attitudinal stances
toward the Jews
Discrimination Assimilation Tolerance
National Feeling .197** .161* -.152*
National Liking .148 145* -.130
National Pride 199** 174* -.169*
National Preference .270** .280** -.154*
National Superiority .373** .374** -247**
Nationalism .529** .546** -.385**
* p<.01 ** p<.00!
At the first glance we see m arked general directions in the interdependence of the 
exam ined variables in the tables above: Except for some fluctuation at the first three 
stages6, we found a close-to-linear increase in discriminationist and assimilationist 
attitudes as national affiliations became more pronounced and as tolerance 
decreased. The fact that there is a vast gap between the level o f National Pride and 
Preference in almost all the six cases might imply that attitudes making up the levels 
o f  the Nationalism Pyramid not only increase in strength from the bottom o f the 
pyramid to the top but there might be a qualitative change between the level of 
N ational Pride and Preference. It is from the level o f  National Preference and 
onward where attachment to the nation involves some sort of comparison between 
one’s own nation and others, an association that might strongly interfere with 
attitudes toward groups not unambiguously constituting the core of the nation.
The first pattern o f relations obvious from both tables is that none o f the 
nationalism subscales have a positive relationship with tolerance. In the case o f the 
Roma the first three stages -  from national feeling to national pride -  have no 
significant relation with tolerance while the top three levels -  from national 
preference to nationalism -  show highly significant, strong negative correlations. 
The same connections are even more marked in the case o f Jews where all levels of 
national affiliations but national liking are significantly and negatively correlated 
with tolerance. These results imply that tolerance toward the Jews -  the most 
supported strategy in the sample in general -  declines as soon as one enters the 
Pyramid of Nationalism with the exception of the stage o f  National Liking, while in 
the case of the Roma tolerance starts to decrease with the appearance o f National
6 Factor analysis conducted on the items of the Nationalism scale did not separate the items of 
National Feeling and National Liking. Therefore we attempted to solve the irregularity 
experienced at the first three levels by combining the six items of National Feeling and Liking. 
Correlations of this combined subscale with the attitudes toward the minorities fit into the 
structure of the assumed pyramid much better than the original two separate subscales.
Assimilationist iDiscriminationist |Tolerant Assimilationist IDiscriminationist |Tolerant





243** .148* -.049 .164* .177** -.148*
* p<01, **p<.001
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Preference. The difference between the attitudes toward the two minorities in this 
case might be attributed to the difference between the symbolic functions o f  anti- 
Semitism closely associated with national sentiments and the rather ethnocentric 
attitudes toward the Roma.
The negative correlation between National Feeling and Tolerance challenges the 
assumption of the neutrality o f  the attitude of National Feeling hypothesized by 
Dekker and Malova. In a wider context it also raises the question -  far beyond the 
scope of the present work -  whether we can postulate national affiliation or national 
identity which is neutral in affect, thus is unrelated to prejudices toward minorities.
As regards to assimilation and discrimination related to the Jews, we find a 
similar and very strong increase in both cases with the ascending in the hierarchy of 
national attitudes. However, in the case o f the Roma we can observe an interesting 
pattern of correlations: both assimilation and discrimination increase as national 
affiliations strengthen but while assimilation gains more strength in the first three 
levels, discrimination wins from the level of National Preference and onward. This 
result combined with the finding that negative correlation between national 
affiliations and tolerance turns significant from the level o f National Preference 
further supports the assumption that the gap between National Pride and Preference 
is o f greater significance than other steps in the Pyramid.
The second major step in the development o f the attitude pyramid is the last one 
from the level o f National Superiority to the level o f Nationalism where again all the 
above described tendencies gain significant strength.
Summing up the above results, we found ample support for the systematic 
interrelatedness o f the attitudes assumed in Hypotheses 3. On the other hand an 
interesting contradiction also appeared. Toward the end o f the second section we 
pointed out the connection between identification with nationalism and the 
dominance of an ethnic conceptualization of the nation, a category where national 
affiliation is seen to be a matter o f ascription rather than achievement. We refined 
Hypothesis 3 in the light o f these results since this approach to the concept o f the 
nation does not leave much space for the assimilationist attempts o f  the minorities. 
Now we can see that the cognitive structuring of this collection of attitudes does not 
follow such a strict logic, since the assimilationist expectation gains strength -  
almost parallel to the discriminationist strategy -  with the development o f  stronger 
national affiliations.
Conclusion
The study presented above investigated attitudes organised around the notion o f the 
nation, attitudes toward the Roma and the Jewish minority in Hungary and explored 
the structural relationship between the two clusters o f dispositions.
The investigation tested three hypotheses about these relationship through the use 
o f a questionnaire given to a non-representative sample o f secondary school students 
in Budapest. The data yielded by our survey provided a firm base for two o f the 
hypotheses while a third one was rejected. We could prove that the representational
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structure of attitudes toward minorities is indeed organised into three main clusters 
o r strategies: assimilation, discrimination and tolerance. We tested the validity of the 
D ekker-M alova Nationalism M odel in Hungary and found support for a systematic 
relationship between the stages o f  national orientation and attitudinal strategies 
tow ard minorities. However we had to reject the hypotheses regarding the existence 
o f  one dominant strategy tow ard minorities in general, regardless of the actual group 
in question.
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One o f the greatest problems o f empirical research on prejudice is that we must draw 
conclusions about the prejudices of members o f a surveyed groups on the basis o f 
opinions that prejudiced people in particular may be reluctant to express openly 
under certain social conditions.
As Róbert Angelusz has shown in his analyses o f latent public opinion (Angelusz 
1996a: 9-39), the main factor determining whether opinions are hidden or clearly 
manifested is the political and social system, operating mainly through the structure 
o f the public sphere. On the one hand, opinions may be hard to measure in the 
course of research because certain members o f  the society don’t readily form 
opinions about relevant subjects. On the other hand, the difficulty may stem from 
the fact that some individuals hide their opinions on account o f „a refined attempt to 
seek psychological advantage, ... existential dependence, or a fear o f harder social 
consequences” (Angelusz 1996a: 21). Even in advanced democratic societies with 
well-functioning public spheres, racial, religious, and other group prejudices belong 
in a category of opinions that are often kept hidden because their public expression 
would amount to an open breach of the consensus rejecting such views. As in the 
case o f any other form o f illegitimate public behaviour, this would give rise to 
psychological conflicts and possibly even personal disadvantage.
Research on prejudice, and on anti-Semitism in particular, has revealed a strong 
latency pressure (Latenzdruck) among respondents: they consider it risky to express 
anti-Jewish opinions. For example, in the course o f  a survey performed in Austria in 
the summer of 1991, 27 percent of respondents avoided making a response when 
they were asked whether the number of Jews in influential positions should be 
limited, while 31 percent refused to take a position on whether a law should regulate 
the amount of property or land obtainable by Austrian Jews (Karmasin 1992: 
31-34). In Germany, in 1989, 20 percent o f respondents in a survey o f a 
representative sample o f  the adult population agreed with the statement „ if  I am 
talking about Jews, 1 am always very careful, because it is very easy to get your 
fingers burnt”, while 15 percent stated that „I don’t tell just anybody what 1 think 
about Jews” (Bergmann-Erb 1991: 280). This same statement was accepted by 25 
percent of respondents in a 1993 survey of Hungarian university students, while 52 
percent of the same students thought that „if you say something bad about Jews, you 
are immediately branded an anti-Semite” (Kovács 1997: 58).
O f course, for researchers concerned with measuring anti-Semitism, the most 
important issue is whether or not the feeling o f latency pressures induces 
respondents to hide their real opinions in the course o f  the interviews. Obviously this 
will depend on whether respondents consider the sociological interview to be public 
discourse (in which case they might tend to express socially approved, conformist 
opinions) or a form o f communication that is similar to a private discussion (in
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w hich case they might tend to say what they really think even about sensitive 
issues). There is no general theoretical answer to this question. In the course o f their 
research in Germany, Bergmann and Erb concluded that while about one-quarter o f 
respondents strongly felt latency pressure, it was primarily anti-Semites -  those who 
otherw ise did not hide their opinions in the course o f  the survey -  who considered 
the expression of anti-Jewish views to be risky. According to Bergmann and Erb, 
w ho found that 12 percent o f  the whole population was very anti-Semitic and 7 
percent extremely anti-Semitic, at most a further 4 percent o f the surveyed 
population could be hidden or latent anti-Semites (Bergmann-Erb 1991: 282).
The 1993 survey o f a representative sample o f  Hungarian university and college 
students produced similar results. It was shown that those who gave anti-Semitic 
answ ers in the course o f the interview felt the strongest latency pressure, and that 
this did not stop them from openly expressing their opinions in the interview- 
situation. On the basis o f the results of the survey, I calculated that 7.5 percent o f  the 
students were extremely anti-Semitic, 18 percent were anti-Semitic, and a further 
m axim um  9 percent (but probably less) were latent anti-Semites (Kovács 1997: 59; 
62). Róbert Angelusz, on the other hand, discovered higher levels o f latent anti- 
Sem itism  following a national survey of a representative sample: over and above the 
12 percent of openly anti-Semitic respondents, he identified a further 12 percent as 
latent anti-Semites (Angelusz 1996b: 211).
The different results may perhaps be explained by the fact that different questions 
were asked. But another point to consider is the extent to which the three groups -  
W est-German respondents, Hungarian university students, and members o f  the 
representative sample o f  Hungarian society -  considered the sociological interview 
to be an anonymous and non-public situation. One could well argue that members of 
the last group were the least confident, and that this explains their tendency to hide 
their opinions. Thus, when attempting to form an impression of the strength and 
incidence of anti-Semitic prejudice in Hungary, we should definitely examine 
w hether -  owing to the fact that a significant number o f respondents conceal their 
real opinions -  it is necessary to adjust results obtained on the basis o f opinions 
openly expressed in the course o f  the interviews.
In March 1995, we conducted interviews lasting about sixty minutes with 1500 
individuals. Overall the respondents were representative o f the total adult Hungarian 
population (over 18 years o f  age) in terms of gender, age, place of residence, and 
educational qualifications.1 In order to measure anti-Semitism based on one o f the 
m ost widely employed versions o f the prejudice theories, we elaborated three 
independent scales. We created independent measurements of the content o f  anti- 
Jew ish prejudice, the emotional saturation o f prejudice, and the tendency to 
discrim inate against Jews. On the basis o f their scores on the three scales, we then
1 The survey was performed by the Gallup/Hungary Public Opinion Research Institute. The 
research was funded by OTKA (Hungarian National Research Foundation), the Soros 
Foundation, Ministry of Culture and Education, Budapest local government, Budapest 
Bank and the American Jewish Committee. Support in processing the data was provided 
by The Vidal Sasson International Center for the Study of Anti-Semitism, Jerusalem and 
Szeszlér and Partner, Lawyers’ Office. I am indebted to Mária Székelyi (ELTE Institute of 
Sociology) for her participation in the analysis of the data.
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classified respondents into three groups of differing levels of prejudice. The results 
o f our procedure are shown in table 1,2





Extreme anti-Semite 116 8
Unclassifiable 213 14
Total 1473 100
The results indicate that 29 percent o f the adult Hungarian population is non-anti- 
Semitic, 25 percent is anti-Semitic, while 32 percent accept the centuries-old 
economic stereotypes about Jews without displaying any particular anti-Semitic 
feeling.3 The attitudes o f a further 14 percent o f  the population cannot be measured 
because of the large number o f non-responses. Given their lack of any attitudes, this 
group may also be placed among the non-anti-Semites.
The above results indicate that one-quarter o f  the adult population o f present day 
Hungary may be classed as anti-Semitic. The question is, however, whether we must 
adjust this measured result because some o f the respondents concealed their real 
opinions when answering the factor questions.
Using Luhman’s definition (Luhmann 1984: 458), scholars concerned with the 
problem of latency distinguish between two forms it may take. They speak o f 
conscious or factual latency where a respondent has no developed opinions about the 
issues under examination, and of communicative or functional latency where 
participants in the communication hide their real opinions (Bergmann-Erb 1986, 
1991; Bellers 1990). Opinions may be concealed in two ways: it may be that 
respondents avoid responding to questions even though they do hold opinions; but it 
is also possible that they declare views that are not their real ones.
For our examination o f  latency, we used a group o f  questions that had already 
been used in three other surveys. The first group o f  questions measures the extent to 
which latency pressure is felt, and allows us to examine where individuals inclining 
to latency are placed on the anti-Semitism scale. The second group o f questions 
indicate how strong various respondents consider anti-Semitism to be in society, 
and, on the basis o f their position on the anti-Semitism scale, whether they see 
themselves belonging to what they consider to be the majority or the minority. This
2 For the methods and procedures of measurement, see Kovács, 1999b.
’ Respondents placed in the stereotypers’ group received a high score on the stereotype-scale 
on the basis of their significantly greater acceptance of five stereotypes -  cunning, greedy, 
materialistic, pushy, rapacious. They were not inclined, however, to accept three other 
stereotypes on the factor -  vengeful, supercilious, aggressive. Apart from the traditional 
Shylock stereotypes, members of this group were unlikely to accept the other anti-Semitic 
stereotypes; indeed, more often than not, they rejected anti-Semitic statements. Apart from 
the above five stereotypes, the opinions expressed by the group on the sclae-questions were 
more or less the same as the opinions of the non-anti-Semites, and therefore this group may 
be classified as non-anti-Semitic rather than anti-Semitic.
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analysis is important if we wish to estimate latency, because previous research has 
shown that certain groups react to latency pressure by projecting their real opinions 
onto other people, in particular onto „the majority o f  society” (Angelusz 1996b: 
205). Finally, we assessed whether individual respondents consider a series of 
statements expressing varying degrees of anti-Semitic views to be anti-Semitic or 
not. We may consider negative responses to indicate latency, because respondents 
may be able to dissolve the cognitive dissonance stemming from the illegitimate 
nature of their suppressed anti-Semitic views by declaring these views to be non- 
anti-Semitic (i.e. legitimate). As a next step indices were prepared from the 
responses to the three groups of questions which were then used as indicators of 
latency. The distribution o f  responses and the indices are shown in the following six 
tables.
Table 2. The feeling of latency pressure (percentage)
True False Don’t know/no 
response
... 1 don’t tell just anyone what I think about Jews 29 62 9
... I think many people don’t dare say openly what 
they think about Jews
54 35 11
... If you say something bad about Jews, you are 
immediately branded an anti-Semite
44 41 15
Table 3. Latency-index (percentage)
None of the statements is true 29
One of the statements is true 29
Two of the statements are true 29
All three statements are true 13











In Hungary today, how many people do 
you think are hostile to the Jews?
2 23 48 16 11 ~
And how many people might want to 
limit the influence of Jews in the 
country?
2 23 46 16 13
And how many people think it would be 
better if Jews were to emigrate?
1 17 44 24 14
Table 5. Estimate-index based on the sum of responses to the three questions 
(percentage)
There are very few anti-Semites (1-3 points) 15
There are few anti-Semites (4-6 points) 48
There are many anti-Semites (7-8 points) 14
There are very many anti-Semites (9-12 points) 14
Unable to guess (0 points) 9
66
Table 6. Are people anti-Semites if they ...(percentage)
anti-Semite non-anti-Semite DK/NR
...Always seek to know who is Jewish in their 
surrounding
23 66 11
...Don’t consider Jews living in Hungary 
to be Hungarians
57 31 12
... Wouldn’t marry a Jew 52 36 12
... Want to limit the number of Jews in certain 
professions
67 22 11
...Think that Jews can never become full 
Hungarians whatever the conditions
60 28 12
.. Think that Jews have recognisable features 19 70 11
.. .Think that the murder of Christ is the 
unforgivable sin of the Jews
37 42 21
... Think that Jews should be encouraged to emigrate 
from Hungary
77 13 10
...Think that the interests of Jews in Hungary are 
very different from the interests of non-Jews
35 50 15
...Think that Jews are no longer capable 
of integrating into Hungarian society
48 38 14
...Think that the crimes committed against the Jews 
were no greater than those against the victims 
of Communism
30 51 19
. . .Think that Jews are responsible for the period 
of Communist rule in Hungary
45 34 21
...Think that Jews divide and weaken nations 
that accept them
65 21 14
.. .Think that Jews are hostile to the Christian faith 42 39 19
Table 7. Index of denial of anti-Semitism (percentage)
0-3 statements were anti-Semitic 23
4-6 statements were anti-Semitic 25
7-9 statements were anti-Semitic 28
10-14 statements were anti-Semitic 24
Thus, in the surveyed population, there are two groups whom we may suspect o f 
concealing their real opinions in the course o f  the interviews or of not expressing 
their real attitudes. The first group are those respondents who gave no real answers 
to a great number o f  the questions, i.e. those who did not answer or who selected the 
„don’t know” response. The second group comprises o f respondents who perhaps 
did not say what they were really thinking and responded to the questions raised 
with answers they considered to be appropriate or legitimate.
Two types of motivation may explain why a respondent avoids answering 
questions. Some people simply may not have developed opinions about the issues 
raised; perhaps the problems of the survey are o f  no interest to them. But it is also 
possible that the refusal to give a full answer is a means of hiding opinions. Using 
Luhman’s categories, the first group is characterised by factual latency, and the 
second group by communication latency. Gilljam and Granberg call the former „real
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nonattitudes or true negatives”, and the latter „pseudo-nonattitudes or false 
negatives” (Gilljam-Granberg 1993: 349). Our analysis should concentrate 
primarily on this second group.
W e examined the group o f  respondents who regularly avoided answering with the 
help o f  the questions we had used to divide the respondents into groups according to 
the strength of anti-Semitism. The share of no responses to the 25 questions used to 
form the anti-Semitism scale was the following:
Table 8. The proportion of no response (NR) and don’t know (DK) answers 
to the 25 scale questions (percentage)
Zero DK/NR 43
Less than 10 percent DK/NR 19
10-20 percent DK/NR 16
20-30 percent DK/NR 6
30-40 percent DK/NR 6
More than 40 percent DK/NR 10
Thus, 22 percent o f respondents gave no answer to at least six questions, which 
means in effect that they gave no full answers to the questions about the strength o f  
anti-Semitic prejudice. In this group, respondents who avoided answering more than 
ten questions (40 percent) form the only clearly identifiable subgroup: in this group 
there are significantly higher than average numbers o f  village inhabitants, poorly 
educated people, people with low status, and poor people -  all of whom also often 
failed to give full responses to the questions examining general economic and 
political attitudes. Also o f  interest is the fact that women are slightly more inclined 
to avoid answering, while a higher propensity to respond is characteristic o f 
Budapest residents. We also examined whether we could identify differences 
between the various groups (classified according to their propensity to avoid 
responding) in terms o f  the strength of xenophobia, anomie, and conservatism -  that 
is, on the basis of three attitudes which, according to the results of our previous 
survey, give rise to anti-Semitism (Kovács 1999: 413). Our examination did not 
reveal any significant differences. This result again indicates that refusal o f response 
usually reflects a lack o f  attitudes rather than latency.
This impression is strengthened by the analysis carried out with the help o f  the 
latency-index and the estimate-index. The suspicion o f  latency arises above all in 
connection with those who failed to give full responses to a great number o f 
questions but who, on the other hand, were placed in relatively high positions on the 
latency and estimate indices. An analysis o f the responses revealed that 73 o f  those 
321 persons (22 percent o f the total surveyed population) who gave no response to 
more than 20 percent o f  the scale questions (i.e. to more than five questions) agreed 
with at least two o f the statements forming the latency index, while forty o f  them 
thought that anti-Semites are very numerous in Hungary, and sixteen o f them 
featured in the group with high scores on both indices. Based on these results, we 
may state that between 5 percent and 25 percent o f  those who avoided giving full 
responses may, in doing so, have concealed their anti-Semitic prejudice. This makes 
between 1 percent and 5 percent of the full sample.
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Closer study o f the group revealed once again that in a large majority o f  cases the 
refusal o f response was more likely to indicate non-attitude or factual latency. 
When, for instance, we examined whether, within the group of non-anti-Semites, 
there were any differences between those suspected o f latency and the others in 
terms o f the strength o f  attitudes such as xenophobia, anomie, and conservatism (all 
o f which have a proven causal role in the formation o f  anti-Semitic prejudice), we 
found no significant differences. Thus, employing Gilljam and Granberg’s category, 
we may classify this group as „real nonattitudes or true negatives”. This means that, 
when measuring anti-Semitism, we were right not to regard the group of 
unclassifiables (i.e. those with a large number o f no responses) as anti-Semites.
O f course, the suspicion o f  latency does not only arise in the case o f  those who 
avoided answering many questions. It is also possible that some respondents gave 
misleading answers rather than answering what they really thought. If  a large 
number of the respondents reacted to the feeling o f  latency pressure by giving 
conformist answers, and on the basis of these answers were placed among the non- 
anti-Semites, then we must definitely adjust our estimate of the proportion o f anti- 
Semites. Thus, we have to examine whether the group that was placed among the 
non-anti-Semites on the basis o f its answers but received high scores on the latent 
scale, is in reality anti-Semitic.
Among non-anti-Semites there was a fairly large group of those who felt latency 
pressure. O f 897 non-anti-Semites 239 individuals (27 percent) felt that there are 
many anti-Semites in the country and 386 (43 percent) agreed with at least two of 
the latency index statements. The number o f  non-anti-Semites who received high 
scores on both indices, i.e. who agreed with at least two of the latency index 
statements and who were also o f the view that there are many anti-Semites in the 
country, was 112, which is more than 12 percent o f the non-anti-Semites’ group.
A more detailed examination revealed that in the first group -  the group that is 
non-anti-Semitic but supposes a high number o f anti-Semites -  there were 
significantly higher than average numbers o f  young people (18-29 age group), 
residents of. Budapest, the better educated, and middle class people. This result 
corresponds with the findings o f  Róbert Angelusz, who also concluded that highly 
educated and young Budapest residents belong in this group (Angelusz 1996b: 207). 
In terms o f the strength of attitudes that give rise to anti-Semitism, however, the 
group suspected o f latency was no different from the other non-anti-Semitic groups.
The group that is non-anti-Semitic but feels a strong latency pressure hardly 
differed from the other non-anti-Semitic groups with regard to most social and 
demographic indices. However, there were significantly more women, fewer young 
people, and more people with higher educational qualifications or belonging to the 
upper middle-class in the group. In terms o f attitudes that give rise to anti-Semitic 
prejudice, there were a few small differences between non-anti-Semites suspected of 
latency and other non-anti-Semites: among the former group the feeling o f  anomie 
was significantly stronger than among the latter group, which indicates that anti- 
Semites may be hiding in this group.
The third indicator used to measure latency is the denial of the anti-Semitic nature 
o f anti-Semitic statements. As we have seen (table 6), 48 percent o f  respondents 
considered at most six of fourteen of the statements to be anti-Semitic. Even if we
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take into account the fact that 10 percent o f those interviewed gave „don’t know” 
responses to at least 8 questions, the suspicion may still arise in connection with 
alm ost 40 percent o f the respondents that they did not confess what they really 
thought when they were asked about anti-Semitism. Naturally, the denial o f  the anti- 
Semite content o f anti-Semite statements does not have to be a manifestation o f 
latency; it is possible that a respondent does not perceive the meaning o f what are 
consensually considered to be anti-Semitic statements, or that he or she is uncertain 
about judging the statements and therefore gives arbitrary responses. For these 
reasons, the suspicion o f  latency is strongest in connection with those who received 
high scores on all three indices measuring latency and who were placed in one o f the 
non-anti-Semitic groups when anti-Semitism was being measured.
Thus, as a first step, we examined how many o f the respondents who were placed 
am ong the non-anti-Semites (i.e. in the non-anti-Semitic or stereotyping groups) 
when anti-Semitism was being measured but who agree with at least two of the 
statem ents measuring latency, feel that there were many anti-Semites living in the 
country and, furthermore, do not regard at least eight anti-Semitic statements as anti- 
Sem itic. The result o f this calculation may be considered to be the minimum 
estim ate o f latency. In the sample (N = 1473) we found 39 such individuals. This 
m eans that we must adjust the measured proportion o f  anti-Semites by at least 3 
percent, so that the figure for the whole of the sample may be put at 28 percent.
To calculate the maximum estimate of latency, we created a new index by 
com bining the three latency indices. The maximum possible score on the index was 
11, w hich respondents reached if they agreed with all three statements measuring 
latency, were of the opinion that there were many anti-Semites in the country, and 
considered at most three o f  the anti-Semitic statements to be anti-Semitic.4
Table 9. Combined latency index
Percentage N
Non-latent (index score of 2-5) 45 661
Somewhat latent (index score of 6-7) 36 521
Latent (index score of 8-11) 19 277
Table 10. Latency and anti-Semitism (percentage)
Non-latent Somewhat latent Latent
Non-anti-Semite 52 34 14
Stereotyper 49 38 13
Anti-Semite 12 30 58
Extreme anti-Semite 12 30 58
Unclassifiable 64 25 11
4 Possible scores on the latent-index: 0 (none of the statements is true) -  3 (all three 
statements are true); possible scores on the estimate-index: 1 (there are very few anti- 
Semites) -  4 (there are very many anti-Semites); possible scores on the denial-index: 
1 (7—14 statements are anti-Semitic) -  4 (0-3 statements are anti-Semitic)
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As shown in the table, anti-Semites experience latency pressure much more strongly 
than non-anti-Semites, and yet in the course o f the interviews most o f them did not 
conceal their views and thus, on the basis o f their responses, were placed in the anti- 
Semitic group. This result coincides with the findings o f other surveys and confirms 
the validity o f  our measurement -  at least as regards to the low significance of the 
distorting effect o f respondents who concealed their views. Nevertheless, one should 
also note that out o f  the group displaying strong latency on the combined latency 
index (N = 277) 140 individuals, i.e. about half o f the group, showed up as non-anti- 
Semites in the course o f the measurement procedure -  that is, were placed among 
the non-anti-Semites, stereotypers, or unclassifiables. It is these two groups that 
must be compared in order to find out whether latency disguises a tendency to 
prejudice. The comparison o f  the groups o f  non-anti-Semites with low and high 
scores on the latency index showed that non-anti-Semites with high scores differ 
from  those with low scores in just the same dimensions as those which generally 
distinguish anti-Semites from  non-anti-Semites. With regard to the social and 
demographic indicators, among members o f the group displaying high latency, there 
were significantly greater numbers of inhabitant o f  Budapest and those who were 
born in Budapest, relatively highly educated people, and those whose parents were 
from Budapest (in each case chi2< .04). Those with high latency scores are more 
similar in terms o f their attitudes to anti-Semites rather than to the non-anti-Semites 
who were placed in the same group on the anti-Semitism scale: among the former 
group xenophobia and anomie are significantly stronger than among the latter (Sig.F 
= .000 or .04). With regard to the various cluster groups formed on the basis of 
attitudes, the fact that high scorers on the latency index were significantly more 
numerous among the „left-wing and frustrated” cluster group than among other 
cluster groups is o f  particular interest and serves to confirm the suspicion that the 
group may contain a good number of latent anti-Semites.5 This phenomenon may be 
easily explained: it was electors of parties rejecting anti-Semitism in their public 
ideology (Hungarian Socialist Party/MSZP, Workers’ Party/Munkáspárt) who 
formed the majority o f the „left-wing frustrated”, a group of people who achieved 
higher than average scores on the scalesmeasuring personal frustration, distrust of 
politics and the democratic institutions of the state, social distress and the loss of 
norms, as well as nostalgia for the communist past.6
Finally, therefore, we may conclude that in this group of 140 individuals -  which 
amounts to almost 10 percent o f the complete sample -  numerous hidden anti-
5 In the course of the survey we distinguished two frustrated groups on the basis of a 
combination of various attitudes. The „right-wing frustrated” comprised respondents who -  
when we asked them about the state of things after 1990 -  agreed with opinions revealing 
high levels of personal frustration and strong feelings of anomie, and who were also 
characterised by strong national and religious sentiments and a conservative outlook on life. 
The „left-wing frustrated” comprised respondents with high levels of personal frustration 
and anomie who strongly rejected national and religious sentiments, See Kovács 1999b: 
221.
6 Our observation coincides with the findings of Enyedi, Erős and Fábián who -  in the course 
of an empirical study on authoritarianism in 1994 -  measured relatively high F-scale scores 
among voters on the left of the political spectrum, which had a causal relationship with the 
level of anti-Semitic prejudice (Enyedi-Erős-Fábián 1997).
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Sem ites may be present. Thus, based on the results o f the measurement o f  latency, 
we should adjust our estimate o f  the size of the anti-Semitic groups by a minimum 
o f  2 percent and a maximum o f  10 percent. This means that the proportion o f  anti- 
Sem ites in contemporary Hungarian society could be between one-quarter and one- 
third o f  the total adult population.
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Zoltán Szántó-István György Tóth
DOUBLE OR QUITS: SHOULD MONEY FOUND BE RISKED?
An attempt to measure attitudes towards risk using 
survey methods'
This article examines social attitudes towards risk-preference and risk-aversion. 
First, we briefly discuss the theoretical approach to the analysis o f risk-preference 
and risk-aversion that was developed within rational choice theory. Next, we present 
an approach to operationalise risk-preference using survey data. Our measurement 
o f  attitudes towards risk follows the usual strategy: respondents are asked to choose 
between a small amount o f money they get for sure, and a large but risky amount. 
Drawing on the theoretical models and earlier empirical research, we formulate 
hypotheses about the social factors that have an impact on actual decision making in 
the situations under study. The hypotheses are tested using survey data. The article 
ends with a brief discussion. The novelty o f our paper is that -  to the best o f our 
knowledge -  neither previous Hungarian nor international research has attempted to 
examine attitudes towards risk using data from large-scale surveys.
The analysis of attitudes towards risk
Certainty, uncertainty, and risk
Rational choice theory makes a distinction between perfect and imperfect 
information about the states o f the world that are relevant in decision making 
situations, and thereby about the outcomes that will follow from alternative courses 
o f action (Elster 1986: 5). When, for example, a farmer must choose between two 
grain varieties he or she should bear in mind that the size of the crop next year will 
depend on future weather conditions, which, however, cannot be predicted with
1 This article is a revised version of a paper that was presented at the workshop Action Theory 
and Social Research [Cselekvéselmélet és társadalomkutatás] (27-28 November 1998, 
Budapest), which was dedicated to the memory of László Csontos. Both authors are 
indebted to Csontos, who taught us both professional and human values. The basic questions 
of this paper goes back to the idea he developed with one of the authors to examine the 
relationship between attitudes towards risk and attitudes towards the reform of welfare 
systems, as a follow-up to the research project The state and its citizens [Az állam és 
polgárai] (Csontos-Kornai-Tóth 1996; Csontos-Tóth 1998). The survey questions analysed 
in our paper were suggested by László Csontos. Our work was financially supported by the 
National Science and Research Foundation (OTKA) (research grant F 022195).
Comments and suggestions are welcome. Please direct correspondence to: 
zoltan.szanto@soc.bke.hu and toth@tarki.hu. We are grateful to Róbert Iván Gál for his 
helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper, and to Tamás Bartus for the translation 
of this article.
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certainty. Virtually all actual situations are o f this kind but some o f them 
approxim ate very closely the extreme case of certainty. We have certainty when 
decision-makers know which o f  the possible states o f  the world will occur, and 
thereby  which of the possible consequences will ensue: one o f the states o f the world 
occurs with probability one, and the other states o f  the world occur with probability 
zero.
Consider our farmer who must choose between two grain varieties, A and В 
(E lster 1995: 34-35; 1986: 6). There are two possible weather conditions (states of 
the world), good and bad. U sing available information, our farmer assumes that both 
conditions have an equal probability of occurring (50-50  per cent). The income of 
the farm er and the utility o f  the respective incomes in the various cases are shown in 
Table I. Utilities reflect the decreasing marginal utility o f  money: the utility o f one 
additional dollar falls with the number of dollars.












Good 30.000 47 50,000 50
Bad 25,000 42 15,000 33
Average 27,500 45 32,500 48
C hoice situations where available information is incomplete may be characterised by 
risk or by certainty. Broadly speaking, we have certainty when actors know which of 
the states of the world can occur. Risk refers to situations where actors are able to 
attach -  either objective or subjective -  probabilities to the states o f the world. 
Uncertainty refers to situations where actors do not know these probabilities.
There is considerable disagreement between classical and Bayesian decision 
theories about whether or not all situations o f uncertainty can be represented in 
term s o f  risk. Recent developments point towards the acceptance of the Bayesian 
view . As Bayesian scholars argue (Hirshleifer-Riley 1992: 9-11), rational actors are 
alw ays  able to assign -  to some extent reliable -  probabilities to the states o f  the 
w orld  on the basis o f  available information. Additionally, all probabilities are 
subjective. The distinction between uncertainty and risk disappears: rational 
decision-makers should choose the act which maximises the (subjective) expected 
utility. The expected utility o f  an act is the weighted sum o f the utilities o f the 
consequences, where the weights are the probabilities with which the consequences 
occur.
Risk-aversion, risk-neutrality, risk-preference
To analyse attitudes towards risk, let us consider Table 1 again. Clearly, crop В has 
the highest expected yield. It need not, however, have the highest expected utility 
and hence need not be the one which a rational agent would choose. If an income of 
$20,000 is required for subsistence, our farmer would be foolish to prefer a course of 
action that gave him a 50 per cent chance of starving to death. This is a special case 
o f  the more general fact that m oney has a decreasing marginal utility, which implies
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that the utility o f  expected income is larger than the expected utility o f  income 
(Elster 1986; Varian 1991). In our example,
U[(50 000/2+15 000)/2]>[(У(50 000)+(Д 15 000)]/2 = 48>41.5.
Rationality dictates the choice o f the act with the largest expected utility, and this 
need not be the option with the largest expected income -  even when all utility is 
derived from income. This phenomenon is referred to as risk-aversion 2
To generalsze this example, consider the following situation (Hirshleifer—Riley 
1992: 16-19; Morrow 1994: 36-37). A decision-maker can choose between A and B. 
If A is chosen then he or she receives the intermediate outcome C for sure. If В is 
chosen then he or she gets the best outcome H with probability p  or the worst 
outcome L with probability (1 -p). To be more concrete, imagine the following 
scenario. Option A is receiving 1000 dollars for sure. Option В is receiving 2000 
dollars with probability p  and receiving nothing with probability (1-p). Clearly, the 
choice between A and В depends on the value of p. If it is close to I then В will be 
chosen, and if p  is close to zero then A will be chosen. Between the two extremes 
there must be a value p*  where the decision-maker is indifferent between A and B. It 
can be proven that p*  is the cardinal utility o f outcome C3: U(C) = p*. Imagine that 
our decision-maker is indifferent between A and В i f p*=3/4. This decision-maker is 
said to be risk-averse. A person is risk-averse if he or she strictly prefers a certain 
consequence to any risky prospect whose mathematical expectation o f consequences 
equals that certainty. If his or her preferences go the other way he or she is a risk- 
preferrer. And if he or she is indifferent between the certain consequence and the 
risky prospect he or she is risk-neutral (Hirshleifer-Riley 1992: 23).
Figure I displays three elementary utility functions: Uru would apply to a risk- 
averse individual, Urn to someone who is risk-neutral, and Urp to a risk-preferrer. 
Consequences and their utilities are on the vertical and horizontal axes, respectively. 
The risk-averse, the risk-neutral and the risk-preferrer individuals attach the same 
utilities to the worst and to the best outcomes. In our example, the risk-neutral 
person is indifferent between A and В if p*= 1/2. For risk-neutral persons the utility 
function, Uw is linear because the expected utility o f consequences equals the utility 
o f  expected consequences. The risk-averse person is indifferent between A and В if 
\/2<p*<\ depending on the extent to which he or she avoids risk. In case o f risk- 
aversion, the elementary utility function, Ura is concave because the expected utility 
o f consequences is less than the utility o f  expected consequences. The risk-preferrer
2 Here, risk-aversion is assumed to be a consequence of decreasing marginal utility. It could 
also, however, derive from a cautious, conservative attitude towards risk-preference (Elster 
1986: 29; note 16.).
3 It is important to realise that the argument assumes the preference-scaling (or elementary 
utility) function defined over consequences, and not the utility function defined over actions. 
Neglecting this distinction leads to misunderstandings and fruitless debates (see Hirshleifer- 
Riley 1992: 13-15; 19). Note that the preference-scaling function assumes a cardinal scale, 
while the utility function defined over alternatives assumes only an ordinal scale. The 
requirement that the preference-scaling function must be cardinal is a necessary condition 
for the applicability of the expected utility rule. The usual method to establish such a 
cardinal scale is the reference-lottery technique (ibid. 16.).
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individual is indifferent between A and В if 0<p*<\/2  depending on the extent to 
which he or she likes risks. For risk-preference the elementary utility function, Ur[, is 
convex because the expected utility of consequences is larger than the utility o f 
expected consequences.4
Figure 1.
Preference-scaling functions for risk-aversion, risk-neutrality, and risk-preference5
Utility
kKer(LR)=0 о 1000 2000
The empirical model of attitudes towards risk
General framework
Our study tries to identify the determinants o f  attitudes towards risk. The main 
research question is which social, demographic, and other factors have an impact on 
risk-preference. Our model postulates that attitudes towards risk depend on the sjze
4 Mathematically, the first derivatives of these three utility functions are positive: the function 
is rising, the marginal utility of consequences is positive. This means that more income is 
preferred to less. The second derivative of the preference function is zero for the risk-neutral 
case, it is negative for risk-averse people, and it is positive for risk-preferrer individuals. In 
other words, the function increases at a constant, decreasing, and increasing rate, 
respectively. Among the three cases, risk-aversion is considered to be the normal case 
because only it reflects the principle of decreasing marginal utility. Another justification is 
that people typically hold diversified portfolios (Hirshleifer-Riley 1992: 25).
' The standard model we presented assumes that individual preferences and decisions are 
independent of the endowment of decision-makers. For relaxing this assumption, and for the 
constructive criticism of the expected utility rule, see the famous prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 1981), and the review presented in Thaler (1987). See also 
Csontos (1995) and Thaler and Johnson (1990).
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o f the expected gain/loss, on the one hand, and on the income, occupation, 
education, age, and gender o f the respondent, on the other hand:
A TR = f(VGL, INC, OCC, EDU, AGE, SEX),
where
A TR: attitudes toward risk,
VGL: value of gains/losses,
INC: income o f the respondents,
OCC: occupation/labour-market status of respondents,
EDU: educational level o f  respondents.
The empirical analyses are based on the assumption that among these variables only 
income and the value o f  gains/losses are perceived as decision param eters since 
gains and losses modify income. In contrast, variables like occupation, education, 
age, and sex are assumed to be factors which have an impact on preferences.
D a ta  a n d  methods
Measurement. The measurement o f  attitudes towards risk follows the common 
strategy of previous research. Respondents are asked to choose between tw o options: 
between a „gift” they receive for sure and a gamble which yields twice as much as 
the gift with a probability o f  50 per cent, and yields nothing with a probability of 50 
per cent. Three questions were repeated after each other. The questions were the 
same with the important exception that the amount of the gift was raised. The 
structure of the questions is summarised in Table 2.
Table 2. The structure of survey questions
Option A: gift Option B: gamble
Item Gain Probability Gain Probability
(Forints) (per cent) (Forints) (per cent)
1. 1000 100 2000 50
0 50
2. 100,000 100 200,000 50
0 50
3. 1,000,000 100 2,000.000 50
0 50
Data. Data come from two surveys of the Social Research Centre (TÁ RK I), which 
were held in October 1996 and January 1997, respectively. The questions described 
above were included in the questionnaire in both surveys. The w ording o f the 
questions was identical. Both surveys represent the population above 18 years of 
age. A stratified multi-stage probability sampling design was used, and registered 
interviewers conducted the interviews. The sample size is 1,500 in both surveys. 
Since the samples were representative of the Hungarian adult population along the 
most important social and demographic dimensions, weighting was not necessary.
Because of the similarities of the surveys -  they contained the same key questions 
with identical wording, they were close to each other in time, and they both
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represent the Hungarian adult population we decided to  merge the two data sets. 
Pooling them was necessary to  increase the sample size and thereby to enable more 
refined analyses. The subsequent analyses will use 3,000 cases. We can be 95 per 
cen t confident that the results from our sample deviate only by around 1.5-2 per 
cent from the value we would have obtained had we included the whole population 
in the survey.
Interview context. The questions about risk-preference were first embedded in a 
b lock o f  questions about the reform of the pension system , and second in an ISSP6 
m odule about attitudes tow ards the role of government and httitudes towards work. 
A t the end of each survey, there was a detailed module about politics. Our questions, 
how ever, were always follow ed by biographical information, mostly about the 
respondents’ labour-market position, and by questions about the respondents' 
knowledge about and attitudes towards the reform o f  the pension system.
Hypotheses
B efore we formulate concrete hypotheses, we turn again to our analytical model. 
The dependent variable in the model is attitudes tow ards risk. First, we must 
m easure risk-aversion, risk-neutrality, and risk-preference. The survey question was 
w orded as follows: „Would you choose the sure gain or the gamble?” Following the 
expected utility paradigm, the expected values o f both options are considered as 
equal: the expected values are 1000, 100,000,and 1,000,000 Forints in each round, 
respectively. In this case, i f  the respondents had been offered the option o f  
indifference those who are risk-neutral might have chosen this option. This 
alternative, however, was not included. Hypotheses can be developed for the extent 
to w hich the population o f  people choosing either option differs. If the respondents 
w ere indifferent but were forced to make a choice, h a lf  o f  them would choose the 
gift and half of them would choose the larger but uncertain gain. However, the 
standard literature about decision-making suggests that in such situations risk- 
aversion is the typical attitude. Keeping expected value constant, risk-averse 
individuals prefer sure gifts to gambles, which is consistent with the definition o f  
risk-aversion given above. Thus, our first hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1. (HI.): In decision situations involving risky gains, risk-aversion is 
the typical attitude towards risk.
This hypothesis is supported if the number o f  people choosing the gift is 
significantly larger than the num ber of people choosing the gamble. The hypothesis 
clearly  follows from the theoretical model and it is supported by a vast number o f  
em pirical studies that were m ainly carried out in experimental settings.7
Modelling the decision situation can be refined if  we attribute the following 
reasoning to the respondents: „Giving an answer to the question means having one
6 International Social Survey Programme. Since 1985, when the program started, TARKI is 
the official partner of the program. The survey questions analysed here were not included in 
the ISSP module.
7 The experimental results of Kahneman and Tversky clearly support the hypothesis that risk- 
aversion is common when outcomes are gains. See for example Kahneman and Tversky 
1981.
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thousand Forints. If I risk this amount I either win twice as much or I loose what I 
had.” What is interesting in this reasoning is not that it shows that people are risk- 
averse, but that it shows that there are people who would risk -  on a double or quits 
basis -  a sure gift. Thus, hypothesis 1 is not exclusive. Although risk-aversion is 
typical for gains, there are decision-makers who display risk-preference.8 This 
insight can be considered an extension to hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis la  (HI.a): In decision-making situations involving risks, we can find 
risk-preference along with risk-aversion.
This extension claims only that there are people who display risk-preference. The 
extension has a theoretical significance: it makes explicit that different attitudes 
towards risk exist at the same time, thus it is possible to resolve the standard 
assumption of economics that actors have identical preferences (utility functions).9
In the following, we examine the factors which determine the attitudes specified 
in hypotheses 1 and la. We start with the most apparent factor, the size o f the gain. 
In the decision situations under study, we have two outcomes: the sure gift (1000) 
and the risky prize (2000). Correspondingly, we can move along two dimensions. 
On the one hand, assuming that the risk-free gift, is fixed, increases in the prize 
should increase risk-preference. On the other hand, when taking the risky outcome 
fixed, we may assume that increases in risk-free gift are likely to reduce risk- 
preference.
Given the survey questions, a hypothesis can be formulated which takes both the 
sure and the risky outcomes simultaneously into account. The frequency o f  risk- 
preference will depend on the expected values o f gambles:
Hypothesis 2. (H2.): the higher the expected values o f the options, the smaller the 
likelihood of displaying risk-preference.
The reasons are the same as in case o f hypothesis 1 a: the larger the risk-free gift, 
the lower the willingness to incur a risk. This effect is expected to be stronger than 
the effect of the increases in the value o f the gain.
Next, we formulate hypotheses about the relationship between socio-economic 
characteristics and attitudes towards risk. Obviously, the income of the respondent is 
expected to play a special role. Including income as an independent variable is 
motivated by the principle o f decreasing marginal utility o f money. To put it simply, 
one additional dollar has a relatively small utility for those who have a relatively 
large income. This would be especially the case if  the costs o f producing the income 
were also taken into account. If the assumption o f  the decreasing marginal utility of 
money is correct then we have the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 (H 3): Keeping other factors constant, risk-preference increases 
with income.
8 According to prospect theory, risk-preference is the typical attitudes when outcomes are 
losses. We do not formulate hypotheses about losses since our study is restricted to gains.
4 The programmatic statement can be found in Becker and Stigler (1977). Later, Becker 
(1996) argued that utility functions are the same for different people, and they are stable 
over time. For a criticism, see Elster (1995): „Most social scientists, however, believe that 
people differ in their desires as weil as in their opportunities [...]” (p. 15.)
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This hypothesis says only that if a person’s income increases then the value o f  the 
lost gift becomes less significant when choosing the gam ble.10 1
W e have intuitive rather than well-founded reasons for the assumed impacts o f 
socio-economic characteristics that are expected to have on attitudes towards risk. 
W e formulated three additional hypotheses. We believe that the factors specified in 
the hypotheses have an indirect effect on attitudes towards money, spending, and 
risk  directly and by composition effects as well.
Hypothesis 4 (H4.): the likelihood of displaying risk-preference increases with 
education.
Hypothesis 5 (H5.): the likelihood of displaying risk-preference decreases with 
age.
Hypothesis 6 (H6.): men are more likely to display risk-preference than w om en." 
Later we will argue that experimental situations like this often produce sterile 
results.'U sing available data, it is worthwhile to examine the empirical relationship 
between attitudes towards risk, as defined in an experimental situation, and actual 
behavior, like having insurance or having savings as preparation for old age. 
Occupation is very likely to be one of the factors that determine risk-preference. The 
following hypothesis seems to be plausible:
Hypothesis 7 (H7.): Occupational status has a direct impact on risk-preference, 
w hich cannot be attributed to compositional factors. More precisely, we believe that 
occupation has an aspect which is independent o f  other attributes, like education, 
sex, age, and income. This aspect may be attributed to freedom o f command and 
autonomy when practicing a job.
Analyses
Risk-preference: descriptive statistics
W e begin our analyses by examining the proportion o f people who have chosen the 
gam ble at different levels o f  gains/losses. The results are shown in Table 3.
10 Previous research produced other hypotheses. For example, Hirshleifer and Riley (1992: 
26-28.) claim that risk-aversion is typical among the poor and the rich, and risk-preference 
is the typical attitude for people having an intermediate income. This claim contradicts our 
hypotheses and intuition. In the following, we restrict the analyses to our more plausible 
hypothesis, which is consistent with the assumption of the decreasing marginal utility of 
money.
11 Previous research found that young men very often display risk-preference (cf. Hirshleifer 
and Riley 1992: 28). Our hypotheses H5. and H6. are consistent with these findings.
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Table 3. Proportion of respondents choosing the gamble as a percentage 
of all respondents
Gain (in HUF) 1996
Sample
1997 Pooled data
Small (1,000) 36.3 31.6 34.0
Intermediate (100.000) 18.3 16.4 17.4
Large (1,000,000) 7.8 7.4 7.6
Comparing the two samples reveals that the results from the two samples are very 
similar. There is no significant difference in the proportion of people choosing either 
gamble between the two samples (note that for a sample size of 1500 the sampling 
error is around 2.5-3 per cent).12
This is not the only result. The gamble is chosen by 34, 17, and 7.6 per cent o f  the 
respondents if the prize is small, intermediate, and large, respectively. It is easy to 
see that the number o f people choosing the gamble is about one-third o f the 
population even when the prize is the smallest. The fact that more than the half of 
the respondents avoid any risk shows in an indirect way that people are rather risk- 
averse (see hypothesis /). Nevertheless, one in 12-13 people would risk even the 
highest price for the gamble (see hypothesis la).
We can go further if  we examine the decisions individuals made in each 
subsequent round. Table 4 displays the proportion o f people choosing either the gift 
or the gamble for each level o f gain. The cells contain the distribution o f  people 
choosing these options. Bold numbers and numbers in italics are the proportion of 
those who have chosen the gamble and the gift, respectively. The next cell shows the 
same distribution in the next round. For example, the number in the upper left cell 
indicates that 66.2 per cent o f  respondents have chosen the risk-free gift in the first 
round. After rising the prize, 97.5 per cent keeps choosing the gift, and only 1.1 per 
cent chooses the gamble in the last round.
The inspection o f data leads to the following conclusions. People who have 
chosen the gift in the first round keep choosing it in subsequent rounds as well. 
Those people, however, who undertook a risk in the first round, were less likely to 
incur a risk in the subsequent rounds. Among those who choose the gamble in the 
first round, 54 per cent chooses the gift in the second round, and 97 per cent choose 
it in the last round.
12 This analysis is important because it supports indirectly our decision to stack the samples. 
The samples are similar not only with respect to the most important socio-economic 
factors but also with respect to the distribution of the dependent variable.
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Table 4. The probability of choosing the gamble conditional on choosing or rejecting 
the gamble in the previous round: the distribution of respondents choosing 





















These results support hypothesis 2. There is a clear tendency towards a decrease in 
the proportion of people choosing the gamble as the size o f the gain increases.
A simple bivariate analysis o f the data revealed a J-shaped relationship between 
incom e  and risk-preference.13 Risk-preference relatively often occurs in the low- 
income regions, then it becomes less frequent, and finally, it increases in high- 
income regions. We also found that the effect o f income on risk-preference is 
sm aller for high prizes than for small prizes (these results refine rather than fully 
support hypothesis 3.) Risk-preference decreases with age, as expected on the basis 
o f  hypothesis 5, but it increases with education (hypothesis 4). More precisely, risk- 
preference occurs less often among people with primary education than among 
people with secondary or higher education. Finally, men are more likely to display 
risk-preference than women (hypothesis 6).
It can, however, be the case that these results are due to compositional effects. 
For example, the difference in risk-preference between men and women might be 
explained in terms of differences in income, education and age rather than in terms 
o f  differences in socialization or „genetics” . Similarly, differences between 
educational levels might disappear if we control for other variables. Therefore, we 
exam ine which of the variables specified earlier have a significant effect on risk- 
preference with a multivariate technique.
Logistic regression is appropriate for this purpose. Logistic regression applies to 
situations where the dependent variable is binary (dummy variable), while the 
independent variables may be categorical, ordinal or interval. Furthermore, contrary 
to other methods, it does not require that strong assumptions about the distribution 
o f  variables. Logistic regression predicts the probability of occurrence o f  certain 
events. In case of many variables, the probability o f events is modelled using the 
following equation:
13 These analyses are not reported in detail here.
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Prob(event)= 1 / ( 1 + e y),
where
e is the basis of natural logarithm, approximately 2.718,
Z is the linear combination o f  variables and parameters. Z can be written as
Z=ő(j+ő/2í,;+fi^Ap+ ... BkXk,
where
X,, X 2, ... Xk are the explanatory variables, B„ is the constant, and В/, ... Bk are the 
respective parameters.
In our model, the dependent variable is the attitude towards risk, measured as 
choosing the gamble in each round (GAMBLE\, GAMBLE2 and GAMBLE3, choosing 
the gamble = 1, choosing the sure gift = 0).
The independent variables are defined as follows:
LG10INC  = 10 base logarithm o f household income (we use the log transformation
because incomes are log-normally distributed and the logarithmic 
specification is expected to yield higher explanatory power).
AG E=  age o f the respondents grouped into 6 cohorts (-29, 30-39, 40-49, 
50-59, 60-69 and 70-),
EDU,= highest educational level of respondents (/ = I : primary education or 
less, i = 2: secondary education, and / = 3: tertiary education),
SEX=  sex o f the respondents (0= female, 1= male),
SELFEMP  = employment status o f respondents (l=self-employed, 0= otherwise)
We estimated three models that reflect choices in the three rounds. The first model
contains only these variables. Modelling the second and the third round also takes
into account whether the respondents choose the gamble in the previous round(s).
Thus, our models are as follows:
prob{GAMBLE) = 1/(1 z),
where
Z=B„+B, *LG10INC+ B2 *A GE+B3 *EDU+ B4 *SEX+Bs *SELFEMP.
Estimation results for these three models are summarised in Table 5. All 
independent variables were entered simultaneously (METHOD=ENTER). The 
second colump shows the parameter estimates. The columns Wald and Significance 
display the Wald-statistics and the respective significance levels. These columns tell 
us the level at which we can be confident that the observed difference o f  parameters 
from zero is a result o f  chance only. Bold numbers and numbers in italics are the 
variables which have a significant effect at p<0.05 and p<0.1 levels, respectively. 
Numbers not marked in either way are the coefficients which do not represent 
significant effects at these levels. The reason behind finding no significant effects is 
either the absence o f any causal effect or the fact that there is an effect, but it is
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suppressed or not linear. The last column of the table displays odds ratios. Odds 
ratios indicate how much the odds o f the dependent variable increases if the value of 
the independent variable under study increases by one unit.
In the first round (GAM BLE/), income (LG10INC) and education (EDU) have a 
positive and significant effect on risk-preference. The effect o f AGE  is significant at 
this level, as well, but its overall effect is negative. The effect o f sex is substantially 
w eaker, and employment status (SELFEMP) has no effect at all. The income 
variable has an odds ratio o f  2.4, which means that the odds o f choosing the gamble 
increases by a factor of 2.4 if  the logarithm of income increases by 1 unit (or income 
itse lf increases by a factor o f  10). Imagine a person whose income is 100 thousands 
Forints. Keeping all other factors constant, if the probability o f the gamble is 30 per 
cent for an income o f 10 thousands Forints (the corresponding odds is 3/7 = 0.42), 
our person chooses the gamble with an estimated probability of 50-51 per cent (the 
corresponding odds is 3x2.4/7 = 1.03).
In the second round (GAM BLER, all independent variables have a significant 
effect at the /?<0.05 level except education and sex which are significant only at 
/><0.1 level. The effect o f AG E  is substantially weaker than it was in the first round. 
The variables which have stronger effects on risk-preference are employment status 
(SELFEM P) and choosing the gamble in the first round.




Wald Significance R Odds ratio: 
exp (B)
Gain: 1000 Forints (GAMBLE/)
L G 1 0 IN C 0.8897 0.2261 15.4899 0.0001 0.0684 2.4344
A G E -0.2397 0.0311 59.5491 0.0000 -0.1412 0.7869
E D U 0.2404 0.0802 8.9806 0.0027 0.0492 1.2718
SEX 0.1645 0.0929 3.1380 0.0765 0.0199 1.1788
SELFEMP -0.1335 0.1972 0.4580 0.4985 0.0000 0.8751
Constant -4.6227 1.0125 20.8463 0.0000
Gain: 100,000 Forints (GAMBLE^
L G  1 0  IN C 0.8088 0.3315 5.9522 0.0147 0.0442 2.2453
A G E -0.0936 0.0473 3.9211 0.0477 -0.0308 0.9106
EDU 0.2378 0.1236 3.7044 0.0543 0.0290 1.2685
SEX 0.2491 0.1385 3.2362 0.0720 0.0247 1.2829
S E L F E M P 0.7679 0.2777 7.6453 0.0057 0.0528 2.1553
G A M B L E , 3.3653 0.1815 343.929 0.0000 0.4112 28.9410
Constant -7.7045 1.5014 26.3312 0.0000
Gain: 1,000,000 Forints (GAMBLER
L G 1 0 IN C -0.8691 0.4258 4.1658 0.0412 -0.0435 0.4193
AGE 0.0727 0.0660 1.2121 0.2709 0.0000 1.0754
EDU 0.0457 0.1726 0.0702 0.7910 0.0000 1.0468
SEX -0.0698 0.1916 0.1329 0.7154 0.0000 0.9325
SELFEMP 0.0524 0.3545 0.0218 0.8825 0.0000 1.0538
GAM В LEI 0.3305 0.2863 1.3327 0.2483 0.0000 1.3917
G A M B L E 2 3.4064 0.2882 139.683 0.0000 0.3468 30.1563
Constant -0.5330 1.9001 0.0787 0.7791
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When the prize is the highest (GAMBLER, there are only two variables which have a 
significant effect on risk-preference: household income (LG10INC) and, more 
importantly, choosing the gamble in the second round (GAMBLER. Note that the 
coefficient o f income (LG101NC) is negative, which medhs that keeping other 
factors constant, a rise in income decreases the likelihood o f displaying risk- 
preference.
The regressions were also run using the backstep procedure. This means that after 
entering all independent variables, we removed the variables which were not 
significant, and we re-estimated the models using only the significant variables. The 
resulting models include only variables with actual explanatory power. The results 
are displayed in Table 6.
Table 6. Logistic regressions of choosing the gamble in each round 
using the backstep procedure
Variable 1000
(GAMBLE,)





Constant -4.5669 -7.7045 -0.1523
LglOJOV 0.8762 0.8088 -0.869
AGE -0.2391 -0.0936 n.s.
EDU 0.2398 0.2378 n.s.
SEX 0.1600 0.2491 n.s.





Degrees of freedom 4 6 2
Model £ 144.672 693.180 362.276
Significance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
per cent of correct classification 68.59 85.95 93.2
Using the coefficients in Table 6, we can predict the probability o f displaying risk- 
preference as a function o f the significant variables. Consider, for example, a male 
respondent (SEX = 1) aged 29 (AGE = 1) who has a university education (EDUj = 3) 
and who lives in a household where the household income is 40 thousands Forints 
per person. The probability that he chooses the gamble in the first round can be 
calculated as follows:
Since lgio (40 000)=4.61,
Z = -4.5669+0.8762x4.61 -0.2391 x 1 +0.2398x3+0.1600x 1 =0.1127, 
and hence, prob(GAMBLE,)= 1 / ( 1 +2.718 ° 1127) = 0.5281,
thus our respondent with the above defined characteristics chooses the gamble with 
an estimated probability o f  53 per cent.
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C onsider now a women (S E X  =  0) aged above 70 (AGE  = 6) who has only 
elem entary education (ED U =  1) and who lives in a family where household income 
is 15 thousands Forints per person. Her probability o f  choosing the gamble in the 
first round is given by
prob(G  AMBLE 1 )= l/( 1 +2.718“(~2 O99))=0.1092 
w here
Z = -4.5669+0.8762x4.18-0.2391 x6+0.2398x 1 +0.1600x0 = -2.099, 
and the number 4.18 = lg10 (15 000)
In short, she will choose the gamble with an estimated probability o f around 11 per 
cent.
To develop a more general and transparent interpretation o f the results, we set the 
significant explanatory variables to certain values and we calculate the probability of 
displaying risk-preference for the defined values. The values we chose reflect typical 
demographic and social situations. Our aim here is to show how the probability o f 
choosing the gamble varies with income for each socio-economic type.
For the first round (model GAMBLE/), the following types are defined:
1. male below 29 years o f age with tertiary education (type 1),
2. female aged 40-59 with secondary education (type 2),
3. female over 70 with primary education (type 3).
The risk-preference functions calculated for these typical cases are displayed in 
Figure  2. The functions are calculated separately for the three rounds. First, consider 
the model GAMBLE,. The probability of displaying risk-preference increases with 
income for each typical case. It is the 29 years old male who is most likely to display 
risk-preference. This probability is the lowest if the 70 years old woman is 
considered. Note that risk-preference rises with income somewhat steeper for the 
later case than for the former one if  income is high.
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The probability of choosing the gamble with expected value 1000 Forints as a function 
of income, for typical combinations of social-economic characteristics
Figure 2.
The probability of 
choosing the gamble
For the model GAMBLE2, where the expected value is 100 thousands Forints, the 
typical cases are as follows:
1. male below 29 years of age with tertiary education who is self-employed and 
who chose the risky option in GAMBLE\ (type 1),
2. female aged 40-49 with secondary education who is employee and who chose 
the risky option in GAMBLE\ (type 2),
3. male aged 40-49 with secondary education who is employee and who chose 
the risky option in GAMBLE\ (type 3),
4. female over 70 years old with primary education who is employee and who 
chose the risky option in GAMBLE) (type 4),
The income-GAMBLE2 function is displayed in Figure 3.
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Figure 3.
The probability of choosing the gamble with expected value 100,000 Forints 






— — prob(type 4)
Income, 
log scale
The dispersion of probabilities o f risk-preference is larger than that was in 
G AM BLE |. This is not surprising since the explanatory power o f each variable- is 
higher than in the first round. Again, we find that the probability of risk-preference 
increases more steeply with high gains among those who are unlikely to take a risk i f  
the prize is low than among those who are likely to incur a risk already in the first 
round.
Finally, two typical cases were defined to interpret model GAMBLE3 (expected 
value was 1 million Forints):
1. a person who chose the risky gamble neither in the first nor in the second 
round;
2. a person who chose the risky gamble both in the first and in the second round.
The h\come-GAMBLE3 functions are displayed in Figure 4. The falling shape of
the curves reflects the negative sign o f the income variable in the third round. The 
figure clearly shows that those who chose the gamble in the first two rounds are 
likely to choose the third gamble too. This means that if  the prize is large, like 1 
m illion Forints, only those are likely to incur a risk who have relatively small 




The probability »f choosing the gamble with expected value 1,000,000 Forints 
as a function of income depending on participation in earlier gambling
The probability of 
choosing of gamble
0 20000 500000
Examining non-linear relationships. Earlier in this paper when we examined 
hypothesis 3, we found a J-shaped relationship between income and the probability 
of choosing the gamble. Since logistic regression assumes a linear relationship 
between the probability o f  the event and the independent variables, we must cope 
with this problem. The bivariate analyses showed that the cutoff point for the J- 
shaped relationship is close to half of the median income. Below and above this 
point the relationships seem to be linear. Correspondingly, we can examine the 
relationship between risk-preference and income separately in two groups: among 
those who have less, and those who have more income than half the median. The 
results are summarised in Table 7.
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Table 7. Logistic regressions predicting choice of gamble in each round using 
the backstep procedure; models estimated separately for the poor, 
for the non-poor, and for all respondents.
1000 Forints 100,000 Forints 1,000,000 Forints
Variables All R. non-poor poor All R. non-poor poor All R. non-poor poor
Constant -4.5669 -6.4153 -2.2366 -7.7045 -9.6719 -6.3241 -0.1523 0.0487 -4.0099
LglOJOV 0.8762 1.3101 n.s. 0.8088 1.3558 n.s. -0.869 -0.9255 n.s.
AGE -0.2391 -0.2555 n.s. -0.0936 -0.0881 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
EDU 0.2398 0.1985 0.4734 0.2378 n.s. 1.1218 n.s. n.s. n.s.
SEX 0.16 n.s. 0.7203 0.2491 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
SELFEMP n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.7679 0.8102 n.s. n.s. n.s. 2.5347
GAMBLEi - - - 3.3653 3.327 3.995 n.s. n.s. n.s.
GAMBLE2 - - - - - - 3.5797 3.6618 3.4972
Model / 2 144.67 132.91 7.92 693.18 612.22 60.90 362.28 332.41 30.93
Degrees 4 3 2 6 4 2 2 2 2
of freedom 




68.59 67.8 78.63 85.95 84.89 91.06 93.2 93.05 95.08
Clearly, separating relatively poor and non-poor people somewhat modifies the 
results. In the first round, income and age have significant effects only among the 
non-poor. Contrary to this, income and age are not significant among the poor, but 
education and sex have a stronger effect. Employment status does not have any 
im pact in either groups. Similarly to earlier analyses, the independent variables have 
practically no significant effect on choosing the gamble in the third round. Among 
the poor, the only significant difference is due to employment status. Among the 
non-poor, risk-preference decreases with income.
Again, our results show that taking the income distribution in Hungary into 
account, it is the sum o f 100 thousands Forints which offers the opportunity to 
analyse attitudes towards risk along various dimensions. Among the poor, only 
having chosen the gamble in the first round and education make a difference. 
A m ong the non-poor, neither education nor sex plays any role; displaying risk- 
preference in the second round depends on income, age, employment status, and 
having chosen the gamble in the first round.
Similarly to Figures 2-4, figures 5-7 display the probability of risk-preference as a 
function of income for various typical cases. These results are based on the 
regression results which were run separately among the poor and the non-poor.
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The probability of choosing the gamble with expected value 1000 Forints as a function of 
income; probabilities calculated for women aged 40^19 with secondary education on the 
basis of regressions estimated separately for the poor and the non-poor.
Figure 5.
The probability o f the 
gamble
Figure 5 shows that a poor woman with secondary education, aged 40-^19, incurs a 
risk with an estimated probability of more than 70 per cent. This probability is 
independent of the exact value o f her income. Among the non-poor, a woman with 
the same characteristics chooses the gamble with a probability of higher than 50 per 
cent if her income is higher than about 140 thousands Forints. It also can be seen 
that the explanatory power o f income is higher among the non-poor than among the 
poor if these groups are analysed separately.
Figure 6 displays risk-preference for the same individual when the expected gain 
is 100 thousands Forints. Compared to the average, the sign of change is similar to 
the previous case with two exceptions. First, risk-preference among the poor is 
below 50 per cent, and it is independent o f income. Second, the income value below 
which the probability o f  risk-preference does not exceed the value of 50 per cent 
becomes lower; it is about 80 thousands Forints.
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Figure 6.
The probability of choosing the gamble with expected value 100,00 Forints as a function 
of income; probabilities calculated for women aged 40-49 with secondary education 
having chosen the gamble in the first round, on the basis of regressions estimated 
separately for the poor and the non-poor
The probability of 
choosing the gamble
Figure  7 shows risk-preference for the highest prize. The typical cases are defined in 
term s o f choosing the gamble in the first two rounds because other independent 
variables were not significant. Our typical individuals chose the gamble with an 
estim ated probability which is clearly less than 50 per cent. Note, moreover, that this 
probability strongly falls with income among the rich.
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Figure 7.
The probability of choosing the gamble with expected value 1,000,000 Forints as a 
function of income; probabilities calculated for a person who chose the gamble both in 
the first and the second round, on the basis of regressions estimated separately for the 
poor and the non-poor.
The probability of 
choosing the gamble
Conclusions
In this paper, we made an attempt to examine attitudes towards risk. Our arguments 
were based on the concepts and analytical models o f rational choice theory. We 
discussed the distinction between certainty, uncertainty, and risk, then we defined 
three basic types o f  attitudes towards risk: risk-aversion, risk-neutrality, and risk- 
preference. After this, however, our arguments became independent o f the main 
questions of rational choice theory. We were not interested in questions like what is 
the optima! level o f  risk-preference, or what is the level of risk which should  be 
chosen by a perfectly rational decision-maker. Rather, we were interested in 
exploring the main types and the socio-economic determinants of attitudes towards 
risk using available but relatively limited survey data. Rational choice theory was 
mainly used to clarify concepts and to develop hypotheses. Some hypotheses -  those 
about typical attitudes, and the relationship between risk-preference, on the one 
hand, and prizes and income, on the other hand -  derive from these theoretical 
models. The other hypotheses were motivated by earlier empirical results and 
intuition.
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W e began the empirical test o f hypotheses with relatively simple statistical 
techniques. The data supported our most fundamental hypotheses that the typical 
form  o f  attitudes towards risk is risk-aversion. Results also highlighted that risk- 
preference occurs even when possible losses are relatively large. The hypothesis 
about the relationship o f risk-aversion and gains was also supported: risk-preference 
is less likely displayed with an increase in gains. At this point, it also turned out that 
the initial hypothesis about the relationship between income and risk-aversion needs 
further refinements. First, gains and incomes together constitute the factors that were 
perceived as changes attributed to income level. Hence, our analysis should take into 
account both gains and incomes. Second, the effect o f  income on risk-preference 
displays a J-shaped rather than a linear pattern: risk-preference is somewhat more 
likely in situations implying a small change in income than in situations implying a 
large change in income. Attitudes towards risk also depend on socio-economic 
factors. Age and sex seemed to have a clear effect, while the effects o f education 
and employment status are restricted. These results, however, cannot be accepted 
w ithout reservations since they might be due to further composition effects. 
Therefore, we considered it necessary to analyse our data with multivariate 
techniques, in general, and with logistic regression, in particular.
According to the multivariate results, income and education have significant 
positive effects on risk-preference if prizes are small. If gains are intermediary, all 
variables have significant effects. The effect is strong for income, age, self- 
em ploym ent and having chosen the gamble in the first round; relatively small effects 
were found for education and sex. Choosing the gamble in the last round when gains 
are the highest is significantly affected by only two variables: income and having 
chosen the gamble in the second round (note that the sign of the income effect 
turned into negative). To make the results more transparent, we refined the fit o f  the 
m odels and defined decision-makers we found to be interesting cases, as well as 
exam ined how income affected their risk-preference. We found that risk-preference 
becom es more likely with income if the gain is either small or medium, while the 
opposite is true in case o f  the highest gain. These refinements led us to the 
conclusion that taking the income distribution in Hungary into account, the results 
concerning the intermediary gain are the most plausible.
W e believe that there are basically two lines o f  research that will produce fruitful 
further results. First, following the mainstream o f empirical research on attitudes 
tow ards risk, we intend to improve the measurement o f risk-aversion using more 
refined experimental questions. We are interested not only in the distribution o f  the 
population by the basic categories o f attitudes towards risk but also in developing a 
more refined measure o f the extent to which people are risk-averse. Second, we plan 
to exam ine natural rather than experimental decisions -  like insurances, investments 
-  using a similar methodology, and to compare these results to those coming from 
experimental design. Data about natural decisions are appropriate to enrich and 
eventually to correct conclusions based on experimental data.
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BOOK REVIEW: T H O U G H T S  A N D  D A  ТА 
BY FERENC MOKSONY
W hen turning the pages o f Ferenc M oksony’s work, the reader holds a 
methodological book in his hands which departs from the traditional genre. This 
book is innovative for several reasons. Maybe its most important feature is that it is 
not boring. Suspense dominates its pages which is appreciable and palpable even for 
young readers who were raised on crime stories -  the suspense of consequent and 
logical thinking. Through discussing common and simple problems the author 
describes how inadequate and useless experience in mathematical statistics is if it 
does not go along with a knowledge of model-construction rules and a critical 
attitude, which facilitates discovery.
The in-depth study o f  this book can provide training for prospective researchers 
(or those who currently conduct empirical social research with certain 
methodological hiatuses). The questions which organise the chapters require 
independent thinking, and the exercises at the end o f  each chapter simulate the 
problems which can emerge in „live” situations and efficiently develop the critical 
potential in the reader.
The structure o f the book is also new. Traditional methodological works usually 
discuss a given method in depth first; sometimes in a less exact way in order not to 
frighten off prospective researchers who get anxious at the sight of a double sigma 
notation, or sometimes present ideas in an absolutely correct way in terms of 
mathematical statistics, but do not show the slightest empathy toward the reader who 
did not take at least ten semesters o f mathematics in college. After giving an 
exhaustive discussion o f the method, these traditional books describe a specific 
problem for the social sciences, upon which that method is applicable. O f course, 
everyone knows that you do not seek a topic for a specific method, but seek a 
method to solve a certain problem. Therefore, the structure of Ferenc M oksony’s 
book guides the reader through the process o f  reasoning, pointing to the conclusion 
that we have to take the four steps in theory construction: hypothesis construction — 
operationalisation testing -  conclusion not once but several times if we seek an 
adequate answer. While guiding readers through these grades, the author warns o f 
the dangers of false steps and teaches, almost unnoticeably, the essence o f 
Lazarsfeld’s paradigm, the logic of hypothesis testing, the basics of linear regression 
analysis and, most importantly, reveals the clear beauty o f  logical thinking.
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The book consists o f  five chapters. The first chapter descabes a simplified 
version o f Lazarsfeld’s paradigm, without assuming that the reader previously 
studied mathematics or statistics. Through a simple example, seeking an answer to 
the question of why women are more likely to be neurotic than men, it illustrates 
that two-dimensional thinking misleads us. The introduction o f the concept of 
alternative answers takes the reader closer to understanding the logic o f  hypothesis 
testing, which is discussed in details later. Further examples in this chapter 
(Alzheimer’s disease and social differences in higher educational opportunities) 
illustrate the problem o f selecting empirical consequences and the process of 
successfully executing the critical experiment. Since a phenomenon can be 
explained in many ways, and the conditions established for accepting or rejecting an 
explanation is a key issue in the construction o f explanatory models, the author also 
focuses on this problem throughout the second chapter. Describing Durkheim’s 
thinking strategy in accepting or rejecting potential explanations for suicide he 
emphasises, again, that you do not seek answers to „why’s” through testing the 
validity of one potential explanation; instead, you try to choose from a multitude of 
potential explanations the one/ones which have a „real” role in the development of 
that phenomenon.
In the third chapter the author focuses on a standard concept in empirical social 
sciences; the measures o f  association between variables. This chapter describes 
linear regression models rather than covering all indicators of associations. Ferenc 
Moksony distinguishes two types o f effects an independent variable can have on an 
outcome; unconditional and interaction effects. In the traditional methodological 
approach the concept o f  interaction is related to multivariate analyses o f  variance, 
which means that an independent variable can have different effects on a variable to 
be explained when its impact differs across various categories o f  another 
independent variable. This reciprocal effect is called interaction.
Understanding the concept o f interaction is a very important element o f  handling 
explanatory models. Perhaps it would have been more helpful if the reader had not 
encountered the numerical expression o f the interaction effects in a regression 
analysis first, or at least the author had not consider it evident that the new variable, 
defined as a product o f two independent variables, was applicable to distinguish the 
interaction effect.
Necessarily, in this chapter the reader can find formulas and derivations, but their 
complexity never exceeds the required degree, while figures and explanations 
provide for relatively easy understanding. It is very useful to „allow” non-numerical, 
i. e., not interval- or ratio-indicating measurement level, independent variables in the 
regression model. The clear presentation o f both dummy and effect coding helps us 
understand how independent variables o f at lower levels of measurement can be 
included. Perhaps an additional aspect o f the phenomenon could also have been 
useful to describe for those who wish to apply regression analysis in practice: to 
show, for instance, how you can use an occupation variable which consists o f 18 
categories as an independent variable, and what kinds of difficulties may emerge 
during the interpretation o f such a model which contains 17 dummy variables, as 
well as a related analysis o f  residuals through transferring unexplained heterogeneity 
into a model which tolerates categorical variables.
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As to regression, the author discards the bad reflexes and thoughtlessness 
com m on in many analyses triggered by the „I enter the variables into the SPSS, then 
ju s t describe the output” approach. The potential interpretations of В vs. beta 
coefficients, as well as the coefficient of determination are useful for drawing 
attention again to the fact that even the most complex multivariate analysis cannot 
be a substitute for logical thinking. However, readers who have no experience in 
regression analysis have to have a closer look at the analytical logic criticised by the 
author, and decide to use and interpret various indicators depending on the specific 
question raised.
The appendix at the end o f  this chapter took on a difficult task, making an attempt 
to  introduce the reader to the basics of using the software package SPSS for 
Windows. If the aim is to allow the reader who has never seen SPSS to use the 
program, then the author assumes really ardent readers -  for the section which 
describes the use of SPSS brings up a number o f  procedures and parameters 
(skewness and shape o f distributions, quintiles and cross-tabulations) which were 
not discussed in previous chapters. If, however, the appendix has the sole function of 
helping users to run regression analysis, then the basic information on the software 
package is superfluous.
The fourth chapter discusses the last two components o f  the quartet o f hypothesis 
construction -  operationalisation -  hypothesis testing -  conclusion. The author 
clearly describes the logic o f  hypothesis testing (the definitions of a null hypothesis, 
type 1 errors and significance level), although it would have been worth guiding the 
reader through the logical chain of alternative explanations -  type 2 errors — and 
type 1 errors again for didactical reasons. In addition, it is not practical to define the 
m ore generic notions o f the null hypothesis and the P-value within the terminology 
o f  regression analysis only in the Glossary at the end o f  the book so it may easily 
mislead the inexperienced reader. The last chapter is entitled Suppressor Effects. 
Earl Babbie, in his book Survey Research Methods (Belmont: Wadsworth 
Publishing Company, Inc., 1973: 293), defines the notion o f  suppressor and distorter 
variables in relation to Lazarsfeld’s paradigm. In Babbie’s terms a suppressor 
variable conceals a relationship between variables, while the distorter variable 
switches the sign o f a relationship between two variables. Ferenc Moksony is 
essentially right when describing this sign switch between the two original variables 
as a variant o f the suppressor effect, but perhaps he could have added the 
terminology of Babbie’s work, which serves as a textbook in one of the social 
sciences, sociology, at several universities. This observation does not at all mean 
that this chapter has little value. Like previous ones, the last chapter o f the book 
teaches us to reason in m ultiple dimensions and the importance o f scrutinising the 
validity o f findings.
A logical flow and personalised questions popping up in the chapters encourage 
independent thinking and make this book even more outstanding within the series of 
works available on model construction and data management. I would recommend 
reading this book cover to cover to every newcomer in the social sciences.
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ECONOMIC ACTORS AND THE LOCAL SOCIETY. 
ABOUT MAGDOLNA LEVELEKTS WRITINGS 
IN ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY
A bomlás virágai. Gazdaságszociológiai írások (1988-1998)
[The flowers of disintegration. Writings in economic sociology], 
(Veszprémi Egyetemi Kiadó, Veszprém 1999: 108)
Anyone concerned with economic sociology in Hungary today is in an attractive, 
and at the same time, difficult position. The position is attractive because, applying 
the way o f thinking o f  sociology in exploring the social conditions apart from the 
market environment, he or she can pose ever newer problems and question. And it is 
hard because he or she faces the challenge o f finding the path between universal 
explanations and historicism under rapidly changing social and economic 
conditions, having to jo in  the micro and macro levels, elaborating a high degree of 
incidentalness as well (Granovetter 1994).
Magdolna Leveleki’s writings confirm that she is aware of this challenge and 
possesses the required perceptivity to the problems.
The title already shows that the crop of ten years is presented in the book -  
offering an insight into the events of a far from ordinary decade. It is not static shots 
side by side, but dynamic analyses. The author seems to be intrigued by the changes 
and the responses given by the economic actors to the changes, especially by those 
who had to face serious challenges. Thus, as will be seen, the writings are connected 
in a process, not only in space.
Another major feature, and value, of the studies is regionality, that is, the 
investigation of actors embedded in the local society and economy. The later the 
study, the more emphatic the role of the local environment and the more sharply 
defined the various dimensions of the local environment.
This has special significance because she dissects and refines the process called 
growing regional differentiation in post-socialist Hungary. The well-known rift is 
the east-west axis the relative position along which well defines the growing 
differences in economic performance, income, unemployment and other indicators 
o f the level o f development (Cséfalvay 1993). All this can be interpreted as the 
outcome of complex processes. Following the collapse of the redistributive 
mechanisms and the structural crisis, the advantage of the western regions is 
increasing, caused in part by the proximity of the European markets and other, e.g. 
infrastructural, institutional and cultural advantages rooted in part in the stage of 
economic development. The advance o f foreign companies is determined by the 
geographical position apart from the training level o f  employees.
Narrowing the focus, however -  and that’s where Magdolna Leveleki’s „stories” 
begin -  the processes o f  different „western” regions and the behavioral patterns o f 
different actors o f one and the same region, can be learnt. In her close-ups, even a 
single economic actor’s different roles can be recognised. The interrelation between 
a large company and small-scale enterprises, and the large company as employer
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expose various sections. M agdolna Leveleki has stopped a large gap by outlining the 
tableau o f  a local society -  Székesfehérvár and its vicinity.
In tw o o f her studies written in the late ’80s -  analysing the launching o f  the 
careers o f  chemical engineers in different generations and the difficulties o f  the 
profession of technical engineers as against expectations, the socialist state-owned 
large company still looms large as the environment o f  the studied economic actors. 
{The permanence o f  the structure and the structure o f  permanence; Employment or 
underemployment.)
The two writings dated 1991 are concerned with the emergence of the private sector.
U sing the concepts o f acting strategy, habitus and capital as defined by Bourdieu, 
she creates a theoretical fram e in her Awakening o f  capitals. Conception fo r  a 
research into entrepreneurship to study questions such as: Where do successful 
entrepreneurs grow, or, which social strata can go into entrepreneurship as a real 
alternative? What composition of capitals makes the success of an enterprise 
probable? What individual and collective prerequisites are needed to become an 
entrepreneur? On the soil o f  what past investment can the entrepreneurial habitus be 
produced or reproduced? What social learning processes take place when the size of 
the entrepreneurial stratum is growing?
Entrepreneurial lifepaths in Hungary in the '80s: Traditional and modern 
entrepreneurs seeks answers to the question what elements of a personal lifepath 
predestine the individual to become an entrepreneur, and what correlations are 
possible between the lifepath and the entrepreneurial mentality and behaviour.
T he studies written after 1993 -  taking up some two-thirds of the volume -  are 
closely  connected to the Székesfehérvár region, giving diverse sections o f  local 
society and economy.
Perhaps the best-known work o f the author. The Flowers o f  Disintegration, is 
about the organisation o f the small-scale economic associations born parallel with 
the decay of the large state-owned electronic industrial complex in Fehérvár. How 
are relations reshuffled and certain roles exchanged between large company and 
sm all enterprises, what forms o f  competition and co-operation evolve in the market?
In the ’80s, Videoton (the large enterprise) gladly contacted small private 
subcontractors because the performance was obtained cheaper (not for wages) while 
the subcontractors got extra income. At the turn o f  the ’80s and ’90s, not only 
subcontracting disappeared with the disintegration o f  Videoton, but the status of 
em ployees also became shaky. That was when the „flowers of disintegration” began 
to  sprout, meaning the small electronic ventures with their supplies (aerials, 
intercom s, amplifiers, etc.); they were still connected to the large enterprise using its 
semi-finished products and certain services.
Returning six years later, in 1997, to the scene, the author examined {Market 
relations o f  small enterprises in a changed economic environment) how the small 
firm s o f  1991 were going on, what forms, in which areas, remained viable. How did 
their connections in the markets of acquisition and sale change? Did any co­
operation remain between the small and large enterprises, and if yes, what was it 
like?
W hat competition was there on the labour market, how did small-scale enterprises 
try  to retain their labour resources in a deflating environment?
The transformation o f Videoton substantially changed the position o f  small 
ventures earlier partly dependent on it. With the appearance of foreign capital,
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Videoton itself became the subcontractor of multinationals, and as a result, it ceased 
to be the source o f  acquisitions for small firms. This went parallel with the 
tightening competition and saturation of the sales markets.
After the fundamental reorganisation of circumstances, will the earlier studied 
small ventures be found „alive”? If yes, how have their activities been modified? 
The answer can be got from Magdolna Leveleki.
Another section o f the large enterprises can be found in the study entitled. The 
Paradise o f  wage labour. What do employers offer in Fejér county? which is 
concerned with reviving local large industry seen from the angle of employment. 
The author differentiates and describes the labour policies of firms settled at various 
dates in terms o f what they offer to the employees and what social groups find 
employment in the offered jobs.
Apart from small entrepreneurs and large enterprises, groups of other economic 
actors are also investigated. The study addressing itself to the unemployed (From  
liberation to compulsion. Changes in being unemployed) describes various types of 
workers dismissed in Fehérvár with the strategies connected to these types.
Rural Romas in the sphere o f  attraction o f  an industrial town (co-author: József 
Albert) defines the structuring of the Roma society living in the agglomeration of 
Székesfehérvár, embarking on the extent to which the economic and social changes 
o f the ’90s, the collapse o f large industry in Fehérvár, the expansion o f the private 
sector, and the revival o f large industry in the city affected various strata and groups 
o f the Roma society. What techniques of subsistence and survival do they devise in 
the state o f unemployment?
The scholar does not forget about the local institution most deeply influencing the 
local economy: the local governments (Role variants o f  local governments in the 
early nineties -  co-author: József Albert).
Reading the studies o f  Magdolna Leveleki one feels that the she is an excellent 
practitioner of the method o f interviews and case studies. This genre needs a 
researcher with empathy who does not wish to impose theories on reality, who does 
not squeeze her interviewees into the boundaries o f  prefabricated questions, who can 
weigh the received information and can see beyond the incidental features o f  the 
answers. That is how the outcome will be natural and self-evident -  as it is in 
Magdolna Leveleki’s economic sociological writings.
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IN MEMÓRIÁM ANDRÁS HEGEDŰS
Gyula Rézler
BEGINNING OF A CAREER IN SOCIOLOGY
I recall from a distance o f 55 years my first meeting with Hegedűs, the first steps he 
took in the area of sociological research and my role therein. During a short but 
eventful period of my life did our path crossed. Hegedűs did not forget either about 
our transitory relationship. When, shortly before his untimely death, he sent me a 
copy o f  his book, „The Spell o f  History and Power” he included this dedication: „To 
Rézler Gyula with thanks for the start you gave me” .
I first met András Hegedűs during the summer o f  1943. At that time, with the co­
operation o f László Szabó, I was in the process o f  setting up the Hungarian Institute 
o f  Labour Relations. In order to carry out our research plans, a need for competent 
research arose. Among others, the director of the Györffy College, an organisation 
o f  progressive students was contacted for recommending qualified graduate students 
in social sciences. András Hegedűs and Ferenc Szűcs were sent for an interview. 
Both László Szabó and m yself were impressed by their competency and their 
interest in the problems o f industrial workers. We decided that these features plus 
their analytical approach qualified them to assist us in our research activities.
W e agreed that they will participate in the initial research project of the Institute 
that attempted to investigate and measure, on the basis of a sample, amounting to 
40,000 industrial workers, the social and economic situation of the Hungarian 
industrial work force o f 600,000 (retrospectively, I fully realise that, in view o f  the 
contem porary statistical methods, a much smaller sample would have been sufficient 
to obtain the same results).
The project in which Hegedűs and Szűcs were to be involved, was described in a 
publication of the Institute that contained its mission and programmes, in the 
follow ing manner: „We cannot find a more urgent and important task than to unveil 
the real conditions of the industrial work force in Hungary. Therefore, in its first 
research project, the Institute will initiate a representative data collection based on a 
sam ple o f  40,000 workers. The purpose of this project is to learn about the social, 
econom ic and cultural conditions on the industrial workers’ population. Emphasis 
will be placed on the unit workers defined by their place o f employment rather than 
the location of their housing. This approach was decided because one should not 
disregard the impact o f the work environment on the workers which can only be 
observed within the confines o f  the plant and particularly in the workshop, within 
w hich they perform their job  daily”.
In the first phase o f the above project, Hegedűs and his colleagues attended 
m eetings where the methodology and procedures o f  the planned research were first 
discussed and later defined. On the basis o f the criteria agreed upon, an interview
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guide was constructed. In the course of the discussion, I had ample opportunity to 
observe Hegedűs’ mind in work and to recognise his analytical thought process and 
his approach to problem solving.
In the next phase o f  the research project, Hegedűs and Szűcs were charged to visit 
selected industrial sites in order to interview non-supervisory employees. 
Unfortunately, they could not conclude their jo b  because the operation o f  the 
Institute was adversely affected by the invasion o f  Hungary by the German army. 
The Institute’s research activity slowed down gradually until it was limited to a 
trickle due to the fact that its officers and employees chose to get involved in the 
anti-nazi resistance movement in one way or another.
During the summer, Hegedűs was arrested for his illegal activities in the „Peace” 
Party by the political police in his Institute office. I succeeded in warning Szűcs in 
time who was also engaged in similar political action. Thus, he avoided the ordeal 
Hegedűs went through until his successful escape from a moving train.
Needless to say, the collection of data was suspended. The interview logs were 
stored in the cellar o f the Institute. When the district wherein the Institute was 
located was occupied by the advancing Soviet troops, the billeted soldiers used the 
archives for heating purposes.
However, the project that involved Hegedűs until his capture, gave him the 
opportunity to familiarise himself with the experimental methodology of 
sociological research and, perhaps such experience contributed somewhat to his 
subsequent career in this discipline.
Hegedűs recalled his short tenure in the Institute in the following manner: 
„During the spring o f 1943, I was invited to present a lecture on the industrial 
workers in the college. Approximately, at the same time, I started working for Gyula 
Rézler who intended to continue writing his book on the history of the Hungarian 
labour movement the first volume of which covered the period ending with World 
War 1. My lecture was primarily motivated by Rézler’s publication. I recall that, 
before my presentation, I took a walk in the hills o f  Buda and hiding m yself behind 
the bushes, read loudly the text of my lecture several times. Notwithstanding, I still 
experienced a great deal o f stage-fever” (The Spell of History and Power, 
1993: 51-52).
Due to the arrest o f Hegedűs, our relationship was permanently severed. When I 
later learnt about his lucky escape from a speedy train that would have taken him to 
Sopronkőhida, where political detainees were executed, through a mutual friend I 
offered him the payment o f his salary. I am not sure if he had ever received my 
message as it was left unanswered.
Our paths diverged sharply in the coming years. He made a rapid ascendancy in 
the hierarchy o f  the Communist Party, culminating with his appointment as prime 
minister of Communist Hungary. On the other hand, I was forced by circumstances 
to illegally leave the country. However, I learnt later with a grudging respect about 
his brave opposition to the leaders o f the ruling Communist Party in a way that 
resembled to the conversion of the St. Paul on the road to Damascus. His change of 
heart enabled him to restart his career in sociology. To my best knowledge, the fruits 
o f his extensive research resulted in a number o f acclaimed books and essays.
1 believe that it is not my task to evaluate his contribution to the discipline of 
sociology. Only those contemporaries of Hegedűs who witnessed his work are in the 
position and qualified to evaluate his performance.
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Iván Szelényi
ROAD FROM STALINIST OFFICAL TO THEORIST 
OF REFORM COMMUNISM
András Hegedűs was one o f  the most important social theorists during the era of 
reform  communism in Hungary. Through his death we lost someone who 
contributed as much as any other social scientist to make life livable for millions of 
Hungarians during the last decades o f communism. We lost a socialist who never 
betrayed his faith in social justice and equality, a humanist who cared for ordinary 
people, a man of courage^ and moral integrity who was able to break with his 
Stalinist past and was willing to challenge powers, communist and post-communist 
alike for causes he believed in and was ready to take risks for standing by his 
beliefs.
I first met him in 1962. 1 was in charge of the foreign language journal collection 
o f  the Library of the Central Statistical Office and Hegedűs was appointed that year 
to become the Vice President o f  the Statistical Office.
Hegedűs just returned from his emigration from the Soviet Union. He escaped 
from Hungary during late October 1956 with other Stalinist officials. Hegedűs 
jo ined  the communist movement early in life. He was active in underground 
political activities during the war years, and rose in the ranks of the party and state 
bureaucracy fast after 1945. Hungarian communist party chief, Mátyás Rákosi liked 
him a lot -  Hegedűs even looked a little like Rákosi and for a while many 
Hungarians believed him to be Rákosi’s illegitimate son. In 1952, at the age o f  thirty 
he was appointed Minister o f  Agriculture, in 1953 he became deputy prime minister 
in the first Imre Nagy government. When Nagy was removed he took over first as 
acting prime minister, later as prime minister. The October revolution found him in 
this position. He was among the signatories o f  the document, which requested the 
Red Army to crack down on the revolution, which at that time he called counter­
revolution. He had thus good reason to escape Hungary during the revolution to seek 
asylum in the USSR. In 1957 he was still a firm believer in Stalinism and from 
M oscow  he tried to persuade the Soviets to sack Kádár and bring the „old guard” 
back. But during his Moscow emigration he soon gave up politics and began to read 
sociology and by the time he returned to Hungary during the early 1960s he had a 
basic grasp of the sociological literature. It was not quite clear where he was heading 
politically and whether or not he still had political ambitions. In 1962-63 the Kádár 
regime was searching for a new identity and orientation and it was seriously 
considering that former Stalinists, like Hegedűs may be brought back to important 
positions. Offering Hegedűs the Vice-Presidency in the Central Statistical Office 
was a step in this direction. We all believed it will be only the first step and he will 
keep rising in the party or state hierarchy.
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The rank-and-file clerks at the Central Statistical Office -  including m yself -  
were frightened by the news o f the Hegedűs appointment. We believed this to be a 
sign o f  the return o f Stalinism, and in retrospect, before 1963 it was indeed not 
obvious whether the Kádár regime will return to full scale Stalinism, or it will enter 
the reform communist trajectory, it eventually followed. Soon our opinions changed, 
however. Hegedűs did not behave like a Stalinist cadre at all. He presented him self 
as a smart, thoughtful and modest colleague and did not play the role o f  the 
communist boss. This was in sharp contrast with the style of the President. At the 
time the President o f the Statistical Office was György Péter, an able economists, 
who was one o f the early proponents of market reform. Péter’s style o f leadership, 
however, was a rather distant one. He had a cold, aristocratic style of management. 
He went home for lunch in his chauffeur driven car, did not return the greetings of 
his subordinates in the corridors but if someone did not greet him they had to face 
the consequences. Hegedűs presented himself as a very different person. He joined 
us for lunch in the cafeteria, insisted, that he stand in line, came to the library in 
person if he needed a book or a journal issue. He soon became known for his 
excellent skills of chairing meetings. He let people talk, listened carefully and 
concluded the meeting with picking the right ideas presented at the meeting, even if 
his knowledge of the subject matter was limited or nil. We did not like him, but we 
learned to respect him.
In 1963 Hegedűs faced an important choice. The government wanted to remove 
Péter from his position. The regime disliked him, since he was his own man and 
according to rumours I heard in the Statistical Office he was known to fire whoever 
was recruited by the secret police to be their informants. Now they wanted to offer 
the job  to Hegedűs. In the same year it was also decided that the Hungarian 
Academy o f Sciences would set up a tiny Sociological Research Group. Until then 
sociology was regarded as a „bourgeois pseudo-science”. They were also searching 
for a director of the research group. Hegedűs opted for the directorship o f  the tiny 
research group, and turned down the offer to become president of the Statistical 
Office, which would have guaranteed him a seat in the Council o f Ministers. On 
March 15, 1963 he left the Central Statistical office and assumed the position o f 
Director, Sociological Reséarch Group at the Hungarian Academy o f Sciences.
There were quite a few o f us who wanted a position in this research group. There 
were at that time about a dozen young men and women -  just like me -  who began 
to read sociological literature and train ourselves as sociologists. We were also 
dreaming about a research job  in the Academy o f Sciences, which at that time was a 
prestigious position.
But the Research Group started as a small venture. As far as I remember on 
March 15 1963 only Ferenc Nemes, Mária Márkus, Károly Varga and András 
Szesztay were full time researchers in the Research Group, with Hegedűs as full 
time director. During the next year or two Agnes Heller, Agnes Losonczy, András 
Gyenes, Pál Lőcsei joined the Group as well. In 1963 I got a part-time position and 
had to wait for years to be appointed full time.
The next few years were spectacularly successful for Hegedűs as a social theorist. 
Overnight he managed to become the agenda setter for all the major debates o f  the 
time. I remember four major debates; each initiated by Hegedűs and shaped by him.
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The first major debate dealt with the question o f  social structure. Hegedűs wrote a 
short book on the subject matter and that turned the theoretical debates about class 
and stratification around and paved to road to empirical research on social 
stratification and mobility, which became one o f  the strongest fields in Hungarian 
sociology. In the book Hegedűs rejected the orthodox two-class-one-stratum model 
o f  social structure advocated by Stalinist historical materialism. This theory claimed 
that there are two fundamental classes o f socialism: the working class (state 
ownership) and the peasantry (co-operative property) based on differences in forms 
o f  ownership, with the intellectuals as a middle stratum (since they cannot be clearly 
identified with either o f  the forms of ownership). Hegedűs suggested that the basis 
o f  social inequality in socialism is derived from the position in the division o f labour 
rather than from forms o f  ownership. Hegedűs him self did not conduct much 
empirical research -  his mind worked too fast, he ju st could not do all the nitty-gritty 
w ork of empirical investigation and he even despised us a little for crunching 
numbers. Still, without Hegedűs it would have been unimaginable that the kind of 
rigorous empirical research work on stratification, mobility and poverty, which was 
soon carried out by Zsuzsa Ferge first and by István Kemény and Rudolf Andorka 
later (and by Tamás Kolosi much later). The work I conducted with György Konrád 
on social inequality would have been also impossible without the opening Hegedűs 
initiated.
The second big debate, which was kicked off with an essay by Hegedűs focused 
on the question of bureaucracy. Marxist orthodoxy claimed that bureaucracy is alien 
to socialism. Kálmán Kulcsár, who was close to the Kádárist regime was aware that 
socialism is a bureaucratic society, but he coined the term „administration” to be 
able to write about the subject safely (Kulcsár was a great coiner of such „neutral” 
term s -  I gather he was the one who invented the term „people in multiple 
disadvantages” to write about „poverty”). Kulcsár also emphasised that no complex 
society was imaginable without administration. Hegedűs, like Kulcsár 
acknowledged that bureaucracy was a necessary phenomenon in modern societies 
and he did not share the program of the „anti-bureaucratic” revolution o f  Leon 
Trostky. Hegedűs, however, unlike Kulcsár and other status quo theorists, called for 
social control over the bureaucracy. He did not imply a multi-party system. He did 
not believe that a m ulti-party system was a realistic program in the 1960s in the 
Soviet block and even later he retained his reservations about „bourgeois 
democracy” as too form alistic a system. (Around this time and even much later I 
shared Hegedüs’s skepticism  about multi-party democracy. Once in the 1970s or 
early 1980s I wrote: ” [O jne party is one too many” . Hegedűs believed in direct 
democracy, he was searching to find an alternative between formal bourgeois 
democracy and Kádárist paternalistic bureaucratism.
The third debate focused on economic reform. Since 1963 Hegedűs was a 
committed economic reform er and eventually became one of the leading figures in 
the Hungarian reform movement. But his contribution to the reform debate was 
quite original. He did understand that market reform was inevitable, but he wanted 
to draw attention to the contradictions o f „humanization and optimalization.”
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Hegedűs saw it with more clarity than market reformers o f  his time that there was an 
inevitable trade-off between social equity and economic efficiency. As a committed 
socialist he did not want to sacrifice the ideal of equality and was searching for some 
reasonable compromise between equity and efficiency.
Finally, Hegedűs initiated the debate, which lasts until this very day in Hungarian 
social sciences,about „critical sociology.” Hegedűs found „socio-technic” or „social 
engineering” boring. Fashionable social science o f the time saw it its task to give 
advice to the government and the party about how to exercise power more 
effectively. In Hegedűs’ view the vocation of a social researcher was to be a critical 
analyst. In his approach that implied that the social scientists will confront the 
realities o f actually existing socialism with its ideals.
One could argue that there was nothing really new in Hegedűs’ articles and 
books. His „theories” were only interesting, when one contrasted them with the 
stupidity of the Stalinist doctrine. Since Weber it is well known that a position in the 
division of labour is an important determinant o f social status. Weber a few months 
after the October Revolution warned socialists that the new system, which was in the 
making in Soviet Russia, would be even more bureaucratic than the „iron cage” of 
capitalism. Milton Friedman was well aware of the contradictions between equality 
and efficiency. Lukács, Marcuse and Adorno wrote eloquently about the necessity of 
critical theory. Still, the Hegedűs oeuvre, which appeared in print between 1963 and 
1968 is extraordinary. No one had the courage o f Hegedűs to bring these sensitive 
questions out into the open. No one could formulate these important problems with 
greater lucidity; no one could translate these rather abstract theoretical propositions 
into concerns, which became subjects of public discourse.
Just 2-3 years after its birth the new Hungarian sociology constituted the 
intellectually most exciting „scientific field” and it attracted the attention and even 
admiration o f leading social scientist from all over the world. Parsons, Etzioni, 
Polanyi, Elihu Katz, Herbert Gans, Ferrarotti and many other leading sociologists of 
the time visited Hungary and were impressed. I acted as the translator for Talcott 
Parsons. When he departed he wrote a letter to me and expressed his astonishment 
and admiration for the quality o f ideas he found in Hungary. (He was careful enough 
to put in the letter: I don’t mean your own work, I mean the work of your 
institute.... Just to make sure I don’t start applying for jobs with his letters of 
thanks...). This was all the accomplishment of Hegedűs. After he was removed from 
his position o f director o f  the Institute of Sociology, Hungarian sociology rapidly 
fell into mediocrity and boredom.
During most of the sixties my relationship with Hegedűs was rather cold, 
occasionally almost hostile. For Hegedűs -  a populist deep in his heart -  I was the 
bourgeois boy from the Buda Hills. He was reluctant to give me a full time position 
and it was only several years after the Institute of Sociology was established that he 
called upon me -  out o f necessity since he needed a scientific secretary and I was the 
only person around with some administrative skills and talent. Not that 1 liked him 
all that much. For a long time I looked at him as the prime minister o f Mátyás 
Rákosi, the person who invited the Red Army to invade the country. Still, I was the 
one who began to change my mind about him and see him as an ally rather than as 
enemy. During the early-mid 1960s he was the chief editor of the progressive social
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science monthly journal, Valóság. Given the progressive line the journal followed 
under his editorship he was sacked, if 1 recall correctly sometime around 1965. 1 
rem em ber clearly, I had a discussion about the firing o f  Hegedűs from this position 
w ith Rudi Andorka, who at the time was a close friend o f mine. Rudi believed, and 
told me in so many words, that this was not our business, let the communists fight it 
out amongst each other. This may have been the beginning of the cooling o f my 
friendship with Andorka and my first step on the road to become a political 
dissident. From that day onward I became the ally o f  those, like Hegedűs, who 
w anted to take the regime on and I began to distance myself gradually from those, 
w ho opted for the strategy o f  „passive resistance.”
M y difference with Hegedűs was not simply one o f human „habitus.” We 
approached some of the basic questions o f the discipline differently. First and 
foremost: I was and remained to this very day an empirical sociologist. Hegedűs 
never thought much of my scholarly work, he did not like, did not value empirical, 
data driven social research.
We did not think the same way about the question o f economic reform either.
I did understand and appreciate the insights Hegedűs offered with his distinction 
between „humanization and optimálisadon”, but unlike him, 1 was more committed 
to m arket reform and even believed that more reform would increase social equality 
in socialist redistributive economies. Our views also differed about the nature of 
critical social science. In this respect Hegedűs followed Lukács’s line and in my 
judgm ent he and the members o f  the Lukács-school offered „an ideological critique” 
o f  socialism.
The critical analysis 1 practiced was instead a „critique of ideology.” In my view 
the problem with socialism was not that it did not live up to „the ideals o f  socialism” 
as Hegedűs and the Lukács-school suggested. The problem was that actually 
existing socialism was too close to its ideals. The ideal version o f socialism was 
sim ply the ideology o f socialist social order, which legitimated inequalities and 
injustices of the system.
Hegedűs finally offered me a tenured, full time job in the Institute only around 
1966. Even at that time he did this only reluctantly. Ferenc Nemes, who was the 
scientific secretary of the Institute between 1963 and 1966 was appointed Chair of 
the new sociology department at Karl Marx University o f Economics and Hegedűs 
needed a secretary. I was the only available person who appeared to have the 
administrative skills and imagination (he needed help in this respect, he was a lousy 
administration in day-to-day management). We worked together for two years, 
during this time our relationship become friendlier. We often traveled abroad and we 
drank gallons of wine together. (During those years we both drank more than we 
should have.)
In 1968 our road could have been separated. In August 1968 Ágnes Heller and 
M ária Márkus -  during the days o f the Soviet invasion o f Czechoslovakia -  were at 
a conference in Yugoslavia and they signed the „Korcula declaration” , which 
opposed, in no uncertain terms, the invasion. Upon their return the party 
organisation of the institute o f  Sociology -  Mária Márkus was party secretary -  also 
issued a statement of protest.
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1 was not a member o f  the Communist Party, but was asked by some friends to 
sign the protest statement as well. I refused. I did not see what the point was. I had 
predicted the invasion weeks before it happened. As an analyst I believed that the 
Russians would have little choice but to intervene if  they wanted to keep the Empire 
together. While I supported the ideals of the Prague Spring 1 believed that the protest 
movement couldn’t achieve its purposes, so 1 decided to stay out o f it altogether.
The leadership o f the Hungarian Communist Party was outraged. Hegedűs was 
removed as director o f  the institute and disciplinary action was taken against those 
who signed the declaration. From one day to the next I became the favorite 
sociologist o f the regime. They not only rewarded me for staying out o f  the protest 
movement, but they also decided to change their science policy. Empirical sociology 
was supported; critical social analysis of the sort Hegedűs and his colleagues stood 
for was repressed. The party leadership decided to rely on me for this transition. The 
new director, Kálmán Kulcsár (I was actively involved in picking him as the 
replacement o f Hegedűs) not only kept me on as scientific secretary, but he also 
sought my advice and for a while even followed it.
Nevertheless, after 1968 my relationship with Hegedűs and the members o f  the 
prosecuted Lukács School (Ferenc Fehér, Ágnes Heller, György Márkus, Mária 
Márkus) did not deteriorate at all, on the contrary, we became friends. I attempted to 
manage the transition from the Hegedűs to the Kulcsár „regime” without negating, 
or rejecting the earlier achievements of Hungarian sociology. My aim was to 
promote a kind o f sociology, which was based on a close integration o f  empirical 
research and social theory. 1 tried to keep Hegedűs and his colleagues in Hungarian 
social science and defended them against attacks. By the early 1970s I had to realize 
I failed as a science politician. I resigned from my administrative position, entered a 
collision course with the Kádár regime and in 1975 I was expelled from Hungary. I 
was not allowed to return until 1982 and during the past 25 years I met Hegedűs 
only a couple o f times.
After 1968 Hegedűs was quickly marginalised. He wrote no major work after he 
lost his position as director. Even dissidents turned against him. They forgot the 
important role he played as a critic and reformer during the 1960s and he was only 
remembered as the prime minister of Mátyás Rákosi.
His „autobiography” (edited by Zoltán Zsillé) created big a controversy. Hegedűs 
just loved Zsillé and he shared his innermost thoughts with him. The most 
controversial section o f the book reports on the events which took place on October 
23-25, 1956. Hegedűs claimed that he was not particularly responsible for inviting 
the Soviet troupes to invade Hungary. This was the decision o f Gerő, then first 
secretary of the Communist Party. He had to take responsibility for this decision 
only to the extent that Imre Nagy should take it as well. According to Hegedűs 
during the late afternoon, early evening he was sitting in the office o f  Gerő with 
Imre Nagy and others. Gerő did the talking and they did the listening. Gerő said, 
„Comrades, we have no alternative but to ask the Soviet comrades to help us in this 
situation.” He picked up the phone and made the tragic phone call, which later 
legitimated the Soviet action (there is little doubt the Russians would have invaded 
Hungary anyway and may have already been on their way to Budapest when the
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phone call arrived). Hegedűs claims neither he, nor Nagy said a word. He also 
claim ed that by that time he believed Nagy replaced him as prime minister anyway.
Those who are familiar with the events o f 1956 usually accuse Hegedűs o f 
falsifying history and trying to put the blame on Nagy. I don’t know. I was not in 
G erő’s office on October 23, 1956. But the Hegedűs I knew was no liar.
Nevertheless, for the rest o f his life, 1956 remained an unbearable burden. 
O ctober 23, 1956 was a „G reek” tragedy in his life, much like it was a tragedy for 
János Kádár. Kádár died the day Imre Nagy was officially rehabilitated by the 
Hungarian courts. Hegedűs died on October 23, 1999. A coincidence? For sure, but 
sym bolic too.
He lived in horrendous tim es and he was no saint, he made mistakes in his life. 
But is there any one among us who lived in this epoch and remained faultless?
He was a modest and smart man. With his essays, written in the 1960s, he created 
single handedly the new Hungarian sociology and it would have been better for the 
profession if sociology in Hungary had remained on the road opened up by Hegedűs. 
The lime may come when another generation o f  social scientists will re-read his 
work and will be inspired by his critical spirit. That would be the appropriate way to 
rem em ber him and his legacy.
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Mária Márkus
ON THE DEATH OF MY FRIEND
For almost forty years András Hegedűs has been one of my closest friends. It is thus 
the loss o f a friend that I mourn and so my g rief is a private affair, and is o f  no 
concern to anyone else.
András Hegedűs was, however, a public figure and not just on the political arena. 
He was also one o f  the most significant Hungarian sociologists. In this context, his 
loss is already a public affair, or at least a cause for common sorrow for the 
community o f  sociologists. I am sure that this sorrow and feeling of a genuine loss is 
shared by many, quite independently of their attitudes towards András as a former 
politician, a person, or even independently o f  their sympathy towards the kind of 
sociology he pursued.
It was my privilege for twenty odd years to work with him in close collaboration 
and also for many years to be his colleague at the Institute of Sociology o f  which he 
was the first director. i
There is no doubt that the establishment o f institutionalised sociology in Hungary 
is directly linked to his name. By saying that, I don’t wish to suggest that without 
András Hegedűs, some sort o f institutional form o f sociological research, like the 
Institute of Sociology (originally the „Research Group”) would not have ultimately 
emerged. After all, at that point in time, there were many people, scattered across 
different academic and other institutions, who were interested in sociology or who 
were already engaged in various sociological investigations. Also, the 
„rehabilitation” o f  sociology was not a specifically Hungarian phenomenon or 
achievement, but was taking place gradually in all Central East-European countries 
and in the former Soviet Union as an expression o f  the new „Zeitgeist” .
Nevertheless, while the establishment o f an institution for sociological research 
cannot be ascribed to Hegedűs alone, it was to a large extent due to his effort that the 
Sociological Research Group came into being. It was he, who obtained permission 
for its establishment „in exchange” for the ministerial position of Director o f  the 
Central Office o f  Statistics, originally offered to him. Not that it was a particular 
sacrifice on his part, since at this stage he has already decided never to return to 
politics and the position on offer was undoubtedly a political one. Yet, it was a step, 
which -  as it was clear for everyone involved — meant giving up a relatively stable 
position o f high prestige for an uncertain future.
More importantly, at this point in time, he has not just attempted to break with his 
political past, but also began to critically re-examine this past. Not just his own, 
personal, past and his own role, but also the past o f  the idea, the movement, and later 
the system, in the „shadow” of which his own thinking has been initially formed. To 
accomplish this task, however, he needed to create also a formal distance from the 
establishment, which he hoped to achieve by entering Academia.
I l l
In this sense, it was the result o f the confluence o f  a number of factors that it was 
Hegedűs, who ultimately established the Institute o f  Sociology and became its first 
director.
W hat kind of director he was, however, is an altogether different question. What 
he did in his position, what kind o f people he attempted to bring together in this new 
institution was not incidental. His initial recruitment policy was characterised by two 
basic principles. On the one hand, he attempted to bring into the Institute people, 
w ho have already been engaged in some sort o f  sociological investigation within 
various institutions but often in an environment not conductive, or even hostile, to 
this type o f activities. On the other hand, he attem pted to employ, or at least to 
connect to the Institute’s activities persons, with sim ilar interest who, for various 
political reasons, were excluded from the academic life and whom no other 
academ ic institution was prepared to offer employment.
These two principles were supplemented by yet another one, rooted perhaps in 
H egedűs’ own life experience: he always tried to support gifted young people with 
various social handicaps, especially those o f peasant background.
This naturally resulted in quite a mixed group, consisting of people from various 
backgrounds, with various pasts, various education, and possessing quite different 
kinds o f  knowledge and gaps in their knowledge not less different. This to some 
extent defined the nature and the scope of the Institute’s initial research and also 
influenced its very character and its modus operandi.
One could ask: how successful was Hegedűs as a director; did he succeed to forge 
a „school” or to unify this heterogeneous group around one particular vision of 
sociology?
This is neither the place nor occasion to discuss the justification for, or the role 
of, „schools” in the social sciences today. Nor is it possible to evaluate Hegedűs’ 
role in some sort o f  an „objective” way. In this respect, one’s judgm ent is 
necessarily coloured by one’s personal beliefs and experiences. What, however, can 
and ought to be said here is that at this point o f  time, the independence o f thought 
and intellectual autonomy became for him o f paramount importance and he was 
anxious to realise it not just in his own work but also in his relationships with others. 
It is thus partly due to this commitment that, as the Institute’s director, he strived to 
bring together -  both on personal and professional level -  this extremely mixed 
group o f  people in such a way that the previously mentioned heterogeneity o f  their 
knowledge, interests and opinions would not be lost in the process.
This was, in my opinion, a splendid endeavour and also -  at least so it seemed at 
the tim e -  a successful one. As members of the Institute, we tried to learn and to 
engage in sociological research together but in a way that allowed all o f us, at the 
same time, to follow our own interests and realise our own preferences.
This endeavour, however, was made increasingly difficult to sustain, mainly due 
to the external pressure from various superior bodies, which demanded that the 
Institute subordinate its scholarly work to politically derived definitions concerning 
the substance, the boundaries, and the role o f sociology, as well as prescribing its 
relationship to the various tenets o f  historical materialism.
A ndrás Hegedűs had a clear vision of what sociology meant for him and he 
form ulated it on various occasions. He was primarily and above all interested in a
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critical investigation o f  social reality. This, however, under the circumstances o f the 
time, necessarily involved an open contestation o f the politically sanctioned tenets of 
official ideology. For these reasons alone his sociology could hardly remain within 
the narrowly conceived professional boundaries. As a matter o f fact, many 
investigations of the latter type were, with relative ease, accepted and even coopted 
by the regime under the familiar slogan: ,,we do still have some deficiencies” .
This does not mean, however, that the basic principles of his critical approach 
remained unchanged during his entire sociological career. Hegedűs himself 
distinguished between two basic periods in this respect. The first, lasting from the 
beginning o f  the sixties up to 1968, and the second period after sixty eight, 
following the collapse o f  hopes for the possibility o f  reforms, transforming the 
existing regime into „socialism with human face”, when he too, like many others, 
took farewell from the reformist illusions of the past.
It is not an easy task to account for the merits and problems associated with the 
type o f sociological enquiry pursued by Hegedűs and some of his colleagues; a 
sociology which, willy-nilly, crosses over into the arena o f  political debates. 1 have 
already mentioned some justification for this approach, but to avoid any 
misunderstanding 1 have to emphasise that many sociologists who did not followed 
this path had not been coopted by the regime either. There were among Hungarian 
sociologists o f this period people whose work, though basically adhering to a 
seemingly non-political, professional framework and standards, could not be easily 
coopted, owing mainly to the selection of the issues investigated and/or the 
formulation o f research questions, which often in their own right implied a social 
critique.
This type of critique, however, did not really suit Hegedűs’ interest or 
personality. It did not suit him not because he was lacking sensitivity towards the 
critical potential o f the very formulation of the vital social problems, but rather 
because his scholarly interests went well beyond the purely professional boundaries 
o f sociology. He did not simply reject the existing system (speaking o f the time 
when he already did), but passionately willed to face, to confront, and to understand 
its history, which -  after all -  was also his own life story.
Despite the biographical aspects of this explanation, 1 don’t think that his 
approach and way o f thinking is devoid of any relevance for the later development 
of Hungarian sociology or for the younger generations o f Hungarian sociologists. 
Yet, 1 do understand that for the new generation this approach and oeuvre may 
appear „alien” or even inappropriate. Perhaps more time is needed to really 
understand this history. Also the conditions o f reaching such an understanding are 
radically different today. While the need for social reflection and critique is as 
pertinent today as it was in the past, there emerged and already function -  some 
more, some less successfully -  public forums for the political and social debates 
independent o f sociology. This undoubtedly constitutes a process o f social 
„normalisation”. Whether the impact of this development upon sociology itself is 
unambiguously positive is another question altogether and I have some serious 
doubts in this respect.
In any case, the significance and meaning o f András Hegedűs’ sociological 
heritage deserves to be rethought. I am convinced that there will come a time for the
serious analysis and evaluation o f  his sociological work and that it will bring to light 
m any valuable lessons and insights for the future.
It was the end of June 1999, when I have received András’ last letter, together 
w ith his, just published, small book of reflections under the ominous title: 
„Admonition to Survivors” . In his letter, he took a final farewell, though at that time 
I did not really comprehend it and considered it as an expression of his long-suffered 
depression, which, especially after the death of his wife, worsened dramatically.
In the book I found an aphorism which seems to reflect quite accurately András’ 
own reflection upon his life and is thus perhaps appropriate to end this brief 
reminiscence with:
„I know  I erred
but, striving for the good and the true 
it is not fair to be weighed down 
by failings of the past.”
Miklós Szabó
THE RENEGADE OF RÁKOSIST EMIGRATION
We are burying a one-time prime minister. There is no orchestra, there are no 
official wreaths. No wonder, we have lived to see several political turns, and no new 
system will bury the late premiers o f previous systems. The deceased, however, is 
not one of the many prime ministers of the second half of the 20th century whom 
even well-informed newspaper readers would be hard pressed to locate in time. 
They know who András Hegedűs was. For one thing, his premiership coincided with 
truly historic times. He was a premier who is distinctly differentiated from the heads 
o f all other governments by something. Not by his having been the youngest prime 
minister ever in Hungary, but by the fact that his renown and historical prestige were 
connected very loosely and indirectly to his one-time premiership.
From his university years his life was intertwined with many major processes and 
events of 20,h century Hungarian history. The Györffy College was the meeting 
point of the ruralist and the communist movements. Students o f the college 
constituted an important squad in the Hungarian resistance movement. Converted 
into the so called People’s College, the institute became the central institution of 
training communist leaders. Its members really had the fieldmarshal’s baton in their 
haversack. After the year o f the turn, he became first in rank among the senior 
functionaries picked for the front-line o f future party and state leaders. As a „cadre” 
of Gerő, the number two leader in the Rákosist kernel decisively shaped his political 
personality. This is what helps us to understand the immensity o f the human turn 
caused by the break with the Rákosist emigration in Moscow in 1956 which Gerő 
had just been appointed to lead. This turn made András Hegedüs’s life unique. Prior 
to that turn, however, several major events played a great role. He was a member of 
the delegation o f party leaders sent to Moscow in 1953 to receive the Soviet decision 
to replace Rákosi by Imre Nagy. When Moscow dismissed the more and more 
openly anti-Stalinist and democratically open Imre Nagy government and had the 
Hungarian party leadership issue the „March resolution” condemning Imre Nagy’s 
„June journey”, Hegedűs became the key person o f the „March resolution” line. His 
place in the new leadership can best be characetrised by his appointment to 
premiership in 1955. In this capacity, he signed the founding charter o f the Warsaw 
Pact. The line o f the „March resolution” implied a partial restoration o f the pre-1953 
state o f affairs. „Hard dictatorship”, however, did not return. The members o f the 
„March command”, among whom he was first in rank, were primarily opposed to 
the „June line”, to the NEP policy o f Imre Nagy’s government, but they no longer 
wished to implement the next period o f governance with the „old” cadres who had 
compromised themselves in the events prior to 1953. The „June command” already 
excluded Révai; Farkas also failed because he had joined Imre Nagy’s government. 
The apparatus o f the „March resolution” -  András Hegedűs, Lajos Acs, Béla Végh. 
István Hidas -  were considering the possibility o f  excluding Rákosi and Gerő, or at
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least, not passing back the helm into their hands. When in 1956 Rákosi fell, Gerő 
w anted to push Hegedűs to the fore as party chief, but he had the dignity to refuse to 
act as the microphone stand for his still idolized party leader. On the afternoon o f 
O ctober 23, it was Gerő who asked for Soviet aid on the phone, but Hegedűs agreed 
to  sign the official document sent to the Soviet government. He signed it, antedated: 
he was no longer the prem ier, but he wanted to save reluctant Imre Nagy this 
embarrassment. It was not a „gesture to Imre Nagy” but served to severe the leader 
o f  the party opposition from his following. From 1953 to October 1956 he was 
involved in important decisions. He was not the decision-maker, but he was no mere 
extra. He is not to blame for anything alone, but he is also to blame for everything.
W hen Imre Nagy’s about face o f ’56 took place -  the government went over to 
the side of the uprising -  Hegedűs left the country as a compromised member o f the 
G erő leadership. In Moscow, he was a member of the Rákosist replacement squad 
w hich the Soviet leaders held in the fire as second iron to blackmail Kádár, or, had 
K ádár refused to collaborate, to use them to set up a collaborating government. That 
w as when the historic turn cam e in his career. As the only emigrant Rákosist, he 
broke with this countercentre o f emigration which Moscow still needed to keep 
K ádár at bay and went over to  Kádár’s side in early 1957. At that point, it was not 
yet more than switching over from the losing to the winning camp. True, it was a 
lesser evil. His about-turn was not a triumphal procession. In the months of 
pacification, the Kádár leadership wanted to gloss over the continuity with the 
Rákosi regime, so his com ing from the Rákosist camp did not help. His switch was 
not given any publicity. Hegedűs became the vice president of the Statistical Office 
w ith the prospect of succeeding president György Péter, an economic reformer 
rum oured to have had „ties to Imre Nagy”.
Had this appointment taken place, he would have returned to the nomenclature in 
a leadership position -  even if  at the lowest level. Rumours spread that he kept 
dragging his foot: he would not sign anything as vice president because he had 
signed the Warsaw Pact and that made him fed up with signatures. That was a funny 
w ay o f trying to distance h im self from his past. It indicated that the break was 
serious. The deputy head o f  an important government agency joking about the 
W arsaw Pact ran risks. It revealed two human traits o f  his personality: civic courage 
w hich increasingly became the motor of his life, and humour that helped him handle 
delicate political situations. By this humorous-discrete allusion to his reservations 
concerning the policies o f  the Kádár regime he suggested he was determined to find 
a way out of the nomenclature. He could take this step when he became the leader of 
the sociological research group, and later, the head o f the institute his efforts helped 
create. The regime wished to  use him. He was entrusted with guarding Marxist 
sociology permitted to exist very reluctantly so that the regime could turn down 
Sándor Szalai who was regarded as far more dangerous. But the Kádár regime 
proved to be wrong. Soon he caused them more trouble as a sociologist than anyone 
else would have. I met him first as the leader o f the sociological research group, 
m yse lf also an associate o f  an institute of the Academy located in the Castle district. 
He held lectures to the researchers of other sister institutes o f the Academy, all 
based in the Castle area, in order to have sociology, which was still fighting for 
survival, officially acknowledged. He held lectures in an easy-going manner, not in
the usual party lingo, which was so hard to swallow. He did not talk about why 
sociology must be based on Marxism but about what everyone was truly interested 
in hearing from him: Why he broke with Gerö and his clique in Moscow in October- 
November 1956. He answered the questions we did not dare to ask. He brilliantly 
connected it to sociology. He told us that he, who had been interested in sociology 
as a university student, changed over to this branch o f  research as a civil profession 
in Moscow. Around that time some awkward steps were taken in the Soviet Union 
too to concoct a sort o f Marxist imitation sociology. I still remember Comrade 
Changli. He described her as a sort o f commissary of party-governed Soviet 
sociology for whom sociology meant using questionnaires to inquire into the secrets 
o f  the „асе-workers” and to find out about the Stahanovites’ success. He said he had 
called sheer party propaganda „changliese” . In his lecture popularising sociology he 
said that the „Changli experience” was the last straw that deterred him from his 
previous party alignment. That was a wink at us since he was clearly aware o f  our 
political stance. These lectures were feelers towards a base, and this base was 
already outside the bastion o f Kádárism. The lecture exposed his sense o f  humour 
and his ability to use humour for political goals.
Another memory o f Hegedűs I still cherish from that time reveals another 
important human trait o f his personality which was also part of his being as a 
politician. The personnel o f academic institutions in the Castle district had lunch in a 
huge self-service restaurant. Once 1 happened to get a place at the table o f  the 
sociological group. Director Hegedűs was having lunch there surrounded by young 
female administrators and several young researchers. A cordial chat was going on 
without any hierarchic tension. For his young colleagues he was a jo lly  and 
humorous collaborator, not the director who is the „boss” even in merry-making. I 
suddenly realised that the lunch groups o f the other academic institute heads were 
like the courts o f Louis XIV compared to that o f  Hegedűs. His intimacy and easy­
going ways with people were the main strengths o f  his political influence.
He left the Rákosist boat at the moment when it started to sink, but he turned 
against the Kádár regime when it was on the peak, in the mid-sixties. It was a sign o f 
dissent when as a leading Marxist sociologist, he argued that Djilasiades and his 
work still provided important insights into the interpretation of bureaucracy as a 
power factor. He became the advocate for workers’ self-government of the Yugoslav 
type. When the committee for the new economic mechanism was set up Hegedűs 
was made responsible for the subcommittee in charge o f workers’ self-government; 
and he managed to sneak elements o f workers’s participation into the reform 
package.
Nineteen-sixty-eight offered him the opportunity to go over to the side of 
dissenting intellectuals. As the party representative and head of a state institute, he 
protested against the intervention in Czechoslovakia at the Central Committee o f  the 
party. The „Trial o f the Lesser Philosphers” removed him from public view in 1972. 
From then on he belonged to the growing number o f opposition intellectuals. He 
joined in the activities o f the democratic opposition from the late ’70s. He signed 
protest sheets, gave biographical interviews compiled intó a book to emigrant 
activists o f the opposition which the Hungarian public could only get acquainted 
with from a series o f broadcasts by Free Europe radio, and he held lectures at the
M onday Free University. He was in search of possible ways for direct democracy. 
He became an advocate for political pluralism but he couldn’t come to terms with its 
classical western variant, the system of many parties. We, the members o f the 
opposition at the time, argued with him, learning a lot from the experience o f  a 
fellow fighter who knew the measured operation o f power from the inside.
At the great political turn of 1989-90 he d idn’t even try to join in the 
reorganisation efforts o f  the socialist party. Not jo ining any side, he drifted o ff the 
mainstream, to the margins o f  the transformation. Heroes emerging from obscurity, 
who were nowhere near the intellectual resistance to the Kádár regime o f which he 
was a weighty figure, spotted the one-time party-dictated prime minister in him. 
M aybe these people were really ignorant o f the fact that András Hegedűs dared to 
speak up when they held th^ir mouths tightly shut. His humour, love o f life and 
humanity helped him overcome the anguish o f being neglected in the past ten years. 
His W orkers’ Academy did not fit in the political style after the change, but it 
exemplifies that there is more than one style for a democratic transformation.
We are taking farewell o f  a public figure who has jumped over his shadow. We 
are giving him his place in our private pantheons convinced that he will get his due 
place in the pantheon o f historical memory.
(Delivered on November 12, 1999, in the Farkasrét cemetery)
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